POST MORTEM ON CONFLICT IN JONGLEI,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000482 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV MOPS PINS SOCI PINR PHUM SU SUBJECT: POST MORTEM ON CONFLICT IN JONGLEI, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 17, CG Juba met with Gatkuoth D. Kuich, Member of the Southern Legislative Assembly from the Waat Constituency in Jonglei State, where fighting broke out between the SPLA and Nuer militia two weeks past. Kuich had traveled to the area and interviewed civilians, SPLA officers, SPLM officials, and militia fighters in order to prepare a report for submission to the Assembly and the GoSS. He described a chaotic situation in which forced disarmament, poor communications, tribalism, and bad faith from all parties involved had contributed. Kuich said that while the situation is presently stable, impending cattle camp migrations could cause renewed violence. End summary. -------------- Root Causes -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Kuich cited forced disarmament of civilians by the SPLA, with attendant abuses, as a root cause. On the orders of the Jonglei Governor, a force of 1,700 SPLA began disarmament following a three-day conclave with local tribal chiefs. SSDF troops from Yirol County accompanied the mission and explained to the chiefs that they had become part of the SPLA. The operation initially went smoothly, until an SPLA soldier reportedly raped a Nuer woman, and other SPLA soldiers beat a number of civilians until they surrendered weapons that they had claimed not to possess. The SPLA confiscated 220 guns and recruited 180 new troops, who were able to keep their weapons. Villages in their line of march began emptying before the SPLA troops arrived as word of the abuses - much embellished in the retelling - spread. ¶3. (SBU) An earlier decision by the Governor that local Nuer cattle herders saw as partial to the Dinka Bor also played a part. As water has dried up around Waat and Yaui in recent years, the SPLA had provided an escort to accompany the Nuer and their herds to pasturage along the Toich River, near the Dinka Bor. Recent Dinka returnees to that area had expressed fear that the Nuer would attempt to seize cattle, and the Governor announced that the annual migration would not be authorized this year. The Nuer were outraged. -------------- Details of the Conflict -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Advance SPLA troops arrived in Yaui expecting no trouble despite the fact that it is a hotbed of the White Army, a Nuer tribal militia that provides security for cattle camps and loots and rustles livestock from surrounding peoples. Among them were elements of the local SSDF, a more organized force that had not yet been integrated with the SPLA. After initial talks between SPLA officers and the local chief, who had agreed to disarmament, a small group of armed SPLA troops went to the market, where they were confronted by Nuer youth demanding that they leave. A SPLA soldier fired a burst in front of the group to drive them off, weapons appeared from everywhere, and a generalized firefight ensued. ¶5. (SBU) The main body of the SPLA force arrived just as the fracas commenced, and utter chaos reigned. Virtually every White Army militiaman in the town, plus local SSDF troops, raced toward the shooting, as did the SPLA, and the market was engulfed in close combat. Realizing the operation had gone hopelessly awry, the SPLA commander ordered a retreat by his men and the smaller Yirol SSDF force, all of whom fled the town in disarray. A number of SPLA officers were captured and other SPLA groups scattered into the bush nearby. Kuich said he had confirmed 27 White Army dead, all men and all combatants, and at least 45 SPLA, the majority perishing of thirst. Kuich said that neither Gabriel Tang nor Gordon Kong or their supporters were in any way connected with the fight, and that the extravagant claims made by them and other northern Government of National Unity officials were false. -------------- Who to Blame? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Kuich said that he had interviewed individuals high and low to try and determine who was responsible. SPLA soldiers and officers told him that "the leadership" had approved the disarmament. Minister of the Council of Ministers Justin Yaac had told Kuich that he did not know who had authorized the plan. The Governor of Jonglei KHARTOUM 00000482 002 OF 002 said that the chiefs and civilians had requested the disarmament. Kuich spoke by telephone with the SPLA Chief of Staff, in Eritrea at the time, and was told that disarmament was SPLA policy but refused to say who had authorized the operation in Yaui. ¶7. (SBU) In Kuich's view, there is plenty of blame to spread. Two young fighters from the White Army admitted that the rank and file had made prior plans to attack the SPLA when they arrived in order to procure additional arms, a reverse disarmament. Kuich said that his report would cite negligence, poor coordination in local government, and weak linkages to the GoSS as major failings. He also listed poor communication between Nuer tribal leaders and the population as a contributing cause. Kuich said that a full investigation would seek to determine individual accountability of those involved. -------------- Next Steps -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Kuich credited former SSDF general (now SPLA) Simon Gatwich for his role in defusing the crisis. In Kuich's conversations with Yaui civilians and the White Army, they said they would now be willing to disarm if two conditions were met: the SPLA provided adequate security and took measures to provide sufficient water for them and their herds from new boreholes. They also demanded that the SPLA designate assembly points on the border between the Nuer and Murle people, where they would disarm both tribal militias at the same time to prevent the Murle from raiding for cattle. And finally, the Governor should no longer take the side of the Dinka Bor. They expressed a preference for disarmament managed by UNMIS or troops from Bentiu rather than SPLA troops they had fought in the past. No one, Kuich stressed, had forgotten the bloody Dinka-Nuer clashes of 1991 and 1992. ¶9. (SBU) Kuich counseled the White Army herders to remain where they are and not attempt to force passage to the Toich River, since that would guarantee fighting and Dinka seizure of their cattle. He told CG that by the end of March all water points around Waat and Yaui will have run dry, and that one way or another the migration would occur. He said that he would stress to GoSS President Salva Kiir that a solution must be found soon to avoid another round of violence. ¶10. (SBU) Kuich said that any attempt at disarmament would be a challenge, because arms and munitions continue to come into the market. He saw many market stalls selling boxes of AK-47 cartridges. Traders bring some ammunition from the north for profit -- not necessarily politics -- and SPLA and SSDF soldiers also add to the mix by selling arms and ammunition for personal gain. -------------- Bio Data -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Kuich is a Nuer from Waat who resided in Omaha, Nebraska from 1983-1995, where he was pastor of an Evangelical Lutheran congregation and the director of several Sudanese oriented NGOs, including one that helped settle the "Lost Boys." He is one of four former U.S. residents currently sitting in the Southern Assembly. Kuich, who refused an armed escort and walked alone nine hours into Yaui, is known for his personal honesty and fearlessness. HUME