CODEL PELOSI AND VP TAHA ON CPA AND DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000440 SIPDIS SIPDIS CAPE TOWN PLS PASS CODEL PELOSI, DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO US AU UN SUBJECT: CODEL PELOSI AND VP TAHA ON CPA AND DARFUR REF: A. A) KHARTOUM 437QB) KHARTOUM 431 ¶B. C) KHARTOUM 430 KHARTOUM 00000440 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: CODEL Pelosi and Vice President Taha discussed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the crisis in Darfur during a February 19 meeting in Khartoum. The CODEL pressed Taha to get the CPA "back on track," and asked about the U.S. proposal to expand the Darfur peacekeeping force. Taha urged the CODEL to give Sudan a chance to deliver on the CPA, and rejected the CODEL's analysis of the conflict in Darfur. He also declared that Sudan would have to be convinced to accept a more robust UN-led force in Darfur -- though he did not rule it out. End Summary. -------------- -------------- CODEL Raises CPA Implementation, Genocide Concerns -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Rep. James Clyburn, Chief of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC),told Sudan Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha during a February 19 meeting with CODEL Pelosi that the caucus was filled with "anxiety and hope" about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),and wanted to help get CPA implementation "back on track." Rep. Joe Wilson asked about President Bush's proposal to expand the peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Ref C),while Rep. Maxine Waters asked Taha why he believed there was no genocide in that region. Rep. Melvin Watt continued the discussion, emphasizing that the CBC wanted to help Sudan solve the crisis in Darfur. "How do you see getting to the endgame?" Watt asked the Vice President. -------------- -- Taha: Joint Diagnosis Leads to Darfur Solution -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Taha retorted by asking why the United States was so interested in Sudan's domestic affairs, and how Sudan could engage American strengths and interests. The main difference between the Sudan and the United States has been on diagnosis; once both sides agreed on the problem, they could work together on a solution. For years, the United States has pursued a "negative policy" towards Sudan, including sanctions, which have only added to the country's suffering. But after 9/11, Taha said, American policy shifted from "fight and talk" to an emphasis on peace, which helped produce the CPA. There have been some complaints, Taha admitted, but the process is still "on track." "Give us the benefit of the doubt on delivery," he urged the delegation. ¶4. (C) The "proper diagnosis" of the Darfur problem, Taha claimed, focused on a lack of development. The clash was economic, not ethnic. "How can it be genocide when we are the same color? Who is Arab? Who is African?" he asked aloud. The problem was made worse by tensions between Libya and Chad, and by the SPLM's attempts to find allies in the region, according to Taha. This politicized traditional economic conflicts. As it had done with the South, Khartoum now had to engage the parties and pressure the rebels to engage in peace, Taha argued eloquently (but unconvincingly). -------------- --- Taha: Sudan Not Convinced on Need for UN Troops -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Responding to a question from Waters, Taha asserted that the janjaweed were simply "bandits," and that all the players had to come together to resolve the situation. But House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi countered that Americans believe the janjaweed are an extension of the government, and reminded Taha that further American divestiture from Sudan was a real possibility. Americans did not care who started the conflict, said Pelosi, only who suffered from it. ¶6. (C) When Pelosi asked Taha if Sudan would accept a more robust UN-led force in Darfur, Taha became indignant (Ref C). "Why would we do this? What would be the reason for this?" he asked the delegation. "I can't agree to receive UN troops without being convinced of the reason." The AU -- our "African brothers" -- already had troops on the ground; why not support them? Still, Taha was careful not to rule out Sudan's acceptance of UN troops. "We would have to be convinced." -------------- KHARTOUM 00000440 002.2 OF 002 Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Though the atmosphere became increasingly heated during the session, Taha's hedged on the question of UN troops in Darfur. Sudan will oppose a UN force -- unless convinced otherwise. End comment. ¶8. (U) CODEL Pelosi did not have an opportunity to clear this cable prior to its departure. ¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. HUME