PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAHUDDIN OFFERS HIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000562

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SR AF DIRECTOR COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET PINS PINR SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAHUDDIN OFFERS HIS
VIEWS


Classified By: CG REWhitehead, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: CG Juba met with Presidential Advisor
Ghazi Salahuddin on March 4 to review, inter alia, CPA
implementation issues. Ghazi discussed internal dynamics in
the Government of National Unity (GNU),the SPLM's role in
the GNU, progress on the division of petroleum revenues,
Abyei, and SPLM accusations of northern support of the LRA.
End summary.

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CPA Implementation
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2. (C) Ghazi said Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
implementation has not progressed as smoothly as it might
have, but that he believed that most contentions could be
worked out. He admitted that Darfur has created a major
distraction for all involved in the CPA process. Ghazi
commented that there was a growing sentiment in the North,
and among National Congress Party (NCP) supporters, that the
secession of the South might not be an undesirable outcome.
There was growing "peace of mind" on issues pertaining to the
South, especially in regards to the likely regional and
ethnic turmoil that he believed were bound to erupt in the
South. He added that most northerners were far more
concerned with uncertainties prevailing in the North.
Nonetheless, he personally believed that secession would be a
mistake.

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Internal Dynamics
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3. (C) Ghazi discounted current rumors that the influence of
Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha was in decline. He said
that the relationship between Taha and President Bashir was
unchanged. Taha realized his moment of triumph with the CPA,
but naturally Bashir moved more to the forefront with the
establishment of the GNU. He said that Taha had withdrawn
himself somewhat from his role as de facto prime minister,
and that disarray in government was the result. Bashir
remained withdrawn/indecisive on most matters, and, in fact,
no one was playing the necessary coordinating role. Ghazi
said that he had strongly pushed against elements in the GNU
who wished to use the NCP majority to impose outcomes on the
SPLM. He had prevailed on Bashir, much to Taha's chagrin, to
withdraw three presidential decrees that had inflamed the
opinion of the SPLM. Ghazi thought that the NCP majority was
best used as a shield rather than a sword, blocking
unacceptable SPLM initiatives, but not forcing equally
polarizing NCP positions on its putative partner in
government.

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SPLM's Role
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4. (C) He expressed concern that the SPLM was not doing its
part to make the GNU work. He said that Salva Kiir has begun
to take his role as First Vice President more serQusly, but
nonetheless remained preoccupied with the South at the
expense of the GNU. He described Kiir's November visit to
Washington as a fiasco, especially what he characterized as
"a fumbling" message on U.S. sanctions on Sudan. Ghazi was
also critical of some of Rebecca Garang's comments about CPA
implementation during her visit to the U.S., a statement that
he felt obscured steady progress and cast the North/South
relationship in inaccurately negative terms. He said that
Government of Southern Sudan Vice President Riek Machaar's
statements about SPLM indifference to shifting the AMIS
mandate in Darfur to the UN represented another misstep: in
the National Assembly, the SPLM had clearly stated that it
favored a policy of maintaining the AU presence in Darfur.
(Note: Three SPLM MPs subsequently told CG that this was not
necessarily so, and sprang from a misinterpretation of
comments on UNSCR 1593 made in the Assembly by SPLM Party
Chair Yassir Arman. End note.)

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Petroluem Revenues
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5. (SBU) Ghazi said that there had been good progress on
demystifying the controversial partition of petroleum
receipts. He said that a meeting scheduled for the evening
of March 4 was expected to clarify the situation. The GNU
had provided figures showing that all but thirteen percent of
revenues had been deposited in the Government of Southern

KHARTOUM 00000562 002 OF 002


Sudan (GoSS) account, and the balance would be paid. The
real issue, he stressed, was what the GoSS had done with the
other 87 percent. CG suggested that both sides might
consider a neutral mechanism of some description to monitor
contracts/receipts and thus avoid future confusion on the
revenue split. Ghazi observed that, if a joint mechanism
saQsfactory to both sides could not be worked out, this
might be an interesting alternative.

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Abyei
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6. (C) He cauQoned thatQbyei remains the single greatest
threat to implementation of the CPA. He said that the
acceptance of the 1905 Dinka Ngok chieftancy formula, and
what he saw as the Abyei Boundaries Commission's overreach,
as mistakes, but "ones that we have to live with." Ghazi
said that the upcoming Missiriya transhumance passage into
Abyei would be a critical period.

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No Ties to LRA
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7. (C) CG noted that outside of the issue of petroleum
revenues, the perception in the South that the North
continued to support that LRA was the most emotive issue.
Ghazi said that the GNU did not support the LRA and had been
surprised by public accusations from the GoSS/SPLM that
support continued. He did not see any policy other than
continued denial that this was true.
WHITEHEAD