UN A/SG ANNABI: SUDAN TO DEFER UN ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000953

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/SPF, AF/RSA, AND IO
ABUJA FOR AMB HUME

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: UN A/SG ANNABI: SUDAN TO DEFER UN ASSESSMENT
MISSION UNTIL AFTER DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT REACHED

REF: A. KHARTOUM 00912

B. ADDIS ABABA 01003

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Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (b) AND
(d)


1. (C) Summary: During an April 19 briefing of the
diplomatic community, UN A/SG for PKO Annabi said that Sudan
had indicated it would not permit a UN assessment team to
visit to plan a peacekeeping transition from the AU to the UN
until after a Darfur peace agreement was reached. Sudan
feels under pressure and resents the perceive lack of
consultation; Annabi responded that the UN did not seek to
occupy, but to build a peace operation. Sudanese government
officials also raised concerns about the ICC and UN
operations being a NATO Trojan horse; Sudan prefers a
post-peace agreement arrangement, much like UNMIS, which
followed the Naivasha accords. UN SRSG Pronk advised Charge
in an aside that an early UN assessment was not necessary; UN
and AMIS representatives already in-country could carry out
the required planning. End summary.

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Addis Ababa: "Useful Exchanges" with African Union
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2. (C) In an April 19 briefing of the diplomatic corps at the
UN compound in Khartoum, UN Assistant Secretary General of
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi stated
that he had met on April 13 with African Union officials
regarding preparations for UN peace-keeping operations in
Darfur. The meetings, which included Special Representatives
Konare and Djinnit, affirmed the AU's readiness to work
closely with the UN in the "possible transition." This
includes strengthening the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from
the present through September. The parties also agreed to
set up a joint liaison group in El Fasher to address
technical aspects, with larger issues on the transformation
left to the headquarters level.

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Annabi: UN Not in Business of Occupying Countries
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3. (C) Annabi said that he had met on April 14 and 15 with
Presidential Advisor Mansour Khalid, Foreign Minister Lam
Akol, National Intelligence and Security Services Director
Salah Ghosh, and Presidential Advisor Mustafa Ismail, and
President Bashir. He followed this with a visit on April 17
to Juba, where he met with Government of Southern Sudan
(GoSS) Vice President Riek Machar and Presidential Advisor
Pagan Amum (Note: GoSS President Salva Kiir was in Yei. End
note.) Annabi's message to Sudan was that the "UN is not in
the business of occupying countries," that it carries out
peace operations. He pointed out that the UN already had
8,900 troops in Sudan (UNMIS),which would rise to 10,000 by
the end of May.


4. (C) Annabi said that the UN had something similar in mind
for Darfur; preparations to do so required sending as
assessment team to Darfur to do a "detailed on the ground
assessment." He estimated that this would take an
interdisciplinary team of perhaps 35-40 individuals 10-14
days. He said he was working backward from September to put
in place a series of measures; this requires an "early
study." The study would lead to recommendations to the
UNSYG, in turn he would recommend a course of action to the
UN Security Council and they would decide on a mandate. Only
with a mandate known, would TCCs come forward. Annabi also
said that any eventual UN force in Darfur would retain an
"African core," and that it would not deprive the current
UNMIS operation of resources.

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Sudanese Anxieties: Occupation, ICC, NATO Trojan Horse
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5. (C) President Bashir told Annabi that he was against an
early UN assessment mission to Sudan. (Note: when asked in
a the follow-on question and answer period whether Bashir had
indicated a willingness for UN presence after a peace
agreement, Annabi and Pronk said that Sudanese leaders had
indicated acceptance of such as an eventuality. End note.)
Annabi said that FM Akol had said much the same, although he
was in more of a listening mode regarding the UN's intentions
for proceeding on a possible transition. Annabi added that
he had patiently explained the nature and intent of UN
operations, including ensuring its freedom of movement and
its mandate, which would have elements of both Chapter 6 and

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7.


6. (C) Annabi said that Sudanese government officials
expressed concern about the extensive press coverage of UN
interest in becoming involved in Darfur, and felt a distinct
lack of consultation. Sudanese government officials also
evinced anxieties about the UN occupying Sudan, and giving
the wrong signal to rebels now negotiating in Abuja. They
also expressed concern that the UN troops with in effect
present a "NATO Trojan horse." Their concerns also included
the notion that the UN would "go on a wild goose chase"
looking for individuals on the International Criminal Court's
wanted list. Annabi said he had denied this intention, and
reinforced that no action would be taken at the "expense of
peace." He likened that aspect of the situation to efforts
to reach peace in Sierra Leone.


7. (C) Annabi concluded that Sudan would not permit a UN
assessment mission to visit until a peace settlement on
Darfur had been first reached in Darfur. This result will be
covered in his April 26 briefing to the UN Security Council.


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Pronk Pull-Aside: He and UNPKO Disagree
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8. (C) UN SRSG Pronk told Charge privately at the end of the
meeting that he disagrees with Annabi and the UNPKO
"bureaucracy" on the necessity for an early UN assessment
mission. He said Darfur operations had already been assessed
various times, that the UN and AMIS have the personnel here
who can do a lot of work now, and we should not waste further
time on this matter. He said the size of the mission (30
plus) is also silly, as "all of these UN agencies already
have reps here on the ground." He added that the U.S. should
quit pushing on the visas: it will just antagonize the
Sudanese government more by putting it in a corner, and, in
any case, an early assessment mission is unnecessary.


9. (C) Asked whether he had made any progress on this issue
with his colleague Annabi, he said, yes, a bit. Annabi was
now talking about an assessment that would "fine-tune" work
that could already have been completed earlier. Pronk
confirmed what we had heard from AMIS the day before: that
work was now starting on transition with UN and AMIS
representatives already in-country.
STEINFELD