FIRST VICE PRESIDENT SALVA KIIR SPEAKS ON LRA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000754 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PINR EPET SU SUBJECT: FIRST VICE PRESIDENT SALVA KIIR SPEAKS ON LRA, N/S, ABYEI REF: (A) KHARTOUM 740 (B) KHARTOUM 742 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Charge and USAID Almquist on March 23 (Darfur part reported ref A),First VP Salva Kiir reiterated his allegation that NCP elements of the GNU and the SAF continue to provide support to the LRA, and that SAF forces have not sufficiently redeployed out of the south. Kiir acknowledged receiving a letter from LRA leader Kony requesting GOSS mediation with the Government of Uganda, but noted this would be impossible due to the ICC indictment. Kiir is more inclined to arrest Kony than to help him negotiate, but fears SAF action if the SPLA were to make such a move. Kiir requested an update on USG support for SPLA reform, including construction of a headquarters and hospital, stressing the urgency of moving this forward. Kiir also reiterated the importance of USG support for SPLM as a political party, noting they are working on developing the organizational structure of the party. Two CPA hot-button issues remain stalled in the Presidency, the question of an independent secretariat for the National Petroleum Commission, and the implementation of the Abyei Boundaries Commission report. Movement on either issue is unlikely until after the Arab League summit is over; Kiir will return to Juba after the summit. End Summary. -------------- LRA -------------- ¶2. (C) During a discussion on the recent security incidents in southern Sudan, Kiir expressed regret over the loss of seven SPLA soldiers, including one captain, during a recent firewood gathering expedition just outside of Juba earlier in the week. Kiir said that the soldiers were ambushed by armed attackers, and seven had died. When pushed on the identity of the attackers, Kiir speculated that they were most likely either LRA or SAF, given that the area of the attack is SAF-controlled and very near one of their camps. Kiir reiterated his contention that the SAF are still harboring and supplying the LRA in southern Sudan, saying that the two forces are even living in the same barracks together in some cases. When asked whether he thought this was a policy from Khartoum or the initiative of local SAF commanders, Kiir noted that he had challenged the Chief of Staff of the SAF on this, and he did not deny it. Kiir believes the LRA is now recruiting Acholi from within southern Sudan, and contends that it is in the interests of the SAF to keep a proxy force in the south to cause trouble for the GOSS in the event that a referendum ultimately leads to separation. The SPLA is not capable of going after the LRA in southern Sudan until the SAF withdraw their forces and JIUs are properly deployed. Until this time, the SPLA's hands are tied because the SAF will prevent anything from happening to the LRA. ¶3. (C) Kiir believes that LRA leader Joseph Kony may now be 8-10 miles south of Juba near the border, though Kony had recently been in DRC and CAR. Kiir admitted that the SPLA had requested to pursue him the in the DRC, but had been denied permission by the Congolese government. Kiir believes that even though the DRC does not want to harbor Kony and the LRA because of the way they treat local populations, the DRC is more fearful of allowing another foreign force to enter the country. ¶4. (C) When asked about direct contact between the SPLA and Kony, Kiir commented that he had once requested the SAF to arrange a meeting for him with Kony, but SAF refused to facilitate for fear of self-incrimination. When asked if GOSS VP Riak Machar was in contact with Kony, Kiir stated that he had recent contact with some LRA commanders, but not Kony himself. A letter to Kiir from Kony requesting the GOSS to mediate between the LRA and the Government of Uganda was passed to Machar. Kiir has not seen the letter itself, but was briefed by Machar on its contents. Kiir's commented that it would be impossible for the GOSS to mediate given the ICC indictment of Kony, noting instead that they are under obligation to try to arrest him, but he returned to the difficulties of SAF protection for the LRA if they did try to make such a move. -------------- SPLA Re-organization -------------- ¶5. (C) Kiir contends that the SAF are not yet withdrawing their forces from southern Sudan, and that SPLA reorganization needs to be sped up. He inquired as to the status of USG support for SPLA reform, including the KHARTOUM 00000754 002 OF 002 construction of an SPLA headquarters and a hospital. Action request: Post requests Department to provide update on status of USG activities in support of SPLA reform for transmittal back to Kiir. -------------- SPLM Party Support -------------- ¶6. (C) Kiir informed that the SPLM would be holding leadership meetings in Rumbek in early May, and that he was looking to continued USG support for the SPLM as they were trying to put structures and organization in place. Almquist noted that both USAID and the Department have activities ongoing in this regard, and that we would work closely with SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amun to ensure that the assistance is well targeted. -------------- Oil Transfers -------------- ¶7. (C) Kiir agreed with Almquist's assessment that progress on reconciling oil revenue transfer figures for 2005 had been made at the Sudan Consortium meeting in Paris, but that the analysis still needed to be explained to people in the south. The figures may need to be revised once the Border Committee begins its work on delineating the 1956 border between north and south, but Kiir seems confident in Bashir's assurances to him that the calculations will be redone if necessary to account for any additional oil production deemed to have come from the south once the border is finally agreed. -------------- National Petroleum Commission -------------- ¶8. (C) According to Kiir, the National Petroleum Commission (NPC) is still stalled over the question of an independent secretariat, which has not yet been resolved in the SIPDIS Presidency. The SPLM is holding firm on the necessity of an independent secretariat, fearing it will not have full access to data and information on the oil sector if the Ministry of Energy serves as the secretariat, which is the NCP position. Further discussion between Kiir and Bashir to resolve this matter will not take place until after the Arab League Summit. When asked what the US or the international community could do to help, Kiir stated that the question of the secretariat must be worked out internally, but thought that technical assistance to the SPLM would be helpful in identifying what they need to insist upon if they have to fall back from an independent secretariat. Almquist reiterated that the US and Norway stand ready to send technical advisors to work with the SPLM and the National Petroleum Commission, with the US providing assistance to the SPLM to help with analyzing production data and other technical matters, and Norway more focused on overall support to the National Petroleum Commission. Kiir welcomed this assistance. Post will follow-up with Angelina Machar, SPLM Minister of State in the GNU Ministry of Energy. -------------- Abyei -------------- ¶9. (C) Kiir expressed satisfaction with the SPLM public presentations on the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) report (reported ref B),stating their intent is to make the facts known, but that "our partners," meaning the NCP, are not happy with the public discussions. Kiir would like to invite the chair of the ABC, Amb. Don Peterson, to return to Sudan to further explain the findings, but Pres. Bashir has so far alternately rejected and accepted the idea. It is still under discussion in the Presidency. Almquist noted that the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) has also discussed inviting Peterson to brief the Commission, and could do the inviting rather than the Presidency if that would help. Kiir promised to get back to us on whether or not to proceed with an invitation from the AEC after his next discussion with Bashir. Kiir repeated that the SPLM could not agree to an interim administration in Abyei until the question of the borders had been resolved. Almquist noted that tensions on the ground are rising, and that the very high albeit unmet expectations of returnees are further exacerbating the situation. STEINFELD