DARFUR: MEETING WITH UN POL ADVISOR ON AMIS/UNMIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000660 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU UN SUBJECT: DARFUR: MEETING WITH UN POL ADVISOR ON AMIS/UNMIS TRANSITION Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Cameron Hume; Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) On March 15 CDA Hume met with Jack Christofides, senior political adviser to UNSRSG Jan Pronk. Hume said he had urged the Sudanese government to cooperate with the UN on planning for a mission, whether or not they reserved their position on conditions in which it would take place. He described recent USG contacts relating to the Abuja peace talks, including the understanding that AU mediator Salim would push ahead with the "enhanced humanitarian ceasefire" draft, with mediation texts on wealth- and power-sharing. ¶2. (C) Christofides said that neither AMIS nor the Sudanese government had yet cooperated with UN planning for an operation in Darfur. AU Mission Head Kingibe had so far avoided regular consultations with UNSRSG Pronk, although a meeting was now planned to take place next week. For its part, the Sudanese government had turned aside all efforts to plan for the visit of a UN assessment team to discuss possible operations in Darfur. That visit would not take place before April, and a report to the Security Council was not likely before May. ¶3. (C) Christofides said the most important element in UN planning was an unknown: whether the parties to the peace talks in Abuja would reach an overall agreement, or an agreement on an enhanced humanitarian ceasefire, or no agreement at all. The worst case for the UN would be another agreement that neither side abided by, resulting in planning for an environment conducive to peace-keeping when in fact hostilities continued. He said Salim's current cease-fire draft "lacked teeth;" the UN was worried that the parties might agree on long-term security arrangements that would be impractical for the UN to implement. He said it was important for Salim to move ahead with drafts on wealth- and power-sharing, and he reported that Salim's team was consulting with UN experts in preparing these texts. ¶4. (C) Hume asked what steps the UN intended to take next. In addition to making arrangements for an April visit by the assessment team, UNSYG Annan was considering how best to make use of his contacts during the upcoming Arab League summit. One option was to send USYG Ibrahim Gambari to represent him at the summit, a choice that would lead to a sharper focus on Arab/Israeli issues and less of a focus on peace-keeping in Sudan. The other option was to send Lakhdar Brahimi as a special envoy, a move that would put more focus on peace-keeping issues. Hume suggested that the choice might not be so stark. If Brahimi were to be called on to pave the way for UN peace-keepers, the timing and circumstances for his involvement should be decided by the odds for success, not by the happenstance of an Arab League summit. ¶5. (C) Christofides said that Pronk had just returned from a visit to Asmara to discuss Eastern Sudan with President Isaias Afwerki. Pronk had expected to meet with representatives of the Beja Congress during his visit, but they failed to appear. Afwerki made biting comments about the SPLM leadership, saying that the NCP leadership in Khartoum had taken advantage of Salva Kiir and turned FM Lam Akol into their agent. Pronk came away from his meeting pessimistic about the near term prospects for any progress in solving Eastern Sudan issues. HUME