SPLA's Cirilo: JIUs Not Operational Anytime

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000633 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MOPS SU SUBJECT: SPLA's Cirilo: JIUs Not Operational Anytime Soon ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On March 4, CG Juba Officials met with Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Brigadier General Thomas Cirilo, commander of the SPLA Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) and member of the Joint Defense Board (JDB). Cirilo said the JIUs still only exist on paper, and that the March 15 deadline for deploying troops into JIUs will be missed. He explained that all SPLA troops are in position in the south, but the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have yet to deploy in most places. Cirilo characterized this delay as another sign that the north is not serious about peace implementation. In addition to this lack of will, Cirilo believed the greatest challenges facing the formation of the JIUs are budget, logistics, communications, and training, although some progress has been made. Cirilo could not give an estimate for when the JIUs would be ready, which he though was problematic for ensuring CPA implementation and even possible prospects for peace in Darfur. End Summary. -------------- Movement at the Top -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Although the JIUs are a long way from becoming operational, Cirilo said some work has already been done. The JDB has been meeting and the organizational structure for the JIUs has been generally agreed upon. The JIUs will be formed with separate SAF and SPLA units operating under a unified command structure. For instance, in one brigade, the basic units will be split evenly between SAF and SPLA troops. Above these units, at every level in the command structure, there will be either an SPLA commander with an SAF deputy or vice versa. The two may then switch positions after a predetermined period of time, perhaps one year. Within this brigade, the troops will live, work, and train together. ¶3. (SBU) Cirilo said that the Joint Military Technical Committee (JMTC),essentially the secretariat of the JDB, has also begun work. After holding meetings in the Officer's Club in Khartoum, the group was now looking for a new space. ¶4. (SBU) However, even at this operational level, there are problems. Cirilo's only communication with the JDB and JMTC is through his Thuraya phone, making him inaccessible when he is inside a building. Cirilo said that the JIUs also need a headquarters in Juba. Gesturing to the mangoes overhead, Cirilo pointed out �0A;that the JIUs function like guerrillas, meeting under the trees. He complained that all SPLA troops in Juba were still living like guerrillas. There have been discussions about moving SPLA troops into the Juba military base as a part of JIU formation, but the timeframe they have been given for this by the SAF is "inshallah." ¶5. (SBU) The only operational unit of the JIUs is the JIU military police (MP) in Juba. Cirilo said this group has been effective in keeping the peace and has been able to respond quickly and effectively to any disturbances, especially disturbances involving soldiers. Because each JIU MP unit has at least one person from each army, they have the credibility to calm most situations, and to take into custody anyone who needs to be arrested. ¶6. (SBU) By contrast, he said that the SPLA and SAF troops in Torit, from which he recently returned, were causing problems. Cirilo believes that both armies need to pull back to their barracks and allow civilian police to maintain order. -------------- JIUs Need A Lot of Support -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Cirilo said that the JIUs were a long way from becoming operational, and that he could not even estimate a timeframe for formation. He said they needed a budget, effective communications and other logistics, and joint training. On the budget, he said that the Ministry of Finance only recently started releasing money to support the JIUs, which are funded separately from each individual army to ensure parity. To date, Cirilo claimed the SPLA has only received half the money it needs to pay its JIU-deployed soldiers for January. To prevent problems associated with making partial payments or only paying some troops, the SPLA has, therefore, decided to withhold all payments until the full amount is released. KHARTOUM 00000633 002 OF 002 ¶8. (SBU) In terms of communications and logistics, Cirilo said that they lack the fundamental equipment necessary to deploy as a joint unit and to coordinate any operations. Joint training is also important to ensure that all JIU troops from both armies are at the same level, and to build confidence and teamwork between them. Cirilo said he was unfamiliar with the IMAT training program, but that the SPLA Chief of Staff, General Oyai Deng, was handling all training directly. -------------- Distrust High -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Throughout the meeting, Cirilo expressed a high level of distrust of the SAF and northerners. He felt the SAF was stalling in JIU deployments to prevent the units from forming. Meanwhile, he maintained that the SAF was not redeploying its non-JIU troops to the north, and was even bringing in additional weapons in violation of the CPA. Cirilo said that the SAF has not been notifying the SPLA of redeployments, as stipulated in the CPA, so they have been unable to verify any SAF claims. ¶10. (SBU) Cirilo asserted that the SPLA is constantly under surveillance and said that he cannot use his satellite phone anymore, his primary means of communication, because all his calls are monitored. Cirilo requested assistance from the USG in providing the SPLA with secure communications so that they could exercise command without being compromised. Cirilo also said that he believes the vehicles provided to GoSS officials in Khartoum are bugged. -------------- JIUs No Help For Darfur -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Cirilo believes that the formation of the JIUs is critical for protecting CPA implementation, and if they are not properly formed, unity will be impossible. The general also briefly touched on John Garang's plan to use JIUs to help control the situation in Darfur. Cirilo said that he has not heard any talk of this plan since Garang died, but that it was now impossible because of the length of time it would take to bring the JIUs up to speed. We estimate six months of basic training and six months of additional training in peacekeeping would be necessary for the JIUs to be effective. WHITAKER