Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2892
2006-12-21 16:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DARFUR: UN STATES HUMANITARIAN STRUCTURE ON THE

Tags:  EAID PREF PHUM SOCI PGOV PREL SU UN 
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VZCZCXRO1617
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2892/01 3551659
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211659Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5632
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002892 

SIPDIS

AIDAC
SIPDIS

STATE FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND PRM
STATE PLS PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR PITTMAN, PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016
TAGS: EAID PREF PHUM SOCI PGOV PREL SU UN
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN STATES HUMANITARIAN STRUCTURE ON THE
BRINK

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02875


B. KHARTOUM 02876

C. KHARTOUM 02879

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002892 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS STATE FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND PRM STATE PLS PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR PITTMAN, PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016 TAGS: EAID PREF PHUM SOCI PGOV PREL SU UN SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN STATES HUMANITARIAN STRUCTURE ON THE BRINK REF: A. KHARTOUM 02875 ¶B. KHARTOUM 02876 ¶C. KHARTOUM 02879 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a December 21 meeting with Charge Hume, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) for the United Nations (UN) in Sudan Manuel d,Silva and Deputy Director for Sudan of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Michael McDonagh discussed the significant impact of recent insecurity in Gereida, South Darfur, and a conversation between CDA Hume and the State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Karti that morning (Karti meeting reported septel). The UN feels that the humanitarian structure in Darfur is on the brink, that the Sudanese Government is in denial of the real situation, and that the next three months will determine whether or not humanitarian activities can continue. End summary. -------------- -------------- Gereida Attacks ) UN Holds SLA/Minawi Responsible -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The UN holds the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/Minawi) responsible for the attacks on the Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and Oxfam compounds in Gereida (Ref B). Gereida is in an area controlled by SLA/Minawi. In the opinion of both d,Silva and McDonagh, Minni Minawi is therefore responsible under international law for this attack on humanitarian workers. The UN,s theory is that National Redemption Front (NRF) elements carried out the attack with the consent of SLA/Minawi. A UN helicopter approaching Gereida on the morning of December 21 sighted several of the stolen vehicles not far from the town, clearly within SLA/Minawi-controlled territory. The two vehicles taken from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were returned to the organization 20 minutes later. Also returned to the ICRC was a computer stolen from one of the raided international non-governmental organizations (NGO). The rap
id return of the vehicles while the attack on the NGOs was ongoing suggests the perpetrators were not in a hurry to escape. Per Ref B, when the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) troops returned to the ACF compound with SLA/Minawi elements to escort staff to the helicopter, the NGO,s staff recognized several of the SLA/Minawi escorts from the raid of the previous night. ¶3. (C) D,Silva believes that the NRF can operate in SLA/Minawi territory without hostilities. The NRF,s recent attack on Abu Jabra near the border with South Kordofan demonstrated that a modus operandi exists. The DSRSG believes that Minni Minawi is preparing to abandon the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and has informed his supporters to jump ship and join the NRF in advance of him to avoid being arrested by the Sudanese Government. ¶4. (SBU) The agencies targeted in the attack provided the most critical humanitarian services to the internally displaced population (IDP). Per Ref B, Oxfam provides water, sanitation, and hygiene services and ACF conducts food distributions to the 128,000 inhabitants of the Gereida IDP camp. UNOCHA expressed concern that without these essential services, humanitarian conditions in the camp would decrease significantly. The current estimate is that food supplies would be depleted in one to two months. -------------- --- Expatriate Humanitarian Raped, Tripwires Crossed -------------- --- ¶5. (C) The recent targeting of humanitarian workers crosses a new security threshold. One Oxfam staffer found a bullet in his pocket, where it had become caught in the cloth. According to UN sources, an ACF expatriate staff member was raped, allegedly by the local SLA/Minawi commander. (Note: ACF denied this to USAID staff in Khartoum, but confirmed it with USAID staff in Nyala. End note.) The victim is in the KHARTOUM 00002892 002 OF 003 process of being repatriated, and is expected to leave Sudan on December 23. An ACF press release is anticipated. ¶6. (C) DSRSG revealed that the UN is reflecting on its tripwires for pull out. The situation in El Geneina and events in Gereida over the past three weeks represent a severe deterioration of the security situation. D,Silva indicated that if the situation did not change in three months, the UN may pull out everyone. Should that occur, DSRSG indicated that all humanitarian agencies (UN and NGO) should withdraw from Darfur - an all or nothing approach. Humanitarian programming in Darfur could continue to provide "bread and butter" services (food, water, and health services) without expatriate staff; however, the humanitarian protection situation would significantly deteriorate without international witnesses. UNOCHA stated that if there is no improvement in the security situation within the next couple of months, it might not be necessary for the Sudanese Government to seek the departure of remaining NGOs overtly. -------------- -- Government Responsible for Chaos in West Darfur -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Regarding West Darfur, the DSRSG indicated that he holds the Sudanese Government responsible for the situation. On December 15, thieves stole two NGO vehicles in the El Geneina market. This reportedly followed celebratory shooting around town by Arab militia returning from Chad. Stray bullets hit several humanitarian compounds; no injuries occurred. The next day, Wali Jaffar Abdul al Haq fired Deputy Wali Mohamed Yusef Al Tilib. Tilib,s constituency is the Arab population of West Darfur. That same day a USAID partner reported that the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) informed the UN that the Sudanese Government could not provide security to humanitarian workers and NGOs should thus depart El Geneina. The Sudanese Government has put in place vehicle restrictions in El Geneina preventing UN and NGO movements except by taxi. One USAID partner has indicated that it is unable to implement water, sanitation, and hygiene projects because it can move neither staff nor materials around the town. The duration of these restrictions is unknown. -------------- Sudanese Government Fragile -------------- ¶8. (C) The DSRSG asserted that the Khartoum regime is under significant stress. He believes that if the NGOs pulled out of Darfur and there was vigorous action on the part of the international community, the Sudanese Government would not survive. The DSRSG indicated that the Sudanese Government is concerned about the possibility of an Afghanistan or Bosnia-Herzegovina-type scenario where rebel groups on the ground are provided international air support. He also stated that he has told the Sudanese Government that thus far the rebels in Darfur have never received direct support from the West, but the situation could change. McDonagh characterizes IDPs, current situation as a "slow death," in which populations are fed so that they can be raped and subjected to psychological torture. If asked, IDPs would request protection above all other humanitarian services. The DSRSG stated that "we should set a date for withdrawal and step up the rhetoric" in order to get the Sudanese Government to implement agreements on an AU-UN protection force deployment. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The atomization of Darfur continues, with Sudanese Government structures appearing to break down in North and West Darfur, and elements of the SLA/Minawi faction are re-supplying themselves. If indeed the UN,s interpretation of events in Gereida is correct, the safe operating havens in which NGOs and UN agencies have operated will constrict humanitarian space severely. The rape of the international KHARTOUM 00002892 003 OF 003 NGO worker is the first reported deliberate attack upon an expatriate in Darfur. This singular event has caused humanitarian agencies to critically re-evaluate their situation and needs. HUME

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