DARFUR: UNSR OULD ABDULLAH BRIEFS P5 REPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002896

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PREF PHUM AU UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UNSR OULD ABDULLAH BRIEFS P5 REPS

REF: KHARTOUM 02890

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During a Dec. 22 briefing of P5 ambassadors,
UN Special Envoy Ould Abdallah said he delivered UNSYG
Annan's letter to President Bashir on Sudan's commitment to
phased peacekeeping in Darfur. Ould Abdallah noted Bashir
was skeptical, feeling the Darfur situation had been
exaggerated and that many sanctions remained in place against
Sudan. He requested a written response before returning to
New York Dec. 23. Charge Hume noted that performance
mattered more than promises; Washington is looking for
results. Discussion also dealt with UN and AU appointments;
participants stressed they be timely and coordinated. End
summary.

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Ould Abdallah: Bashir Friendly, but Skeptical
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2. (C) During a December 22 briefing of P5 Ambassadors, UN
Special Envoy Ahmadou Ould Abdallah said that he had met with
President Bashir on December 21 to deliver a letter from
UNSYG Annan requesting confirmation of Sudan's commitment to
the Addis Ababa and Abuba framework agreements on
peacekeeping operations in Darfur. Ould Abdallah surmised
that this should be easy, given that the Council of Ministers
had endorsed the matter earlier; however, he acknowledged
that the timing of the issue, with several visitors to
Khartoum and the holiday, that timing might present a
challenge. Bashir was friendly, but skeptical; he accepted
the need to address the Darfur conflict, but felt it had been
exaggerated. He complained that rebels were traveling in
Europe and North America, and that they had resources and
outside support. It was difficult to take rebels seriously;
also, the frequent creation of new groups made discussion
difficult.

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Ould Abdallah Seeks Response; Bashir Lists Complaints
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3. (C) Bashir felt that if Sudan agreed to follow through
with its commitments, others would not work to implement
them. He listed lack of support for previous assistance
pledges, economic sanctions, failure of the IMF and World
Bank to address outstanding Sudanese debt, and retention on
the list of State Sponsors of terrorism (Note: All are
primarily U.S. bilateral issues. End note.) Bashir asked
that if Sudan were to act, would the UN fast track its own
efforts? Ould Abdallah said he believed Bashir would accept
the phased peacekeeping approach, although it would be a
lengthy process. He asked Bashir to respond to Annan's
letter before he departed on December 23; Ould Abdallah hoped
to see the letter early in the day, and not receive merely
"Christmas wishes."

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CDA Hume: Sudan has Agreed; Proof Lies in Performance
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4. (C) Charge Hume pointed out that Sudan had already agreed
to the phased peacekeeping approach in both Addis Ababa and
Abuja, and that capitals needed to see people on the ground
as evidence of acceptance. He also noted that the EU-U.S.
meeting in Washington in early January would address unmet
funding issues for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
Darfur partners should not assume there is money on the
table; he recalled that the League of Arab States had not met
its USD 150 million pledge. Ould Abdallah replied that he
sought written commitment to Phase I and II, and agreement to
accept or at least not oppose Phase III. Hume reiterated the
importance of performance over promises.

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UN Team to Meet on Implementation Details
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5. (C) UNMIS Office in Charge Taye-Brook Zerihoun noted a
meeting would be held on December 24 to discuss
implementation details for the light package; if Sudan has
not cooperated, it would be reported. He added that
President Bashir needed to address the "what and how" of a
hybrid force. The June 2006 assessment indicated roughly
17,000 troops were needed for Darfur. Taye-Brook also
addressed the issue of the proliferating initiatives on
Darfur, adding that an AU/UN joint team would review them to
determine if any could be useful. The team would also review

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the status of the DPA non-signatories with respect to the
initiatives.
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Timing, Coordination of UN and AU Appointments Key
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6. (C) The French ambassador urged that preparations be
undertaken now to avoid delays later in appointing an UN
Special Representative. Considerable discussion ensued
regarding consultations required to appoint AU and UN
representatives. Regarding the AMIS Force Commander,
Taye-Brook affirmed that the status quo would remain until
July 1, 2007, when Phase III is slated to commence. Three
key appointments would be made in the phased approach: a UN
Special Representative on Darfur decided jointly by the AU
and the UN; an AMIS Force Commander selected by the AU in
consultation with the UN, and the new Special Representative
for UNMIS, concerned with North-South matters.
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CDA Hume: Need to Fill AU Leadership Vacuum
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7. (C) In discussion regarding the lack of AU leadership on
the ground, Charge Hume noted that the USG shared the sense
of urgency in making timely selections of AU and UN
officials. The AU is decapitated, and needs to fill its
leadership vacuum. Taye-Brook concurred, and noted that
strengthening AU leadership was essential for the phased
peacekeeping approach. Balance between UN and AU capacities
is also important, he added, as is avoiding different
understandings of the situation in Darfur.
HUME