AN RX FOR AMIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000719 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AU UN SU SUBJECT: AN RX FOR AMIS Classified By: Political Officer Ron Capps for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Improving African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) performance in the transition period with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) will require physical support from the donor community and structural evolution at AMIS. There are dozens of options for the international community and for AMIS, but some simply won't be helpful, or will take too long to implement in this period. The critical equipment needs are night vision equipment, communications architecture, and equipment to give AMIS sector and group site commanders an expeditionary capability - the ability to project their forces beyond their bases for extended periods of time. Critical training and mentoring needs are in intelligence, operations and planning, and logistics management. Structural changes required include creating a Division Level Joint Task Force headquarters atop AMIS (which will include both a Joint Operations Center (JOC) and a Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC)); rapid introduction of self-sufficiency to AMIS units which are expected to become part of UNMIS in terms of transportation, maintenance, communications, food service and medical coverage; and rapid introduction of UNMIS staff officers into the AMIS architecture. Selling it to the Sudanese will be tough, but using Mediterranean Dialogue nations, ACOTA troops, and African troops to the extent possible will make it more palatable to Khartoum. However, no amount of support can help AMIS improve unless AMIS is willing to accept mentoring and support from outside nations. AMIS must be willing to change. This cable is a joint Political - Defense Liaison Office product. End Summary. -------------- The Possible and the Helpful -------------- ¶2. (C) As the denouement of AMIS and the expansion of UNIS into Darfur approach, the international community has a multitude of options how to help AMIS better carry out its mandate until UNMIS can take over, and ease the transition. But not all of the possible will truly be helpful; some options are relatively simple fixes, most will require AMIS to want to change, and some are either too hard or would take too long. We have looked at some of the options and, in conversations with AMIS, UNMIS, other embassies, and our own staff, made a list of a few things we think could be most helpful. We have divided these into two categories: (1) Things AMIS needs, including training; and (2) Things AMIS will need to do internally. -------------- Things AMIS Needs -------------- ¶3. (C) The Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF),the AU's Darfur command center in Addis Ababa, has presented a wish list to the UN. The list, divided into priority one (must haves) and priority two (may haves),is long and contains a plethora of items that will do little to improve AMIS's performance in the field (lapel microphones and laser pointers for example). But there are many items and requests for training that are needed in Darfur and that would be helpful to increasing AMIS's capacity and easing the transition to UNMIS. -------------- Equipment -------------- ¶4. (C) Night vision equipment: The mission has imposed a curfew on itself; hence, AMIS does not operate at night. The warring factions, however, do. In order to "dominate the area of operations," as AMIS Force Commander MG Ihekire claims he wants to do, AMIS must be a 24 hour a day operation. Night observation devices will allow AMIS patrols to operate at night with an advantage. The request asks for 65 pairs of night vision binoculars. This is probably about right, but providing night vision goggles (NVGs) to the force as well would increase the forces' mobility. Currently the GOS closes the main airports at 1800 hours to AMIS operations. This must change. AMIS must have a night operations capability on the ground and in the air. Providing the contract pilots with NVGs is worth considering. Many of these pilots have experience using the NVGs and could reasonably be expected to re-qualify rapidly. ¶5. (C) Communications: More Thuraya phones and more calling card minutes is a start. Redundant HF and VHF radio systems KHARTOUM 00000719 002 OF 003 would also help. Internet connectivity at all camps is a must. In order to effect some of the changes suggested below, the mission will also need more computers, printers, scanners, copiers, fax machines, and so on. ¶6. (C) Deployment Equipment: Improving the force's ability to project itself around the three Darfur states is important. Once the force is capable of patrolling at night, it should also be capable of remaining outside of the camps at night. Each site should have a sufficient number of tents, sleeping bags and mats, field rations, and camp stoves to deploy at least one platoon. The rations should be replaced as used by patrols. Some of this equipment has already been provided, but AMIS leadership claimed to be disQisfied with the quality of the tents. -------------- Training -------------- ¶7. (C) If AMIS is to employ properly the equipment listed above, the soldiers will require training. But the training cannot stop at the operator level, as is the case with the Canadian-provided armored personnel carriers (APCs). Since many of the AMIS staff officers and commanders have never employed armor in either combat or in a peace support operation (PSO),the APCs have little effect beyond providing better protection from small arms fire for patrols, which continue to use their old tactics. Leadership training is critical. All training provided must take place in Darfur. AMIS cannot afford to parcel out its officers on course. It must remain operational throughout the evolution. ¶8. (C) It will do little to improve AMIS's effectiveness in the field if donor nations simply provide equipment without providing the capacity building training (at all levels) to properly employ it. The AMIS request to the UN includes "capacity building for staff at the DITF strategic level," and "capacity building for JOC staff at the operational level." Left out is the tactical level; officers at the sector and Military Observer Group Site (MGS) level require training as well. Specific requirements center on intelligence analysis, operational planning, and force support (logistics). ¶9. (C) J2: Intelligence: AMIS's capacity to collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence must be strengthened, either by providing mentors and trainers or by placing NATO architecture on the ground in direct support of AMIS - which would likely require time-consuming force generation. Creating capacity in the J2 (intelligence) section will also require the introduction of additional physical assets, particularly information systems. ¶10. (C) J3/J5: Operations/Plans: Developing a stronger operations management and planning capacity will start withQcreating a Joint Operations Center, then staffing and equipping it properly. The critical task is staff integration in directing current operations and planning future operations. Many of the AMIS staff have little or no experience integrating the plans cell with the logistics cell, for example, but conducting PSO requires integrating the military staff with the Civilian Police and civilian staff (humanitarian liaison, political officers, public affairs officers, etc.) Mentoring here is absolutely essential. NATO experience in IFOR, ISAF, etc., is precisely what is needed to help AMIS J3/J5 improve, stand up the JOC, and ease UNMIS transition. ¶11. (C) Logistics has been called AMIS's Achilles heel. The mission is overly dependent on air movement of assets and supplies, thus creating an enormous fuel requirement - which is flown in from Dubai. The JLOC is helping improve logistics management; this is where the transition from UNMIS to AMIS should be assisted soonest: using UNMIS logisticians to help AMIS. AMIS could begin to draw on UNMIS logistics expertise and support almost immediately. UNMIS uses El Obeid as its primary operational staging base; El Obeid should be considered as (in military terms) the Corps Support Command for both UNMIS and AMIS through the transition period. -------------- Things AMIS Must Do -------------- ¶12. (C) The Forward Headquarters in El Fasher must be restructured to more resemble a conventional division level Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. The restructuring would include the creation of the JOC and its integration with the Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC). ¶13. (C) In accordance with the AU Peace and Security Council KHARTOUM 00000719 003 OF 003 decision on March 10, UNMIS and AMIS should immediately begin working out the details of the transition by embedding UNMIS staff officers onto the AMIS staff in El Fasher. ¶14. (C) AMIS units that are expected to remain a part of UNMIS should immediately begin to acquire, deploy, and use integral logistics support equipment, replacing PA&E's functions of motor transport, maintenance, food service, medical, and communications. This would move the battalions closer to meeting the UNMIS standards. ¶15. (C) AMIS must change its operational mind-set and take advantage of the equipment and training it receives. Patrols must go out and stay out for days at a time, covering areas they could previously not reach because of the self-imposed curfew. AMIS must pursue aggressively its mandate to "provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and returns of IDPs and refugees." AMIS must follow its Rules of Engagement to "protect civilians in imminent danger in the immediate area, in identified areas of threat, and throughout the Darfur region," to "provide area security for humanitarian operations throughout the Darfur region of Sudan," to "escort humanitarian movements where necessary," to "provide a secure environment by the establishment of temporary outposts and intense patrolling in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the populations through Darfur," to carry out preventive deployment as necessary to reduce incidences of inter-party attacks," to "be prepared to deploy force elements between parties as necessary in advance of potential clashes... and to fill vacuums of power." -------------- Selling it to the Sudanese -------------- ¶16. (C) The enhancement of AMIS in the next six months comes in the context of UN re-hatting, which the Sudanese continue to reject, except under specific circumstances. Hence, they may fight these enhancements, particularly insofar as they may involve increased numbers of non-African troops. One way to reduce its suspicions is to use to the greatest extent possible NATO affiliated nations to provide mentoring - particularly Mediterranean Dialogue countries like Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. African nations like Namibia, Angola, and South Africa should also be part of the mentorship process. Perhaps Turkey would be an acceptable NATO partner. ACOTA-trained units can be used as well. The fewer the number of troops from Europe and North America that are in the mix, the more the Sudanese will find it palatable. -------------- But the Hardest Part... -------------- ¶17. (C) Most importantly, AMIS must want to change. AMIS must want to patrol more aggressively, and during both day and night. AMIS must want to restructure and evolve. AMIS must want to accept mentorship, instruction, and guidance from outside nations. Otherwise, no input of equipment or training will much of a make a difference. STEINFELD