FIRST VICE PRESIDENT SALVA KIIR SPEAKS ON LRA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000754

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PINR EPET SU
SUBJECT: FIRST VICE PRESIDENT SALVA KIIR SPEAKS ON LRA,
N/S, ABYEI

REF: (A) KHARTOUM 740 (B) KHARTOUM 742

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Charge and USAID Almquist
on March 23 (Darfur part reported ref A),First VP Salva Kiir
reiterated his allegation that NCP elements of the GNU and
the SAF continue to provide support to the LRA, and that SAF
forces have not sufficiently redeployed out of the south.
Kiir acknowledged receiving a letter from LRA leader Kony
requesting GOSS mediation with the Government of Uganda, but
noted this would be impossible due to the ICC indictment.
Kiir is more inclined to arrest Kony than to help him
negotiate, but fears SAF action if the SPLA were to make such
a move. Kiir requested an update on USG support for SPLA
reform, including construction of a headquarters and
hospital, stressing the urgency of moving this forward. Kiir
also reiterated the importance of USG support for SPLM as a
political party, noting they are working on developing the
organizational structure of the party. Two CPA hot-button
issues remain stalled in the Presidency, the question of an
independent secretariat for the National Petroleum
Commission, and the implementation of the Abyei Boundaries
Commission report. Movement on either issue is unlikely
until after the Arab League summit is over; Kiir will return
to Juba after the summit. End Summary.

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LRA
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2. (C) During a discussion on the recent security incidents
in southern Sudan, Kiir expressed regret over the loss of
seven SPLA soldiers, including one captain, during a recent
firewood gathering expedition just outside of Juba earlier in
the week. Kiir said that the soldiers were ambushed by armed
attackers, and seven had died. When pushed on the identity
of the attackers, Kiir speculated that they were most likely
either LRA or SAF, given that the area of the attack is
SAF-controlled and very near one of their camps. Kiir
reiterated his contention that the SAF are still harboring
and supplying the LRA in southern Sudan, saying that the two
forces are even living in the same barracks together in some
cases. When asked whether he thought this was a policy from
Khartoum or the initiative of local SAF commanders, Kiir
noted that he had challenged the Chief of Staff of the SAF on
this, and he did not deny it. Kiir believes the LRA is now
recruiting Acholi from within southern Sudan, and contends
that it is in the interests of the SAF to keep a proxy force
in the south to cause trouble for the GOSS in the event that
a referendum ultimately leads to separation. The SPLA is not
capable of going after the LRA in southern Sudan until the
SAF withdraw their forces and JIUs are properly deployed.
Until this time, the SPLA's hands are tied because the SAF
will prevent anything from happening to the LRA.


3. (C) Kiir believes that LRA leader Joseph Kony may now be
8-10 miles south of Juba near the border, though Kony had
recently been in DRC and CAR. Kiir admitted that the SPLA
had requested to pursue him the in the DRC, but had been
denied permission by the Congolese government. Kiir believes
that even though the DRC does not want to harbor Kony and the
LRA because of the way they treat local populations, the DRC
is more fearful of allowing another foreign force to enter
the country.


4. (C) When asked about direct contact between the SPLA and
Kony, Kiir commented that he had once requested the SAF to
arrange a meeting for him with Kony, but SAF refused to
facilitate for fear of self-incrimination. When asked if
GOSS VP Riak Machar was in contact with Kony, Kiir stated
that he had recent contact with some LRA commanders, but not
Kony himself. A letter to Kiir from Kony requesting the GOSS
to mediate between the LRA and the Government of Uganda was
passed to Machar. Kiir has not seen the letter itself, but
was briefed by Machar on its contents. Kiir's commented that
it would be impossible for the GOSS to mediate given the ICC
indictment of Kony, noting instead that they are under
obligation to try to arrest him, but he returned to the
difficulties of SAF protection for the LRA if they did try to
make such a move.

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SPLA Re-organization
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5. (C) Kiir contends that the SAF are not yet withdrawing
their forces from southern Sudan, and that SPLA
reorganization needs to be sped up. He inquired as to the
status of USG support for SPLA reform, including the

KHARTOUM 00000754 002 OF 002


construction of an SPLA headquarters and a hospital.

Action request: Post requests Department to provide update
on status of USG activities in support of SPLA reform for
transmittal back to Kiir.

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SPLM Party Support
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6. (C) Kiir informed that the SPLM would be holding
leadership meetings in Rumbek in early May, and that he was
looking to continued USG support for the SPLM as they were
trying to put structures and organization in place. Almquist
noted that both USAID and the Department have activities
ongoing in this regard, and that we would work closely with
SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amun to ensure that the
assistance is well targeted.

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Oil Transfers
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7. (C) Kiir agreed with Almquist's assessment that progress
on reconciling oil revenue transfer figures for 2005 had been
made at the Sudan Consortium meeting in Paris, but that the
analysis still needed to be explained to people in the south.
The figures may need to be revised once the Border Committee
begins its work on delineating the 1956 border between north
and south, but Kiir seems confident in Bashir's assurances to
him that the calculations will be redone if necessary to
account for any additional oil production deemed to have come
from the south once the border is finally agreed.

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National Petroleum Commission
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8. (C) According to Kiir, the National Petroleum Commission
(NPC) is still stalled over the question of an independent
secretariat, which has not yet been resolved in the

SIPDIS
Presidency. The SPLM is holding firm on the necessity of an
independent secretariat, fearing it will not have full access
to data and information on the oil sector if the Ministry of
Energy serves as the secretariat, which is the NCP position.
Further discussion between Kiir and Bashir to resolve this
matter will not take place until after the Arab League
Summit. When asked what the US or the international
community could do to help, Kiir stated that the question of
the secretariat must be worked out internally, but thought
that technical assistance to the SPLM would be helpful in
identifying what they need to insist upon if they have to
fall back from an independent secretariat. Almquist
reiterated that the US and Norway stand ready to send
technical advisors to work with the SPLM and the National
Petroleum Commission, with the US providing assistance to the
SPLM to help with analyzing production data and other
technical matters, and Norway more focused on overall support
to the National Petroleum Commission. Kiir welcomed this
assistance. Post will follow-up with Angelina Machar, SPLM
Minister of State in the GNU Ministry of Energy.

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Abyei
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9. (C) Kiir expressed satisfaction with the SPLM public
presentations on the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) report
(reported ref B),stating their intent is to make the facts
known, but that "our partners," meaning the NCP, are not
happy with the public discussions. Kiir would like to invite
the chair of the ABC, Amb. Don Peterson, to return to Sudan
to further explain the findings, but Pres. Bashir has so far
alternately rejected and accepted the idea. It is still
under discussion in the Presidency. Almquist noted that the
Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) has also discussed
inviting Peterson to brief the Commission, and could do the
inviting rather than the Presidency if that would help. Kiir
promised to get back to us on whether or not to proceed with
an invitation from the AEC after his next discussion with
Bashir. Kiir repeated that the SPLM could not agree to an
interim administration in Abyei until the question of the
borders had been resolved. Almquist noted that tensions on
the ground are rising, and that the very high albeit unmet
expectations of returnees are further exacerbating the
situation.
STEINFELD