DARFUR: CHARGE MEETS WITH MFA UNDERSECRETARY

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000655

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: CHARGE MEETS WITH MFA UNDERSECRETARY
SADDIQ MUTRIFF


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Cameron Hume; Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Charge Cameron Hume and MFA Undersecretary
Saddiq Mutriff discussed the AU mediation's new "Enhanced
Humanitarian Ceasefire" proposal on March 14. Hume advised
Mutriff to use the document to engage the other side in
negotiations, and work constructively on the proposal.
Mutriff briefed Hume on Vice President Taha's recent meetings
with Mini Minawi and Khalil Ibrahim in Tripoli. Hume also
urged Sudan to cooperate with the U.N. planning assessment
team scheduled to visit Darfur, and to resolve the status of
the International Military Advisory Team (IMAT). End Summary.

Hume to Mutriff: Respond to the Ceasefire Proposal
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2. (C) On March 14 Charge Hume met with MFA Undersecretary
Saddiq Mutriff to discuss status of Darfur negotiations in
Abuja. Hume noted that Deputy Secretary Zoellick planned to
call VP Taha this week to discuss cooperation with the AU
mediation at the talks.


3. (C) Hume asked what the government's reaction was to the
"Enhanced Humanitarian Ceasefire" document that the mediation
had presented to the parties in Abuja. Mutriff said he was
aware of the document, but had not yet studied it. Although
the government did not object to improving the ceasefire, it
had several doubts that this effort would bear fruit: 1) it
doubted that Abdel Wahid, Mini Minawi, or Khalil Ibrahim had
effective authority to negotiate real constraints on the
freedom of action of the movements' commanders in the field;
2) it insisted that any real agreement had to include a map
that indicated the various zones of exclusion and control, a
step that the movements had previously refused absolutely;
and, 3) it questioned the wisdom of postponing a renewed
effort to conclude an agreement on a package that included
wealth- and power-sharing.


4. (C) Hume advised Mutriff that, whatever the government's
doubts about this step, it had to engage positively. If it
thought a map were needed, it should propose that the
mediation produce a map with the various zones clearly
demarcated. Perhaps the government should consider making a
unilateral offer, such as withdrawing all of its attack
helicopters from Darfur, that would put pressure on the
movements to respond with other concessions. Mutriff
acknowledged that the government had to work constructively
on the ceasefire document, even if it doubted that the
document could be the basis for a breakthrough.

Minawi, Khalil, and Taha in Tripoli
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5. (S) Mutriff described VP Taha,s recent separate meetings
in Tripoli with Dr. Khalil and with Minny Minawi. Qaddhafi
had brought Khalid and Minawi to Tripoli to coincide with
Taha,s planned refueling stopover. Taha agreed to the
meetings to listen. Khalil emphasized points relating to
power in Khartoum -- a vice president slot, ministerial
positions, and a role for his party. Minawi was accompanied
by a member of the SLA delegation in Abuja who stated
Minawi's position, emphasizing issues more relevant to
Darfur, such as the 1956 boundary and a regional government.
Taha explained to both that he appreciated the meetings, but
that these issues had to be negotiated through the talks in
Abuja.

U.N. PKO Planning Assessment Team, IMAT Status
-------------- -


6. (S) Hume said to Mutriff that it was important for the
Government of Sudan to engage constructively with the
upcoming U.N. assessment mission for the peace-keeping
operation in Darfur. It was also important for the
government to resolve the issue of a status of mission
agreement for the International Military Advisory Team
(IMAT),which the Deputy Secretary had raised with VP Taha.
Mutriff responded that these issues were difficult and needed
more work.


7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
HUME