DARFUR: UN ENVOY OULD-ABDALLAH MEETS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002890

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN ENVOY OULD-ABDALLAH MEETS WITH
PRESIDENT BASHIR


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: UN Envoy Ould-Abadallah had a "good meeting"
with President Bashir on December 21, State Foreign Minister
Karti told CDA Hume in late afternoon phone call. However,
Karti gave no details on their discussions of the light and
heavy packages envisioned in the Addis/Abuja framework. Hume
had met Ould-Abdullah on December 20 regarding Special Envoy
Natsios' recent meeting with Bashir, and outlined U.S.
expectations after the passage of the UNSC presidential
statement. It was now Sudan's move. Success should be
measured by the deployment of blue helmets on the ground,
Hume had warned, not simply by the Government's agreement to
a deployment. Ould-Abdallah plans to brief P5 ambassadors on
December 22 on his meetings with Bashir, prior to departing
Khartoum. End summary.

Ould-Abdallah Asks for Advice
--------------


2. (C) UN Special Envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah asked to see
CDA Hume on December 20 at the start of his visit to Sudan.
He had had a good meeting in New York with USUN, which had
briefed him on Special Envoy Natsios' recent visit, but he
hoped Hume could offer some advice on dealing with President
Bashir. Hume replied that Natsios and Bashir had focused on
three major items: the immediate acceptance of the "light
package;" agreement on the "heavy package" by December 31;
and the immediate extension of the moratorium on humanitarian
restrictions. Bashir had been hard on the details because he
questioned the final goal, and had asked for a PRST as
reassurance. Hume had told Bashir that if the UNSC issued a
PRST and Sudan still balked, Washington would react
negatively. Bashir had replied only that he would "do his
best."


3. (C) Sudan realized the PRST was an opportunity,
Ould-Abdallah said; State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali
Karti had told him earlier on December 20 that it "would make
things easier." But Ould-Abdallah still had to convince
Bashir to accept the UN; how could he persuade him, he asked
Hume. "Perhaps he just wants to haggle on what we call it?"
Ould-Abdallah mused. Hume replied that Bashir would not
change his position during a meeting, but that he might
change it outside of a meeting. Meeting with Karti first had
been a good move, but Ould-Abdallah should focus his efforts
on delivering a clear message to Bashir, and setting goals
for implementation. The United States had done its part in
passing a PRST, and now Sudan had to do theirs, Hume said.
"What do you think the United States will do if Sudan rejects
the UN and lets the AU collapse?" Hume asked pointedly.


4. (C) Ould-Abdallah replied that he wanted a written
agreement on the light and heavy packages, with a word on the
hybrid force. UNMIS Officer-in-Charge Taye-Brook Zerihoun
noted that the Sudan/AU/UN tripartite meetings had gone well,
and there was already a implementation mechanism in place.
"If they agree to deploy the light package, we can have the
meeting immediately," he said. The real sticking point was
the blue hats. The UN regarded this as an issue of
principle, Taye-Brook said, but once the light and heavy
packages had been deployed, the "facts on the ground" would
guide discussions over the hybrid force. Hume agreed, noting
that Natsios and Bashir had not discussed specific command
and control arrangements for the hybrid mission.

State FM Karti: Envoy's Message "Confusing"
--------------


5. (C) In a separate meeting with State Minister for Foreign
Affairs Ali Karti on the morning of December 21, Hume
reiterated that the United States had delivered the PRST, and
the time had come for Sudan to respond. Karti agreed that
the time had indeed come, but complained that his December 20
meeting with Ould-Abdallah had been "confusing." The Addis
meeting had been a consultation, with nothing decided; Abuja,
rather, represented the decision. Moreover, SYG Annan's
recent statements about Darfur addressed the Darfur situation
broadly, and not the Addis Ababa meeting directly. Hume
replied the task of working out the confusion was Sudan's
task, and that Washington would regard Sudan's inability or
unwillingness to act positively as both severe and negative.
Karti repeated that the UN's message was confusing, and that
he had no clear message to present to President Bashir. But
Hume answered that the Natsios -- Bashir meeting had resulted
in mutual obligations; Washington would judge Sudan by its
actions rather than words. If no deployment takes place, it
will conclude Sudan's response has been negative. Karti

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suggested that Hume's reaction was threatening. Hume replied
that he was not conveying a threat, but rather noting the
likely reaction by Washington policymakers.


6. (C) After meeting with Karti, CDA Hume phoned Taye-Brook
to warn him that Sudan was confused by Ould-Abdallah's
message, and that the UN envoy should be prepared for
questions during his meeting with Bashir. Taye-Brook replied
that the confusion came from the fact that the SYG's letter
had been written before the PRST was issued, and the PRST
should take precedence.

Moving Forward?
--------------


7. (C) Late in the afternoon of December 21, Karti phoned
Hume to say that Ould-Abdallah had just had a "good meeting"
with President Bashir. The confusion had been cleared up,
Karti said, and implementation could now move forward.
Ould-Abdallah plans to brief P5 ambassadors on his
discussions with Bashir on the morning of December 22; Post
will report on the briefing septel.
HUME