UKRAINE: DELIVERABLES FOR GUAM SUMMIT, NSDC AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001107

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM EUN ENRG PGOV PINR RS AZ GG MD UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: DELIVERABLES FOR GUAM SUMMIT, NSDC AND
TRANSNISTRIA

REF: A. BAKU 431


B. STATE 43368

C. KIEV 1025

Classified By: Political Counselor Aubrey A. Carlson for reasons 1.4(b,
d)


1. (C) Summary: According to a National Security and Defense
Council (NSDC) staff official, the May GUAM summit aims to
feature agreements to enhance regional energy security and
cooperation in solving "frozen conflicts." The official
opined that NSDC Secretary Kinakh's visit to Moscow might
have influenced Russia to apply pressure on the Transnistrian
authorities to lift the closure of the Transnistrian border.
End summary.

GUAM
--------------


2. (C) Over lunch March 21, National Security and Defense
Council staff official Roman Rukomeda told us he and his
Ukrainian government colleagues were working on preparations
for the May GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova)
summit in Kiev, when the member countries expected to
formalize a decision to establish GUAM as a regional
organization. While membership would be open to other
countries, Rukomeda commented that a decision had been taken
not to change the name. GUAM's potential contribution to
frozen conflicts was an obvious agenda item, since frozen
conflicts directly involved three member countries (Moldova
with Transnistria, Georgia with North Ossetia and Abkhazia,
and Azerbaijan with Nagorno-Karabakh) and Ukraine
participated in the Transnistria settlement process.


3. (C) Rukomeda continued that the Ukrainian government hoped
the GUAM summit would also address energy security. One
possible summit deliverable could be an Azerbaijani
commitment to supply crude oil for the Odesa-Brody pipeline,
but the Azerbaijanis were balking. Rukomeda said the
Azerbaijanis were beholden to Russia, so were reluctant to
enter into arrangements to deliver oil and natural gas that
avoided transiting Russia. (Note: See ref A for background
on Azerbaijan government efforts, and the problems it
confronts, to put an arrangement in place to deliver oil from
Kazakhstan to points westward.) He asked for USG assistance
in persuading Azerbaijan to be more flexible. Drawing on EB
A/S Wayne's address to the NATO North Atlantic Council (ref
B),we noted that the USG in principle welcomed efforts by
countries and organizations to diversify energy supplies and
thereby enhance energy security. Rukomeda also said the GUAM
summit was likely to include an arrangement for a
"Trans-Danube energy bridge," which would be Ukraine's
agreement to further supply electricity to Moldova. He said
this agreement could be implemented relatively quickly,
within three to four years.

TRANSNISTRIA
--------------


4. (C) Rukomeda said NSDC Secretary Anatoliy Kinakh's visit
to Moscow and Kinakh's March 15 meeting with Russian Security
Council Secretary Igor Ivanov might have been a factor that
led to Transnistria's surprise decision to partially lift the
closing of its border with Ukraine that it implemented
following Ukraine's implementation of a customs protocol with
Moldova. (Note: NSDC press service said the two officials
agreed "to step up cooperation in monitoring the
(Transnistria) stretch of the Ukraine-Moldova border in order
to check contraband and illegal migration and improve the
material and technical equipment of the border.") Kinakh had
provided detailed information to Ivanov on the number and
kind of vehicles stopped at the border checkpoints and the
discussions at the five-plus-two negotiations to refute
Transnistrian claims that Ukraine had imposed a blockade and
done so without advance notification of its intent. (Note:
In the event, any positive impact from Kinakh's visit did not
last long. According to media reports, the Russian Ministry
of Emergency Situations announced March 21 that it would send
200 tons of humanitarian assistance to Transnistria. Russian
Duma chairman Boris Gryzlov piously hoped the Ukrainian
authorities would not hamper delivery of the assistance to
Transnistria. Ukrainian DFM Veselovsky characterized to the
media the Russian "humanitarian assistance" as nothing more
than "propaganda and an act of provocation" since
Transnistria had no need for emergency deliveries of food and
medicine.)


5. (C) Rukomeda said the Ukrainian government remained
acutely aware that 6,000 residents of Transnistria held
Ukrainian passports and that Transnistria still might

KIEV 00001107 002 OF 002


engineer an incident to embarrass Ukraine. He commented that
the Transnistrian decision to shut down a hydropower station
that supplied electricity to Odesa for "maintenance" was
probably a Transnistrian attempt to pressure Ukraine. He
said the Ukrainian electric power authority would be readily
able to reroute electricity to Odesa to compensate for any
shortfall from Transnistria, however.

BIO NOTE
--------------


6. (C) Rukomeda hails from Zhitomyr, but has lived in Kiev
since his university studies at the prestigious Kiev-Mohyla
Academy. After graduation, he worked as a professional
member of the Institute for International Security Problems,
the NSDC in-house think-tank. In August 2005, he transferred
to the main NSDC organization, where he has responsibility in
NSDC for GUAM and the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC)
and has geographic coverage of the Caucasus, Central Asia,
and the Middle East. Rukomeda mentioned that his broad
portfolio resulted from two vacancies in his three-person
office. He did not expect the vacant positions to be filled
until after the March 26 parliamentary elections. Although
Kinakh has said he wanted to continue as NSDC Secretary,
Rukomeda noted that Kinakh might be replaced and his
replacement would want to bring in his own team. As a career
employee, Rukomeda expected to continue on at NSDC. Rukomeda
was an exchange student in Spokane, Washington, in 1994.


7. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst