UNMIS HEAD OF OFFICE ON SPLA, JONGLEI CONFLICT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000545 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS PGOV SU CG UG UN SUBJECT: UNMIS HEAD OF OFFICE ON SPLA, JONGLEI CONFLICT, AND LRA REF: KHARTOUM 482 Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld for reasons section: 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. UNMIS Head of Office in South Sudan James Ellory and CG met on February 24 to discuss security issues in South Sudan, including developments in the SPLA, how to keep a lid on the situation in Jonglei State, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Ellory expressed frustration with the slow GoSS approach on the LRA issue and suggested that a muscular response was required to prevent the LRA problem from becoming an internal southern Sudanese affair. End Summary. -------------- SPLA Transformation -------------- ¶2. (C) Recently returned from leave, Ellory discussed the current state of security in South Sudan. He expressed concern that the GoSS/SPLA had been unable to pay salaries to the troops. He said that this was having a deleterious effect on security, with some SPLA troops resorting to criminal activities to support themselves. Ellory agreed that the inability of the SPLA command to determine the number and location of troops was the root cause. He said that the 2006 SPLA budget was approximately USD 80 million. UNMIS estimated that this would translate into a force structure of approximately 100,000. Ellory said that restructuring the SPLA into a more efficient professional force was crucial. The longer this process took, the more difficult DDR and the maintenance of internal discipline would be. -------------- Next Steps in Jonglei State -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Ellory said that he had not been to Jonglei state since transporting Simon Gatwich there to help stabilize the situation following the clash between SPLA troops and the White Army and elements of the SSDF (reftel). CG explained the reported risks associated with a spontaneous move of Nuer cattle camps south toward the territory of the Dinka Bor. Ellory said that he would instruct the very capable UMNIS Sector Commander in Malakal to analyze the situation and devise a strategy to avoid additional violence. -------------- The LRA -------------- ¶4. (C) Ellory said that he was convinced that the aborted attack on the UN compound in Yambio was not the work of the LRA. The tactics differed, and the LRA would not have been so easily deterred. He thought that disgruntled SPLA were involved, as they had been earlier in a similar incident in Maridi. He had prevailed on the SPLA command to move the regional HQ from Maridi to a different site, and the problem had stopped. ¶5. (C) He said that he would seek a meeting with Kiir to discuss the GoSS response, or lack thereof, to the LRA issue. Ellory remarked that Kiir suffered from "muddled thinking" on the subject, as evidenced by Kiir's continued offer to mediate between Uganda and the LRA. Ellory thought this impossible, since the problem was in Uganda, not Sudan, and needed to be resolved among the Ugandans. He questioned the ability of LRA leadership to engage in any meaningful negotiations in any case. He concluded that the SPLA and Kiir were taking a blinkered approach to a problem that was having a negative effect on the South disproportionate to its scope. He concluded that there was evidence that the LRA had begun to take on a more Sudanese character, and that to ignore it risked creating a problem that could take years to eliminate. He intended to press this message on Kiir. ¶6. (C) Ellory briefly discussed the deadly clash between Guatemalan Special Forces and the LRA in the Garamba Park in DRC, which he said the UN had mishandled badly on the public relations level. Press reporting and UN statements had focused on PKO losses, not the twenty LRA killed, and press portrayed the incident as a UN defeat. The outcome could have been much worse. Ellory understood that the operation had started as a reconnaissance in force that had either been leaked by someone, or else had been the product of a contact with what the UN troops thought was a small force they could take down, only to find themselves surrounded by a large concentration of LRA in heavy undergrowth. Whatever the circumstances, he expected a more cautious approach by the UN for the immediate future. KHARTOUM 00000545 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Ellory said that he did not believe that the LRA could be reformed easily. They enjoyed their ability to take women and spoils at will and would not desist until they had been given a black eye. He thought that a couple of successful search and destroy operation in Sudan would send the majority back across the border. ¶8. (C) He said that attack helicopters were unsuitable for the dense terrain of the DRC, but they were perfect for the burnt dry season terrain of South Sudan. If ground troops could flush out LRA units, gun ships could easily destroy them from the air. He said that an ideal solution would be to use the UPDF units assisted by competent special force advisors to root out LRA pockets. He noted that there were indications from his contacts back home that the UK government might be interested in such an approach. He wondered what US thinking might be. CG replied that to this point, to the best of his knowledge, no level of the various governmental layers in Sudan had requested such assistance. The sensitivities of such an approach were self-evident. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) A retired British brigadier who served in the elite Parachute Regiment, and who has been in both Sierra Leone and Iraq, Ellory is prone to looking for muscular solutions to security problems. It is unclear if his comments were personal musings, or if they sprung from prior consultations. Given the nature of the LRA, the possibilities of a negotiated solution seem limited. The alternative, asking a war-weary and unpaid SPLA force to aggressively engage LRA fighters, also seems problematic. STEINFELD