DARFUR: PRONK URGES P5 TO PRESS KHARTOUM, AU ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000768 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/SPG, AND IO KINSASHA PASS BRAZZAVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KPKO SU AU UN SUBJECT: DARFUR: PRONK URGES P5 TO PRESS KHARTOUM, AU ON PLANNING FOR AMIS/UNMIS TRANSITION; GOS FIGHTING UNSCR 1663 REF: KHARTOUM 764 KHARTOUM 00000768 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. ANDREW STEINFELD; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UNSRSG Jan Pronk urged P5 governments on March 27 to press Sudan to accept a UN PKO assessment team for a UN-led mission in Darfur. Resolution 1663 requires the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council by SIPDIS April 24, and the team needs at least two weeks in the field to complete its work. Though Sudan has yet to officially reject the team -- the planners have yet to apply for visas -- Pronk believes it will do so without pressure from UNSC members. Diplomatic efforts should be focused at the top, starting with President Bashir. He also urged the P5 to press the AU, and African members of the UNSC, to cooperate with UNMIS. END SUMMARY. Pronk to P5: Pressure Sudan to Accept UN Planners -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) UNSRSG Jan Pronk urged the Charge and other P5 mission chiefs on March 27 to press Sudan to allow a UN assessment team into Darfur to begin planning the transition from AMIS to a UN-led mission. Resolution 1663 made the assessment team's work even more urgent, because it calls for the Secretary-General to report "a range of options" for SIPDIS operations by April 24. "If there is no agreement by Sudan, there will be no assessment, no report, and no transition," said Pronk. ¶3. (C) Planning for the transition has already begun, according to Pronk, and UNMIS' planning team is currently in New York. However, a UN assessment team from New York still needs to visit all the AMIS sites in Darfur -- a process that would take at least two weeks -- and work with AMIS to produce a joint report detailing the specifics of the transition. "Even if they got their visas tomorrow, it would still be hard to do everything by April 24," Pronk said. ¶4. (C) When pressed by the Charge, Pronk was careful to define Sudan's refusal to cooperate. The UN assessment team has yet to apply for visas, Pronk says, because Sudan continues to say that planning for a UN mission before an agreement in Abuja is "not necessary." "It's not an official no, but a political no," he said. Pronk does not want the team to apply for visas until he is confident they will be approved, because he believes it would be too hard politically for the Government to reverse its decision. "We need a political yes, so we don't get an official no." Diplomacy at the Highest Level: Bashir is Key -------------- - ¶5. (C) When asked how P5 governments should approach the Government of Sudan, Pronk noted that opposition to a UN mission seemed to come from President Bashir himself. Any approach had to be a "very high level." Moreover, according to Pronk, Bashir's position had hardened over time, because "powerful groups" within the Government had denounced him for his earlier lukewarm opposition to a UN force. Pronk recounted that during one cabinet meeting, the Interior Minister, Defense Minister, and Communications Minister had strongly criticized Bashir and others who had more "nuanced views" about foreign intervention; Bashir then changed his position, and put the three ministers in charge of a task force to mobilize public opinion against the UN. ¶6. (C) Approaches to at the Vice Presidential level were likely to be less effective, according to Pronk. First VP Salva Kiir had "no interest" in Darfur; John Garang "was the only person in the SPLM who ever talked about it." Whatever Kiir's personal views, he had to go along with the NCP position for the sake of the GNU; in fact, said Pronk, the SPLM negotiators in Abuja were "plus royaliste que le roi." Second VP Taha, on the other hand, was "very strongly against" a UN force both publicly and privately. "He offered Mini Minawi and Khalil Ibrahim all sorts of things during his meeting in Tripoli if they would give up on UN intervention," Pronk recounted. (Note: Taha met with the Minawi and Khalil in Tripoli earlier this month after his meetings in Brussels). AU Going Wobbly? -------------- ¶7. (C) Pronk and his deputy, Taye-Brook Zerihoun, also urged KHARTOUM 00000768 002.2 OF 002 P5 governments to press the AU, AU PSC member states, and African states on the UNSC to cooperate. "There,s been a big change in AMIS the past few weeks," Pronk noted. The AU PSC had taken the initiative in January and March in discussing an AMIS/UNMIS transition, and AU President Konare had personally written UNSYG about the issue. Now, however, AMIS had instructions not work with UNMIS, according to Pronk. UNMIS planners requested a meeting with AMIS five weeks ago to discuss a transition; AMIS has yet to answer. "They,re constantly postponing things. We ask on the ground, they say ask Fashir, who says ask Khartoum, who says ask Addis." Security cooperation on the ground between AMIS and the UN has deteriorated as well, Pronk said. ¶8. (C) Pronk speculated the AU is intentionally putting off the AMIS pledging conference under pressure from Sudan, because it knows such a conference would formalize the end of AMIS and a transition to the UN. "That,s why the Sudanese are now going to the Arab League," Pronk said, referring to a draft Arab League communique calling for Arab states to support AMIS (Ref A). Comment: Where to Push -------------- ¶9. (C) Pronk is seeking P-5 help in cutting through Sudanese opposition to implementing 1663. A P-5 demarche is possible here, though we are unlikely to be received at the Bashir level. Chinese and Russian views are unclear; the two were conspicuously silent during Pronk's meeting, although as Pronk rightly points out, the vote on 1663 was unanimous. Pronk and his deputy pushed for demarches with key AU capitals, particularly with Konare. Obasanjo's visit to Washington should be used as well. ¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. STEINFELD