UNMIS HEAD OF OFFICE ON SPLA, JONGLEI CONFLICT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000545

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS PGOV SU CG UG UN
SUBJECT: UNMIS HEAD OF OFFICE ON SPLA, JONGLEI CONFLICT,
AND LRA

REF: KHARTOUM 482

Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld for reasons section: 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (SBU) Summary. UNMIS Head of Office in South Sudan James
Ellory and CG met on February 24 to discuss security issues
in South Sudan, including developments in the SPLA, how to
keep a lid on the situation in Jonglei State, and the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA). Ellory expressed frustration with the
slow GoSS approach on the LRA issue and suggested that a
muscular response was required to prevent the LRA problem
from becoming an internal southern Sudanese affair. End
Summary.

--------------
SPLA Transformation
--------------


2. (C) Recently returned from leave, Ellory discussed the
current state of security in South Sudan. He expressed
concern that the GoSS/SPLA had been unable to pay salaries to
the troops. He said that this was having a deleterious
effect on security, with some SPLA troops resorting to
criminal activities to support themselves. Ellory agreed
that the inability of the SPLA command to determine the
number and location of troops was the root cause. He said
that the 2006 SPLA budget was approximately USD 80 million.
UNMIS estimated that this would translate into a force
structure of approximately 100,000. Ellory said that
restructuring the SPLA into a more efficient professional
force was crucial. The longer this process took, the more
difficult DDR and the maintenance of internal discipline
would be.

--------------
Next Steps in Jonglei State
--------------


3. (SBU) Ellory said that he had not been to Jonglei state
since transporting Simon Gatwich there to help stabilize the
situation following the clash between SPLA troops and the
White Army and elements of the SSDF (reftel). CG explained
the reported risks associated with a spontaneous move of Nuer
cattle camps south toward the territory of the Dinka Bor.
Ellory said that he would instruct the very capable UMNIS
Sector Commander in Malakal to analyze the situation and
devise a strategy to avoid additional violence.

--------------
The LRA
--------------


4. (C) Ellory said that he was convinced that the aborted
attack on the UN compound in Yambio was not the work of the
LRA. The tactics differed, and the LRA would not have been
so easily deterred. He thought that disgruntled SPLA were
involved, as they had been earlier in a similar incident in
Maridi. He had prevailed on the SPLA command to move the
regional HQ from Maridi to a different site, and the problem
had stopped.


5. (C) He said that he would seek a meeting with Kiir to
discuss the GoSS response, or lack thereof, to the LRA issue.
Ellory remarked that Kiir suffered from "muddled thinking"
on the subject, as evidenced by Kiir's continued offer to
mediate between Uganda and the LRA. Ellory thought this
impossible, since the problem was in Uganda, not Sudan, and
needed to be resolved among the Ugandans. He questioned the
ability of LRA leadership to engage in any meaningful
negotiations in any case. He concluded that the SPLA and
Kiir were taking a blinkered approach to a problem that was
having a negative effect on the South disproportionate to its
scope. He concluded that there was evidence that the LRA had
begun to take on a more Sudanese character, and that to
ignore it risked creating a problem that could take years to
eliminate. He intended to press this message on Kiir.


6. (C) Ellory briefly discussed the deadly clash between
Guatemalan Special Forces and the LRA in the Garamba Park in
DRC, which he said the UN had mishandled badly on the public
relations level. Press reporting and UN statements had
focused on PKO losses, not the twenty LRA killed, and press
portrayed the incident as a UN defeat. The outcome could
have been much worse. Ellory understood that the operation
had started as a reconnaissance in force that had either been
leaked by someone, or else had been the product of a contact
with what the UN troops thought was a small force they could
take down, only to find themselves surrounded by a large
concentration of LRA in heavy undergrowth. Whatever the
circumstances, he expected a more cautious approach by the UN
for the immediate future.

KHARTOUM 00000545 002 OF 002




7. (C) Ellory said that he did not believe that the LRA
could be reformed easily. They enjoyed their ability to take
women and spoils at will and would not desist until they had
been given a black eye. He thought that a couple of
successful search and destroy operation in Sudan would send
the majority back across the border.


8. (C) He said that attack helicopters were unsuitable for
the dense terrain of the DRC, but they were perfect for the
burnt dry season terrain of South Sudan. If ground troops
could flush out LRA units, gun ships could easily destroy
them from the air. He said that an ideal solution would be
to use the UPDF units assisted by competent special force
advisors to root out LRA pockets. He noted that there were
indications from his contacts back home that the UK
government might be interested in such an approach. He
wondered what US thinking might be. CG replied that to this
point, to the best of his knowledge, no level of the various
governmental layers in Sudan had requested such assistance.
The sensitivities of such an approach were self-evident.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) A retired British brigadier who served in the elite
Parachute Regiment, and who has been in both Sierra Leone and
Iraq, Ellory is prone to looking for muscular solutions to
security problems. It is unclear if his comments were
personal musings, or if they sprung from prior consultations.
Given the nature of the LRA, the possibilities of a
negotiated solution seem limited. The alternative, asking a
war-weary and unpaid SPLA force to aggressively engage LRA
fighters, also seems problematic.
STEINFELD