Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM740
2006-03-23 13:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
SALVA KIIR ON DARFUR/ABUJA/UN: NEGOTIATING
how-toVZCZCXYZ0025 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHKH #0740 0821357 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 231357Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2016 INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0051 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0095 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0041 RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0035 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0014 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0021 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0013 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0024 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0042
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000740
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR D, AF, IO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU PINR SU
SUBJECT: SALVA KIIR ON DARFUR/ABUJA/UN: NEGOTIATING
POSITION STILL NCP ONLY; "JIHAD" IF UN COMES IN BEFORE PEACE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1
.5 (B) (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000740
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR D, AF, IO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU PINR SU
SUBJECT: SALVA KIIR ON DARFUR/ABUJA/UN: NEGOTIATING
POSITION STILL NCP ONLY; "JIHAD" IF UN COMES IN BEFORE PEACE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1
.5 (B) (D)
1. (C) Summary: First VP Salva Kiir told Charge March 23
that there was still no GNU negotiating position in Abuja,
and that chief negotiator Maqzoub was taking a very hard
line. The Council of Ministers, however, was continuing to
debate a unified NCP/SPLM position. Kiir also reiterated
that the Sudan (read: NCP) would only accept UN rehat after
a peace agreement is reached, and the force would look like
the one in the south. He said that the NCP had called for a
"jihad" against any international force that would come in
absent a peace agreement, or to enforce peace. He and the
SPLM disagreed with this position and would welcome a UN
force. End Summary.
2. (C) In response to First VP Kiir's request to meet with
USAID Almquist, she and Charge had an extended meeting with
Kiir in Khartoum on March 23 (non-Darfur issues will be
reported septel). On Darfur, Kiir reported that the
negotiating position currently being put forward in Abuja was
still one supported by the NCP only. The Council of
Ministers had had "heated" debates about Darfur, but there
was still no joint position, though Kiir hoped more progress
would be made this Sunday. For now, chief negotiator Maqzoub
was taking very tough positions; differences between the NCP
and SPLM were about which compromises to strike with the
movements. Answering the Charge, he said that the Yassir
Arman/ Mutriff Sadiq attempts at reaching a joint position
had not yielded that result.
3. (C) Asked about UN rehatting, Kiir described the
government position (read: NCP) as VP Taha has done both
publicly and privately. A UN force would be permitted to
replace AMIS after a peace accord was reached in Abuja and
would be permitted to operate like UNMIS in the south. He
said that the NCP had called for "jihad" against an
international force that would otherwise enter Darfur for
peace enforcement, and that there would be fighting on the
ground against such a force. (He speculated that such a
force would not be able to reach Darfur through Khartoum.)
He added that he and the SPLM would welcome a UN force, if
the Sudanese could not reach peace on their own in Darfur,
but clearly implied that the SPLM had made no inroads in
moderating the NCP's hostility to international forces. In
fact, Kiir asked rhetorically how one part of the government
could declare war (jihad) without consulting the other.
STEINFELD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR D, AF, IO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU PINR SU
SUBJECT: SALVA KIIR ON DARFUR/ABUJA/UN: NEGOTIATING
POSITION STILL NCP ONLY; "JIHAD" IF UN COMES IN BEFORE PEACE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1
.5 (B) (D)
1. (C) Summary: First VP Salva Kiir told Charge March 23
that there was still no GNU negotiating position in Abuja,
and that chief negotiator Maqzoub was taking a very hard
line. The Council of Ministers, however, was continuing to
debate a unified NCP/SPLM position. Kiir also reiterated
that the Sudan (read: NCP) would only accept UN rehat after
a peace agreement is reached, and the force would look like
the one in the south. He said that the NCP had called for a
"jihad" against any international force that would come in
absent a peace agreement, or to enforce peace. He and the
SPLM disagreed with this position and would welcome a UN
force. End Summary.
2. (C) In response to First VP Kiir's request to meet with
USAID Almquist, she and Charge had an extended meeting with
Kiir in Khartoum on March 23 (non-Darfur issues will be
reported septel). On Darfur, Kiir reported that the
negotiating position currently being put forward in Abuja was
still one supported by the NCP only. The Council of
Ministers had had "heated" debates about Darfur, but there
was still no joint position, though Kiir hoped more progress
would be made this Sunday. For now, chief negotiator Maqzoub
was taking very tough positions; differences between the NCP
and SPLM were about which compromises to strike with the
movements. Answering the Charge, he said that the Yassir
Arman/ Mutriff Sadiq attempts at reaching a joint position
had not yielded that result.
3. (C) Asked about UN rehatting, Kiir described the
government position (read: NCP) as VP Taha has done both
publicly and privately. A UN force would be permitted to
replace AMIS after a peace accord was reached in Abuja and
would be permitted to operate like UNMIS in the south. He
said that the NCP had called for "jihad" against an
international force that would otherwise enter Darfur for
peace enforcement, and that there would be fighting on the
ground against such a force. (He speculated that such a
force would not be able to reach Darfur through Khartoum.)
He added that he and the SPLM would welcome a UN force, if
the Sudanese could not reach peace on their own in Darfur,
but clearly implied that the SPLM had made no inroads in
moderating the NCP's hostility to international forces. In
fact, Kiir asked rhetorically how one part of the government
could declare war (jihad) without consulting the other.
STEINFELD