LATEST TAKE ON YAMBIO CLASH, MORE ON LRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000759 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016 TAGS: PINS MOPS PREL PGOV SU SUBJECT: LATEST TAKE ON YAMBIO CLASH, MORE ON LRA REF: KHARTOUM 725 Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: UNMIS sources described the defense of Yambio from a marauding LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) force as a botched job and questioned the ability of SPLA units in the area to make good on threats to take the fight to the LRA. UNMIS reports little cooperation from the DRC or MONUC in going after the LRA on Congolese territory. The Ugandan Consulate provided the latest Ugandan Popular Defense Force reports on operations against the LRA, suspected LRA positions and additional information. Visiting UN officials recently met with various parties in Juba to discuss the prospects for a DDR initiative targeted at the LRA rank and file, which for now seems unlikely. End Summary. -------------- A Botched Defense -------------- ¶2. (C) CG met with UNMIS Commander James Ellery and his Aide de Camp RPA Lt. Col. Jean Ngendahimana, both just returned from a March 23 visit to Yambio in the company of GoSS Vice President Riek Machar and his wife, GoNU State Minister of Energy and Mines Angelina Teny. Ellery said that the ballyhooed Yambio firefight had been exaggerated in the telling. According to Ellery, there were fewer than 100 LRA fighters involved in the attack. The LRA split into three groups, one that pinned down UNMIS, a second that engaged the SPLA, and a third that foraged and looted the town. He said that UMIS had expended 800 rounds - not 8,000, as reported - and that the SPLA had retired when its forces ran low on ammunition. Ellery said that had the local population joined in with whatever weapons were at hand, including spears, the small LRA force could have been rapidly annihilated. He noted that the LRA had shown some discipline in the attack, and had themselves killed three of their own wounded fighters so that they would not be taken prisoner. ¶3. (C) Ellery said that the LRA had apparently adopted a new strategy. They remained in Garamba Park, but did not attack Congolese civilians living nearby. This tactic prevents them from fueling local resentment and giving the FAC or MONUC a motive to take offensive action. In fact, he complained, ever since the Garamba firefight in which eight Guatemalan peacekeepers were killed, neither FAC nor MONUC have shown much zeal against the LRA. This left the LRA force in an excellent position: it could remain in relative safety in Garamba Park and raid into Sudan for food and equipment. ¶4. (C) According to Ngendahimana, Machar had proclaimed that the GoSS would react to the Yambio attack by launching offensive operations against the LRA, wherever they might be. Ngendahimana expressed doubt that the SPLA units in the area would be up to the task. They were at the far end of a dysfunctional supply chain and lacked transport, sufficient ammunition, and communications equipment of any sort. -------------- Ugandans on the LRA -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Two officials of the Ugandan Consulate in Juba provided CG with the latest UPDF operational information spanning the period from April 2005 to March 2006. During the time, the UPDF captured from the LRA the following equipment: two mortar tubes, 100 mortar shells, 2 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 2 RPG-7 rockets, 19 RPG-7 fuses, 9 mortar fuses, 1 SPG-9, one light machinegun, 2 G-2 assault rifles, 201 machinegun rounds, 913 9mm smg rounds, 196 7.62 mm rounds, three pieces of commo equipment, 1 HK-G3, 1 round of G3 ammunition, and 22 anti-tank or anti-personnel mines. Over the same span, the UPDF killed 97 LRA fighters and captured 42. ¶6. (SBU) A second document detailed rough numbers of LRA remnants still believed to be in Southern Sudan, as opposed to the larger concentration in Garamba Park. The consular officials insisted that both Kony and Otti were with that group, and not stationed near Juba. The Ugandans had no information on a recent, incident near Juba in which 8 SPLA troops were killed, rumored to be another LRA attack. At present, they said, they knew of four groups of approximately 50 men each West of the Nile, each armed with an estimated 15 weapons and led respectively by commanders Odiambo, Lamola, KHARTOUM 00000759 002 OF 002 Labalpiny, and Odoch. East of the Nile, three groups of approximately 70, including women, operated under Major Kibwola, Ochaka, and Ochana in the areas of Bilinyang, Mogur, and part of Jabur. Each of these groups was estimated to possess 25 firearms of various kinds. ¶7. (SBU) The Ugandans said that the LRA east of the Nile are mostly outside of Lafon town. They said that captured LRA fighters had admitted under interrogation that they continued to receive supplies from unidentified Sudanese. LRA commanders would receive instructions to move to a certain location, where ammunition and other supplies were waiting. The Ugandans did not know if the SAF command was behind this, if this were a rogue operation, or if a commercial angle existed. CG pointed out that the raids from DRC into Sudan near Yambio indicated that the LRA continued to suffer shortages of food and communications gear, resupplied by someone or not. The Ugandans said that they had no information that LRA units were operating out of the Central African Republic, as widely rumored. -------------- DDR? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Two visiting UN officials discussed with a number of local UN and other officials their desire to launch a DDR initiative targeted at the LRA. CG reminded them that some LRA leaders remain under indictment in The Hague. Ellery told them that he thought the idea was premature and impractical. Given their ability to operate with impunity out of DRC, the LRA fighters would have little incentive to put down their arms. It would be necessary to take some form of effective military action against the LRA to motivate them to quit the fight. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (SBU) If accurate, the Ugandan numbers show that there are no more than 400 LRA operating in South Sudan, plus those in northern DRC and a small remnant in Uganda. These numbers pose no serious security threat to the GoSS, but do continue to take a psychological toll and have a negative effect on the population disproportionate to LRA numbers. We agree that DDR is not a viable option at this time -- the UN has not yet succeeded in establishing a fully effective DDR initiative with the Sudanese themselves. STEINFELD