Southern Sudan: Meeting with GoSS President's

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000487 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINS MOPS PREL SU SUBJECT: Southern Sudan: Meeting with GoSS President's Advisors ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: On February 21, CG Juba met with Presidential Advisors for Legal Affairs Paul Mayom and Gender Affairs Awut Deng. Mayom offered his views on GoSS priorities; following discussions ranged over alleged northern support of the Lord's Resistance Army, U.S. sanctions on Sudan, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Mayom briefly addressed the White Nile Ltd. vs. Total controversy, expressing his view that a partition of Super Block B was the correct solution. End Summary. -------------- SPLM/A to Remain GoSS Mainstay -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Mayom offered a blueprint for how the South could succeed, beginning with a strengthened SPLM at the center. He said that the SPLM remained and would remain the mainstay for the GoSS for the foreseeable future and that it was essential to create functional institutions that could deliver palpable peace dividends to the population. Absent this, popular dissatisfaction with the establishment would grow, and there would be no alternate political force to govern the South. He stressed that the GoSS needed to simultaneously strengthen the SPLA. The military was responsible for security across a vast stretch of territory and had to remain vigilant that old foes did not attempt to once again destabilize and fan conflict. -------------- -------------- Views on the LRA and Means of Addressing its Threat -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) CG cited Salva Kiir's public statement about continued northern support for the LRA and asked if this represented a change of view within the GoSS. Mayom responded that the North had brought the LRA into Southern Sudan on the pretext that Kampala supported the SPLA, and there was still evidence that northern support continued. Kiir's comments were simply an affirmation of the facts. CG recalled Kiir's formula for dealing with the LRA - disarmament and pacification, return to Uganda, or a military solution - and noted that none of these seemed underway. Mayom replied that the GoSS preferred option was its stated intention to facilitate a negotiated settlement between the LRA and the Ugandan Government that was not dissimilar to the peace deal between north and south Sudan. The GoSS remained hopeful this could still occur. ¶4. (SBU) If it did not, he continued, two options remained. The second most favorable in the GoSS view was the return of the LRA to pursue its war in Uganda, since the LRA stated raison d'etre was to fight for the people of northern Uganda, not against Southern Sudan. The least desirable option was a resort to arms. The GoSS was aware that the pursuit and destruction of LRA elements in Southern Sudan, especially children pressed into arms by the LRA, would generate adverse international publicity. ¶5. (SBU) CG countered that the LRA was having a disproportionately negative impact on the attempt to stabilize and develop the South. How long could the GoSS let this persist? Mayom replied that the CPA has a fixed deadline for the departure of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) forces from the South and the deployment of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) with mixed SAF/SPLA elements. With the SAF and northern military intelligence personnel no longer on the ground to harbor and supply the LRA, a SPLA military solution would not be difficult. -------------- -------------- U.S. Sanctions: Unfair to Punish South for Actions of North -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) CG said that he had heard a range of opinions on U.S. sanctions in prior meeting with GoSS officials and would appreciate a clear statement of GoSS policy. Mayom replied that it remained exactly what Kiir had stated in Washington in November. Given the war in Darfur and northern aggression in the East, the SPLM and GoSS could not morally call for a lifting of sanctions, even if the SPLM was a partner in government. However, it was unfair to punish the South for actions of the North in which the South was no way involved, and thus sanctions should be lifted in the South to help promote recovery and development. -------------- -------------- CPA and Clarification of USG Objectives in So. Sudan -------------- -------------- KHARTOUM 00000487 002 OF 002 ¶7. (SBU) Mayom said that he would appreciate an equally clear statement of USG policy toward Southern Sudan - what exactly did the USG seek? CG responded that we remain committed to the CPA as the negotiated, mutually acceptable framework to maintain peace between the North and South, and we want both sides to respect their implementation commitments. We also see an essential role for the SPLM, as a partner in government, in working to achieve a negotiated peace in Darfur and the East. Without peace in all of Sudan, stability and democratic transformation would be challenged throughout. -------------- --- Oil Controversy Continues: White Nile vs. Total -------------- --- ¶8. (SBU) CG asked if Mayom could supply any information on the resolution of the controversy over who retained petroleum rights in what parts of Super Block B (Central) in the South. Mayom launched into a long retrospective and eventually came to the point that the best solution would be a partition of the block between various groups. He stressed that there were legal irregularities in the signature of the revised 2004 contract between Total and the GOS just prior to the signature of the CPA, a concession that Total had abandoned for twenty years, thus violating the terms of the initial contract. He described the arrangement between White Nile (WNL) and Nilepet as more equitable to the South and invited comments from Awut Deng, one of the original board members appointed to Nilepet in ¶2004. She offered none. Mayom said that huge concessions of this sort were an anachronism and that smaller blocks should be granted to a range of companies, including Chevron, if it remained interested. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (SBU) This is the first time that we have heard a GoSS official suggest that the SPLA will wait until the SAF has completely withdrawn to take on the LRA, and cannot say if this is official thinking or Mayom's personal view. Two years would be a long wait. Mayom is known to be a strong supporter of WNL. ¶10. (SBU) Salva Kiir's public statement in Juba on February 21 in advance of his departure for Khartoum appeared to be walking back to some degrees his accusation of northern support for the LRA. -------------- Bio Notes -------------- ¶11. (SBU) A Dinka from Bahr el Ghazal, Mayom was a trusted lieutenant of John Garang and was the first senior southern to advance to Khartoum after the signature of the CPA, to open the SPLM office there. A lawyer by training, he has had numerous positions in the movement. Although he serves as Kiir's advisor, he was reportedly at odds with Kiir during Kiir's confrontation with Garang in late 2004. HUME