UKRAINE: DNSA CROUCH'S NATO-THEMED DINNER INCLUDES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIEV 001639 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: DNSA CROUCH'S NATO-THEMED DINNER INCLUDES A SPICY SERVING OF RADA COALITION TALK Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) At an April 19 NATO-themed dinner in honor of Deputy National Security Adviser Crouch, Defense Minister Hrytsenko and Foreign Minister Tarasyuk politely disagreed over the attitudes toward NATO of PM-hopeful Yuliya Tymoshenko, the Socialist Party, and Party of Regions. They also disagreed over the best tactics for forging a workable Rada majority coalition between President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine (OU), Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT),and the Socialists. Hrytsenko vouched for Tymoshenko's NATO bone fides and said it was possible to work with or around the Socialists; Tarasyuk discounted Tymoshenko's newfound pro-NATO rhetoric and suggested the ex-PM Yanukovych-led Regions would be easier to deal with on NATO than the Socialists. Coalition possibilities rather than foreign and security policies dominated the discussion. Tarasyuk, who as head of the Rukh party sits on OU's Political Council, took the party line in criticizing Tymoshenko and advocating full negotiation of a programmatic and rules-based coalition agreement before positions could be discussed. Hrytsenko was more conciliatory, stressing the need to move beyond the public posturing and finger pointing that had been the norm since April 14 and resume direct daily coalition discussions. Deputy Foreign Minister Buteyko wryly commented that the ultimate spur to clinch a coalition deal would be having the clock reach 2345 hours on the 60th and final day for a coalition government to be formed (i.e., by 60 days after the new Rada opens its session and the sitting government divests itself, per the constitution, or as many as 90 days from today). FM Tarasyuk suggested a government should be formed by late June; DefMin Hrytsenko thought it would be sooner. ¶2. (C) Comment: It was striking that FM Tarasyuk, who previously has been an olive-branch wielding proponent of Orange reconciliation dating back to September 2005 in the aftermath of the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government, sounded more like Our Ukraine's leading anti-Tymoshenko voice Poroshenko in criticizing Tymoshenko and outlining what would be necessary to make the Orange coalition work. While Tarasyuk said an Orange coalition would eventually form, his tone and body language left his sympathies in doubt. In contrast, Hrytsenko who claimed to be non-partisan (and formally belongs to no party),clearly leaned in sympathies toward Tymoshenko and more forcefully made the case for resolving differences and reaching agreement sooner rather than later. End summary and comment. ¶3. (SBU) Ambassador hosted a dinner April 19 in honor of Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser J.D. Crouch II. In attendance were Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and First Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential representative for NATO issues Anton Buteyko. Also attending for the U.S. side were Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs Judith Ansley, Director for Central, Eastern and Northern European Affairs Damon Wilson, Director for Media and Communications Colby Cooper, Executive Assistant Brian Naranjo, Embassy acting DATT, and Deputy Political Counselor (notetaker). NATO appetizers: Actions, Outreach, and Party Positions -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) DNSA Crouch noted that some members of NATO were skeptical of expansion in general, without reference to the qualifications of specific aspirant countries. While such sentiments had not yet reached the depths of Euro-pessimism that touched the EU, they would affect the dynamics of consideration of Ukraine's aspirations, particularly if Ukrainian public sentiment for NATO membership remained low. Tangible, visible efforts and results were needed to spur momentum; the U.S. was ready to help. DefMin Hrytsenko responded that it was up to Ukraine to produce results. After a nearly continuous election cycle with alternating parliamentary and presidential elections in 1998, 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2006, Ukraine now had a breathing space of nearly four years before the next planned election (note: presidential, in fall 2009). The new government could now govern and show results, rather than positioning for the next election. ¶5. (C) DefMin Hrytsenko made a pitch for NATO allies not to use low Ukrainian public support for NATO as an obstacle to Ukrainian membership if Ukraine met all performance standards. FM Tarasyuk mentioned that he had spent the previous two-and-a-half hours in a meeting with Ukrainian NGOs talking exclusively about NATO, though the meeting had KIEV 00001639 002 OF 004 been called to focus on both NATO and EU aspirations. Tarasyuk had engaged the NGO representatives on how better to streamline interaction between NGOs and the MFA, MoD, and Government Committees on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, particularly in reinforcing joint efforts for an information campaign and outreach to Ukrainian society. ¶6. (C) Hrytsenko stressed that he continued to push forward on reform and related decisions on an accelerated basis, without waiting for all the formalities: for example, recently switching the General Staff to a NATO-compatible J-staff structure; moving defense resource management along Robert McNamara lines, rather than the Soviet-style approaches Ukraine had inherited; signing a strategic airlift agreement with NATO; self-funding the Ukrainian mission in Kosovo; offering strategic airlift for NATO support of the African Union mission in Darfur; and securing a Cabinet of Ministers decision April 19 to authorize the transfer of large-caliber ammunition to Iraqi Defense Forces, similar to the December 2005 decision to transfer equipment used by the Ukrainian contingent in Iraq to Iraqi authorities. He felt holding up a decision on possible Ukrainian membership until Ukraine achieved 50-percent public support for NATO was a wrong approach. DFM Buteyko said that a positive signal to Ukraine on MAP (Membership Action Plan) at the April 27-28 Sofia NATO Ministerial would help Ukraine in its domestic debate on NATO. ¶7. (C) Hrytsenko emphasized that President Yushchenko had clearly stated that Euro-Atlantic integration was the basis for Ukrainian foreign policy. Neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych knew much about NATO; both would focus on energy, social policy, and other domestic issues in a coalition government. Buteyko was the Government of Ukraine (GOU)'s interagency coordinator on NATO issues and had just chaired the first interagency meeting. The MFA and MoD already had their action plans prepared; the goal was to have a unified GOU action plan for all ministries drawn up by June, written in form in the same way a MAP would be structured. ¶8. (C) DNSA Crouch mentioned that ex-PM Tymoshenko, in a meeting earlier April 19, had made positive statements regarding NATO and claimed there was little difference between her position and that of Yushchenko's (septel). FM Tarasyuk acerbically replied: "She is good at saying things which turn out to be too good to be true." Looking back at the early Cabinet meetings under PM Tymoshenko in February-March 2005, Tarasyuk said, Tymoshenko had urged him, "Borys, please do not mention NATO." Hrytsenko interjected, "But she learned from us over the year." Tarasyuk shot back, "She knows what others expect her to say." DNSA Crouch observed that Tymoshenko's April 17 AmCham speech may not have been perfect or complete, but was her best statement yet on economic policy. ¶9. (C) DNSA Crouch described his NATO-related exchange with Party of Regions leader Yanukovych, in which he had urged Yanukovych to keep options open regardless of whether Regions ended up in opposition or government; there was no need to turn up the rhetoric that marked the campaign (septel). A reserved Yanukovych had said little but seemed amenable to keeping options open. Tarasyuk noted that when Yanukovych had been PM under Kuchma (November 2002-December 2004), Regions' Rada faction had voted unanimously in favor of NATO-related legislation and policies, without reservations; that applied to the SPDU(o) party of then-Kuchma chief of staff Medvedchuk as well. Hrytsenko added that it was fortunate that the SPDU(o) and Natalya Vitrenko's People's Opposition bloc, which had both run in the March 2006 parliamentary elections primarily on an anti-NATO, pro-Russia platform, had done poorly and failed to make it over the three-percent threshold into the next Rada. Crouch asked if this were due to the NATO issue or other causes. Hrytsenko judged other factors had been more decisive. ¶10. (C) Tarasyuk suggested that the Socialists were actually more difficult to deal with on NATO issues than Regions. Hrytsenko demurred, saying that the Socialists cared most about economic issues; the Socialists in fact had supported all necessary reforms and legal measures related to NATO, including peacekeeping operations, Partnership for Peace, interoperability, additional Kosovo budget, security sector reform, and so on. The Socialist problem arose theoretically in the Rada if a bill appeared too NATO-oriented; Hrytsenko suggested there were workarounds, and that much progress could be made over the next two years without a crisis decision point. In any event, the Socialists would have much to lose by threatening a walkout, since they had no interest in returning to the opposition. Tarasyuk said that he had reached out to a Socialist International and European Parliament figure and former Polish President Kwasniewski to KIEV 00001639 003 OF 004 engage Moroz on NATO issues. ¶11. (C) DNSA Crouch asked whether the new government would be strongly in favor of launching MAP no matter what its composition. As the U.S. engaged allies, it was important to know Ukraine's unequivocal intent, particularly if the government coalition contained parties that were not fully pro-NATO. Given the skepticism on expansion in general, it would be important for the new GOU to state clearly that MAP and membership were definite goals. Hrytsenko said yes. Tarasyuk grimaced while remaining silent. Hrytsenko said that the GOU was aware of the reluctance of France to approve a MAP for Ukraine and would work with central European friends like Slovakia and Hungary on outreach to skeptics. Main course: Spicy coalition fare -------------- ¶12. (C) Tarasyuk then switched hats from that of Foreign Minister to that of a leader of Rukh, one of six parties in the Our Ukraine (OU) bloc, and a member of OU's seven-person Political Council. He stated that Yushchenko and the OU Political Council saw no alternative to an Orange coalition but were determined to insist on negotiating a policy document prior to discussion of positions. The Socialists' three ministers in the Tymoshenko and Yekhanurov governments in 2005-06 had never challenged Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic course, making Socialist leader Moroz' insistence during recent negotiations on striking mention of NATO in the coalition document all the more strange. Tymoshenko cared only about becoming Prime Minister, he said; the policy substance of the coalition document mattered little to her. Our Ukraine wanted to resolve the potential policy disputes now, before moving forward with filling positions and forming the government; otherwise the coalition would collapse in short order. Tarasyuk identified Yushchenko's red line issues as NATO, land privatization, and reprivatization. Tarasyuk suggested there was a workable formula on NATO for the Socialists: the existing Law on the Fundamentals of National Security already endorsed NATO and EU membership as guiding principles. ¶13. (C) Hrytsenko, who had served as policy planning chief for Yushchenko's 2004 presidential campaign and prior to that directed the Razumkov Center, one of Ukraine's leading policy think tanks, gently disagreed on the wisdom of setting up too specific economic performance targets in the coalition document. No Ukrainian leader could meet a proposed 8% GDP growth target, given looming showdowns with Russia over the natural gas contract and ballooning social payments. The key was that Tymoshenko would sign nearly anything OU proposed if OU would agree on her becoming PM. DNSA Crouch asked Tarasyuk if OU was prepared to take that step. Without answering directly, Tarasyuk reverted to the OU standard line: first, agreement on the policy and rules documents, then on positions. ¶14. (C) While sorting out policies first was formally a good procedure, Hrytsenko allowed, current coalition formation dynamics suggested ulterior agendas were at work. OU leaders were also thinking about positions. Hrytsenko stated that those in OU who were pushing for 50 objectives to be included in the coalition document were the same people who did not want Tymoshenko as PM. Likewise, Tymoshenko was drawing her own redlines, stating that she would refuse to work in government with certain OU figures. Tarasyuk claimed that the situation was actually worse; while Tymoshenko was accusing OU of meeting with Regions, OU knew that she had met with Regions strategist Andriy Klyuyev three times in the past week. Furthermore, he alleged she was in contact with Moscow through an SPDU(o) proxy. (Note: This recalls a similar OU charge brought up consistently since September 2005, in the wake of Tymoshenko's dismissal, when she made a quick visit to Moscow.) ¶15. (C) Having slammed Tymoshenko as cavorting with Regions and the Kremlin, Tarasyuk caveated his criticism by stating that OU was "sincere" in doing its best to create an Orange coalition. The two main obstacles were personal ambitions (Tymoshenko) and differences in substance, particularly with the Socialists on foreign policy. Hrytsenko retorted that the programmatic differences between the parties were being exaggerated. Tarasyuk, claiming to be an optimist, predicted that OU, BYuT and the Socialists would be able to agree on a program and on who would serve as PM. He added, "I do not rule out Tymoshenko as PM." OU wanted neither a "white" coalition with Regions nor Tymoshenko in opposition, he stressed. ¶16. (C) DNSA Crouch pressed on how OU, BYuT and the Socialists could move beyond what appeared to be a Ukrainian KIEV 00001639 004 OF 004 political version of the chicken-and-egg dilemma. DFM Buteyko wryly commented that the ultimate spur to clinch a coalition deal would be having the clock reach 2345 on the 60th and final day for a coalition to be formed (note: after convening of the new Rada, which would put establishment of a new government potentially into July). Hrytsenko saw two options: Tarasyuk could convince his skeptical OU colleagues to accept Tymoshenko as PM, or, less likely, someone could convince Tymoshenko to accept a technocratic PM on the grounds that a coalition might collapse later in 2006, which would leave her out of office and out of the Rada until the next election. ¶17. (C) The immediate problem, maintained Hrytsenko, was the lack of any discussion or meetings on a daily basis between the three parties. Revealing that he had stopped by Our Ukraine's headquarters on his way to dinner to talk to OU Chairman and lead negotiator Roman Bezsmertny, Hrytsenko said that he had advised Bezsmertny to get together with Tymoshenko outside Kiev informally, for coffee, out of the public eye, to break the current cycle of the parties using the media to level charges and accusations, complicating relations without offering solutions. The lack of any contact for the past five days (note: since People's Union Our Ukraine's Executive Council rejected a key part of the April 13 coalition protocol) was a real problem, Hrytsenko maintained; there needed to be daily contact and discussion. ¶18. (C) NSC Director Wilson expressed concern that the Ukrainian detractors of democracy and a Euro-Atlantic course would benefit from the Orange team falling apart a second time, reinforcing their case for the need for "stability" above other considerations. Hrytsenko took issue with the underlying assumptions. Yanukovych and Regions had not benefited from the 2005 Orange divorce, he claimed, securing little more than two-thirds of Yanukovych's 2004 vote (32 to 44 percent) and seeing other parties eat away at their base. Regions of course awaited the second collapse of Team Orange and no doubt would seek to pick off votes in the Rada. Hrytsenko suggested, however, that Tymoshenko herself was also a master of tactics in this regard, knowing how to use the influence and power of the PM's office to motivate MPs to vote. In the aftermath of the loss of criminal immunity for local and provincial council deputies, Hrytsenko maintained that regional officials would be far less brave in challenging central authorities. ¶19. (U) DNSA Crouch cleared this cable. ¶20. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Herbst