DARFUR: CHARGE MEETS WITH MFA UNDERSECRETARY

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000655 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: CHARGE MEETS WITH MFA UNDERSECRETARY SADDIQ MUTRIFF Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Cameron Hume; Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Charge Cameron Hume and MFA Undersecretary Saddiq Mutriff discussed the AU mediation's new "Enhanced Humanitarian Ceasefire" proposal on March 14. Hume advised Mutriff to use the document to engage the other side in negotiations, and work constructively on the proposal. Mutriff briefed Hume on Vice President Taha's recent meetings with Mini Minawi and Khalil Ibrahim in Tripoli. Hume also urged Sudan to cooperate with the U.N. planning assessment team scheduled to visit Darfur, and to resolve the status of the International Military Advisory Team (IMAT). End Summary. Hume to Mutriff: Respond to the Ceasefire Proposal -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 14 Charge Hume met with MFA Undersecretary Saddiq Mutriff to discuss status of Darfur negotiations in Abuja. Hume noted that Deputy Secretary Zoellick planned to call VP Taha this week to discuss cooperation with the AU mediation at the talks. ¶3. (C) Hume asked what the government's reaction was to the "Enhanced Humanitarian Ceasefire" document that the mediation had presented to the parties in Abuja. Mutriff said he was aware of the document, but had not yet studied it. Although the government did not object to improving the ceasefire, it had several doubts that this effort would bear fruit: 1) it doubted that Abdel Wahid, Mini Minawi, or Khalil Ibrahim had effective authority to negotiate real constraints on the freedom of action of the movements' commanders in the field; 2) it insisted that any real agreement had to include a map that indicated the various zones of exclusion and control, a step that the movements had previously refused absolutely; and, 3) it questioned the wisdom of postponing a renewed effort to conclude an agreement on a package that included wealth- and power-sharing. ¶4. (C) Hume advised Mutriff that, whatever the government's doubts about this step, it had to engage positively. If it thought a map were needed, it should propose that the mediation produce a map with the various zones clearly demarcated. Perhaps the government should consider making a unilateral offer, such as withdrawing all of its attack helicopters from Darfur, that would put pressure on the movements to respond with other concessions. Mutriff acknowledged that the government had to work constructively on the ceasefire document, even if it doubted that the document could be the basis for a breakthrough. Minawi, Khalil, and Taha in Tripoli -------------- ¶5. (S) Mutriff described VP Taha,s recent separate meetings in Tripoli with Dr. Khalil and with Minny Minawi. Qaddhafi had brought Khalid and Minawi to Tripoli to coincide with Taha,s planned refueling stopover. Taha agreed to the meetings to listen. Khalil emphasized points relating to power in Khartoum -- a vice president slot, ministerial positions, and a role for his party. Minawi was accompanied by a member of the SLA delegation in Abuja who stated Minawi's position, emphasizing issues more relevant to Darfur, such as the 1956 boundary and a regional government. Taha explained to both that he appreciated the meetings, but that these issues had to be negotiated through the talks in Abuja. U.N. PKO Planning Assessment Team, IMAT Status -------------- - ¶6. (S) Hume said to Mutriff that it was important for the Government of Sudan to engage constructively with the upcoming U.N. assessment mission for the peace-keeping operation in Darfur. It was also important for the government to resolve the issue of a status of mission agreement for the International Military Advisory Team (IMAT),which the Deputy Secretary had raised with VP Taha. Mutriff responded that these issues were difficult and needed more work. ¶7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. HUME