UN A/SG ANNABI: SUDAN TO DEFER UN ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000953 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/SPF, AF/RSA, AND IO ABUJA FOR AMB HUME E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO AU UN SU SUBJECT: UN A/SG ANNABI: SUDAN TO DEFER UN ASSESSMENT MISSION UNTIL AFTER DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT REACHED REF: A. KHARTOUM 00912 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 01003 KHARTOUM 00000953 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (b) AND (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During an April 19 briefing of the diplomatic community, UN A/SG for PKO Annabi said that Sudan had indicated it would not permit a UN assessment team to visit to plan a peacekeeping transition from the AU to the UN until after a Darfur peace agreement was reached. Sudan feels under pressure and resents the perceive lack of consultation; Annabi responded that the UN did not seek to occupy, but to build a peace operation. Sudanese government officials also raised concerns about the ICC and UN operations being a NATO Trojan horse; Sudan prefers a post-peace agreement arrangement, much like UNMIS, which followed the Naivasha accords. UN SRSG Pronk advised Charge in an aside that an early UN assessment was not necessary; UN and AMIS representatives already in-country could carry out the required planning. End summary. -------------- -------------- Addis Ababa: "Useful Exchanges" with African Union -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In an April 19 briefing of the diplomatic corps at the UN compound in Khartoum, UN Assistant Secretary General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi stated that he had met on April 13 with African Union officials regarding preparations for UN peace-keeping operations in Darfur. The meetings, which included Special Representatives Konare and Djinnit, affirmed the AU's readiness to work closely with the UN in the "possible transition." This includes strengthening the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from the present through September. The parties also agreed to set up a joint liaison group in El Fasher to address technical aspects, with larger issues on the transformation left to the headquarters level. -------------- -------------- Annabi: UN Not in Business of Occupying Countries -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Annabi said that he had met on April 14 and 15 with Presidential Advisor Mansour Khalid, Foreign Minister Lam Akol, National Intelligence and Security Services Director Salah Ghosh, and Presidential Advisor Mustafa Ismail, and President Bashir. He followed this with a visit on April 17 to Juba, where he met with Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Vice President Riek Machar and Presidential Advisor Pagan Amum (Note: GoSS President Salva Kiir was in Yei. End note.) Annabi's message to Sudan was that the "UN is not in the business of occupying countries," that it carries out peace operations. He pointed out that the UN already had 8,900 troops in Sudan (UNMIS),which would rise to 10,000 by the end of May. ¶4. (C) Annabi said that the UN had something similar in mind for Darfur; preparations to do so required sending as assessment team to Darfur to do a "detailed on the ground assessment." He estimated that this would take an interdisciplinary team of perhaps 35-40 individuals 10-14 days. He said he was working backward from September to put in place a series of measures; this requires an "early study." The study would lead to recommendations to the UNSYG, in turn he would recommend a course of action to the UN Security Council and they would decide on a mandate. Only with a mandate known, would TCCs come forward. Annabi also said that any eventual UN force in Darfur would retain an "African core," and that it would not deprive the current UNMIS operation of resources. -------------- -------------- Sudanese Anxieties: Occupation, ICC, NATO Trojan Horse -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) President Bashir told Annabi that he was against an early UN assessment mission to Sudan. (Note: when asked in a the follow-on question and answer period whether Bashir had indicated a willingness for UN presence after a peace agreement, Annabi and Pronk said that Sudanese leaders had indicated acceptance of such as an eventuality. End note.) Annabi said that FM Akol had said much the same, although he was in more of a listening mode regarding the UN's intentions for proceeding on a possible transition. Annabi added that he had patiently explained the nature and intent of UN operations, including ensuring its freedom of movement and its mandate, which would have elements of both Chapter 6 and KHARTOUM 00000953 002.2 OF 002 ¶7. ¶6. (C) Annabi said that Sudanese government officials expressed concern about the extensive press coverage of UN interest in becoming involved in Darfur, and felt a distinct lack of consultation. Sudanese government officials also evinced anxieties about the UN occupying Sudan, and giving the wrong signal to rebels now negotiating in Abuja. They also expressed concern that the UN troops with in effect present a "NATO Trojan horse." Their concerns also included the notion that the UN would "go on a wild goose chase" looking for individuals on the International Criminal Court's wanted list. Annabi said he had denied this intention, and reinforced that no action would be taken at the "expense of peace." He likened that aspect of the situation to efforts to reach peace in Sierra Leone. ¶7. (C) Annabi concluded that Sudan would not permit a UN assessment mission to visit until a peace settlement on Darfur had been first reached in Darfur. This result will be covered in his April 26 briefing to the UN Security Council. -------------- Pronk Pull-Aside: He and UNPKO Disagree -------------- ¶8. (C) UN SRSG Pronk told Charge privately at the end of the meeting that he disagrees with Annabi and the UNPKO "bureaucracy" on the necessity for an early UN assessment mission. He said Darfur operations had already been assessed various times, that the UN and AMIS have the personnel here who can do a lot of work now, and we should not waste further time on this matter. He said the size of the mission (30 plus) is also silly, as "all of these UN agencies already have reps here on the ground." He added that the U.S. should quit pushing on the visas: it will just antagonize the Sudanese government more by putting it in a corner, and, in any case, an early assessment mission is unnecessary. ¶9. (C) Asked whether he had made any progress on this issue with his colleague Annabi, he said, yes, a bit. Annabi was now talking about an assessment that would "fine-tune" work that could already have been completed earlier. Pronk confirmed what we had heard from AMIS the day before: that work was now starting on transition with UN and AMIS representatives already in-country. STEINFELD