AN RX FOR AMIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000719

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AU UN SU
SUBJECT: AN RX FOR AMIS


Classified By: Political Officer Ron Capps for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Improving African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) performance
in the transition period with the United Nations Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS) will require physical support from the donor
community and structural evolution at AMIS. There are dozens
of options for the international community and for AMIS, but
some simply won't be helpful, or will take too long to
implement in this period. The critical equipment needs are
night vision equipment, communications architecture, and
equipment to give AMIS sector and group site commanders an
expeditionary capability - the ability to project their
forces beyond their bases for extended periods of time.
Critical training and mentoring needs are in intelligence,
operations and planning, and logistics management.
Structural changes required include creating a Division Level
Joint Task Force headquarters atop AMIS (which will include
both a Joint Operations Center (JOC) and a Joint Logistics
Operations Center (JLOC)); rapid introduction of
self-sufficiency to AMIS units which are expected to become
part of UNMIS in terms of transportation, maintenance,
communications, food service and medical coverage; and rapid
introduction of UNMIS staff officers into the AMIS
architecture. Selling it to the Sudanese will be tough, but
using Mediterranean Dialogue nations, ACOTA troops, and
African troops to the extent possible will make it more
palatable to Khartoum. However, no amount of support can
help AMIS improve unless AMIS is willing to accept mentoring
and support from outside nations. AMIS must be willing to
change. This cable is a joint Political - Defense Liaison
Office product. End Summary.

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The Possible and the Helpful
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2. (C) As the denouement of AMIS and the expansion of UNIS
into Darfur approach, the international community has a
multitude of options how to help AMIS better carry out its
mandate until UNMIS can take over, and ease the transition.
But not all of the possible will truly be helpful; some
options are relatively simple fixes, most will require AMIS
to want to change, and some are either too hard or would take
too long. We have looked at some of the options and, in
conversations with AMIS, UNMIS, other embassies, and our own
staff, made a list of a few things we think could be most
helpful. We have divided these into two categories: (1)
Things AMIS needs, including training; and (2) Things AMIS
will need to do internally.

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Things AMIS Needs
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3. (C) The Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF),the AU's
Darfur command center in Addis Ababa, has presented a wish
list to the UN. The list, divided into priority one (must
haves) and priority two (may haves),is long and contains a
plethora of items that will do little to improve AMIS's
performance in the field (lapel microphones and laser
pointers for example). But there are many items and requests
for training that are needed in Darfur and that would be
helpful to increasing AMIS's capacity and easing the
transition to UNMIS.

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Equipment
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4. (C) Night vision equipment: The mission has imposed a
curfew on itself; hence, AMIS does not operate at night. The
warring factions, however, do. In order to "dominate the
area of operations," as AMIS Force Commander MG Ihekire
claims he wants to do, AMIS must be a 24 hour a day
operation. Night observation devices will allow AMIS patrols
to operate at night with an advantage. The request asks for
65 pairs of night vision binoculars. This is probably about
right, but providing night vision goggles (NVGs) to the force
as well would increase the forces' mobility. Currently the
GOS closes the main airports at 1800 hours to AMIS
operations. This must change. AMIS must have a night
operations capability on the ground and in the air.
Providing the contract pilots with NVGs is worth considering.
Many of these pilots have experience using the NVGs and
could reasonably be expected to re-qualify rapidly.


5. (C) Communications: More Thuraya phones and more calling
card minutes is a start. Redundant HF and VHF radio systems

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would also help. Internet connectivity at all camps is a
must. In order to effect some of the changes suggested
below, the mission will also need more computers, printers,
scanners, copiers, fax machines, and so on.


6. (C) Deployment Equipment: Improving the force's ability
to project itself around the three Darfur states is
important. Once the force is capable of patrolling at night,
it should also be capable of remaining outside of the camps
at night. Each site should have a sufficient number of
tents, sleeping bags and mats, field rations, and camp stoves
to deploy at least one platoon. The rations should be
replaced as used by patrols. Some of this equipment has
already been provided, but AMIS leadership claimed to be
disQisfied with the quality of the tents.

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Training
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7. (C) If AMIS is to employ properly the equipment listed
above, the soldiers will require training. But the training
cannot stop at the operator level, as is the case with the
Canadian-provided armored personnel carriers (APCs). Since
many of the AMIS staff officers and commanders have never
employed armor in either combat or in a peace support
operation (PSO),the APCs have little effect beyond providing
better protection from small arms fire for patrols, which
continue to use their old tactics. Leadership training is
critical. All training provided must take place in Darfur.
AMIS cannot afford to parcel out its officers on course. It
must remain operational throughout the evolution.


8. (C) It will do little to improve AMIS's effectiveness in
the field if donor nations simply provide equipment without
providing the capacity building training (at all levels) to
properly employ it. The AMIS request to the UN includes
"capacity building for staff at the DITF strategic level,"
and "capacity building for JOC staff at the operational
level." Left out is the tactical level; officers at the
sector and Military Observer Group Site (MGS) level require
training as well. Specific requirements center on
intelligence analysis, operational planning, and force
support (logistics).


9. (C) J2: Intelligence: AMIS's capacity to collect,
analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence must be
strengthened, either by providing mentors and trainers or by
placing NATO architecture on the ground in direct support of
AMIS - which would likely require time-consuming force
generation. Creating capacity in the J2 (intelligence)
section will also require the introduction of additional
physical assets, particularly information systems.


10. (C) J3/J5: Operations/Plans: Developing a stronger
operations management and planning capacity will start withQcreating a Joint Operations Center, then staffing and
equipping it properly. The critical task is staff
integration in directing current operations and planning
future operations. Many of the AMIS staff have little or no
experience integrating the plans cell with the logistics
cell, for example, but conducting PSO requires integrating
the military staff with the Civilian Police and civilian
staff (humanitarian liaison, political officers, public
affairs officers, etc.) Mentoring here is absolutely
essential. NATO experience in IFOR, ISAF, etc., is precisely
what is needed to help AMIS J3/J5 improve, stand up the JOC,
and ease UNMIS transition.


11. (C) Logistics has been called AMIS's Achilles heel. The
mission is overly dependent on air movement of assets and
supplies, thus creating an enormous fuel requirement - which
is flown in from Dubai. The JLOC is helping improve
logistics management; this is where the transition from UNMIS
to AMIS should be assisted soonest: using UNMIS logisticians
to help AMIS. AMIS could begin to draw on UNMIS logistics
expertise and support almost immediately. UNMIS uses El
Obeid as its primary operational staging base; El Obeid
should be considered as (in military terms) the Corps Support
Command for both UNMIS and AMIS through the transition period.

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Things AMIS Must Do
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12. (C) The Forward Headquarters in El Fasher must be
restructured to more resemble a conventional division level
Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. The restructuring would
include the creation of the JOC and its integration with the
Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC).


13. (C) In accordance with the AU Peace and Security Council

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decision on March 10, UNMIS and AMIS should immediately begin
working out the details of the transition by embedding UNMIS
staff officers onto the AMIS staff in El Fasher.


14. (C) AMIS units that are expected to remain a part of
UNMIS should immediately begin to acquire, deploy, and use
integral logistics support equipment, replacing PA&E's
functions of motor transport, maintenance, food service,
medical, and communications. This would move the battalions
closer to meeting the UNMIS standards.


15. (C) AMIS must change its operational mind-set and take
advantage of the equipment and training it receives. Patrols
must go out and stay out for days at a time, covering areas
they could previously not reach because of the self-imposed
curfew. AMIS must pursue aggressively its mandate to
"provide a secure environment for the delivery of
humanitarian relief and returns of IDPs and refugees." AMIS
must follow its Rules of Engagement to "protect civilians in
imminent danger in the immediate area, in identified areas of
threat, and throughout the Darfur region," to "provide area
security for humanitarian operations throughout the Darfur
region of Sudan," to "escort humanitarian movements where
necessary," to "provide a secure environment by the
establishment of temporary outposts and intense patrolling in
order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing
hostile acts against the populations through Darfur," to
carry out preventive deployment as necessary to reduce
incidences of inter-party attacks," to "be prepared to deploy
force elements between parties as necessary in advance of
potential clashes... and to fill vacuums of power."

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Selling it to the Sudanese
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16. (C) The enhancement of AMIS in the next six months comes
in the context of UN re-hatting, which the Sudanese continue
to reject, except under specific circumstances. Hence, they
may fight these enhancements, particularly insofar as they
may involve increased numbers of non-African troops. One
way to reduce its suspicions is to use to the greatest extent
possible NATO affiliated nations to provide mentoring -
particularly Mediterranean Dialogue countries like Algeria,
Tunisia, and Morocco. African nations like Namibia, Angola,
and South Africa should also be part of the mentorship
process. Perhaps Turkey would be an acceptable NATO partner.
ACOTA-trained units can be used as well. The fewer the
number of troops from Europe and North America that are in
the mix, the more the Sudanese will find it palatable.

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But the Hardest Part...
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17. (C) Most importantly, AMIS must want to change. AMIS
must want to patrol more aggressively, and during both day
and night. AMIS must want to restructure and evolve. AMIS
must want to accept mentorship, instruction, and guidance
from outside nations. Otherwise, no input of equipment or
training will much of a make a difference.
STEINFELD