UKRAINE: DELIVERABLES FOR GUAM SUMMIT, NSDC AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001107 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016 TAGS: PREL KDEM EUN ENRG PGOV PINR RS AZ GG MD UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: DELIVERABLES FOR GUAM SUMMIT, NSDC AND TRANSNISTRIA REF: A. BAKU 431 ¶B. STATE 43368 ¶C. KIEV 1025 Classified By: Political Counselor Aubrey A. Carlson for reasons 1.4(b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: According to a National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) staff official, the May GUAM summit aims to feature agreements to enhance regional energy security and cooperation in solving "frozen conflicts." The official opined that NSDC Secretary Kinakh's visit to Moscow might have influenced Russia to apply pressure on the Transnistrian authorities to lift the closure of the Transnistrian border. End summary. GUAM -------------- ¶2. (C) Over lunch March 21, National Security and Defense Council staff official Roman Rukomeda told us he and his Ukrainian government colleagues were working on preparations for the May GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) summit in Kiev, when the member countries expected to formalize a decision to establish GUAM as a regional organization. While membership would be open to other countries, Rukomeda commented that a decision had been taken not to change the name. GUAM's potential contribution to frozen conflicts was an obvious agenda item, since frozen conflicts directly involved three member countries (Moldova with Transnistria, Georgia with North Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan with Nagorno-Karabakh) and Ukraine participated in the Transnistria settlement process. ¶3. (C) Rukomeda continued that the Ukrainian government hoped the GUAM summit would also address energy security. One possible summit deliverable could be an Azerbaijani commitment to supply crude oil for the Odesa-Brody pipeline, but the Azerbaijanis were balking. Rukomeda said the Azerbaijanis were beholden to Russia, so were reluctant to enter into arrangements to deliver oil and natural gas that avoided transiting Russia. (Note: See ref A for background on Azerbaijan government efforts, and the problems it confronts, to put an arrangement in place to deliver oil from Kazakhstan to points westward.) He asked for USG assistance in persuading Azerbaijan to be more flexible. Drawing on EB A/S Wayne's address to the NATO North Atlantic Council (ref B),we noted that the USG in principle welcomed efforts by countries and organizations to diversify energy supplies and thereby enhance energy security. Rukomeda also said the GUAM summit was likely to include an arrangement for a "Trans-Danube energy bridge," which would be Ukraine's agreement to further supply electricity to Moldova. He said this agreement could be implemented relatively quickly, within three to four years. TRANSNISTRIA -------------- ¶4. (C) Rukomeda said NSDC Secretary Anatoliy Kinakh's visit to Moscow and Kinakh's March 15 meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov might have been a factor that led to Transnistria's surprise decision to partially lift the closing of its border with Ukraine that it implemented following Ukraine's implementation of a customs protocol with Moldova. (Note: NSDC press service said the two officials agreed "to step up cooperation in monitoring the (Transnistria) stretch of the Ukraine-Moldova border in order to check contraband and illegal migration and improve the material and technical equipment of the border.") Kinakh had provided detailed information to Ivanov on the number and kind of vehicles stopped at the border checkpoints and the discussions at the five-plus-two negotiations to refute Transnistrian claims that Ukraine had imposed a blockade and done so without advance notification of its intent. (Note: In the event, any positive impact from Kinakh's visit did not last long. According to media reports, the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations announced March 21 that it would send 200 tons of humanitarian assistance to Transnistria. Russian Duma chairman Boris Gryzlov piously hoped the Ukrainian authorities would not hamper delivery of the assistance to Transnistria. Ukrainian DFM Veselovsky characterized to the media the Russian "humanitarian assistance" as nothing more than "propaganda and an act of provocation" since Transnistria had no need for emergency deliveries of food and medicine.) ¶5. (C) Rukomeda said the Ukrainian government remained acutely aware that 6,000 residents of Transnistria held Ukrainian passports and that Transnistria still might KIEV 00001107 002 OF 002 engineer an incident to embarrass Ukraine. He commented that the Transnistrian decision to shut down a hydropower station that supplied electricity to Odesa for "maintenance" was probably a Transnistrian attempt to pressure Ukraine. He said the Ukrainian electric power authority would be readily able to reroute electricity to Odesa to compensate for any shortfall from Transnistria, however. BIO NOTE -------------- ¶6. (C) Rukomeda hails from Zhitomyr, but has lived in Kiev since his university studies at the prestigious Kiev-Mohyla Academy. After graduation, he worked as a professional member of the Institute for International Security Problems, the NSDC in-house think-tank. In August 2005, he transferred to the main NSDC organization, where he has responsibility in NSDC for GUAM and the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) and has geographic coverage of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Rukomeda mentioned that his broad portfolio resulted from two vacancies in his three-person office. He did not expect the vacant positions to be filled until after the March 26 parliamentary elections. Although Kinakh has said he wanted to continue as NSDC Secretary, Rukomeda noted that Kinakh might be replaced and his replacement would want to bring in his own team. As a career employee, Rukomeda expected to continue on at NSDC. Rukomeda was an exchange student in Spokane, Washington, in 1994. ¶7. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Herbst