Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM288
2006-02-07 14:19:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DARFUR SITUATION UPDATE AND RECENT TRENDS

Tags:  EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU 
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VZCZCXRO8531
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0288/01 0381419
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071419Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1318
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000288 

SIPDIS

AIDAC
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
USMISSION UN ROME
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR SITUATION UPDATE AND RECENT TRENDS

-------------------
Summary and Comment
-------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000288 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS USMISSION UN ROME GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU SUBJECT: DARFUR SITUATION UPDATE AND RECENT TRENDS -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. From April 2004 to November 2005, the number of people affected by the Darfur crisis has risen from 1.1 million to more than 3.5 million. While the response of the international humanitarian community has been successful in meeting critical humanitarian needs and saving lives in Darfur, the underlying insecurity and political dynamics that produced the crisis have yet to change. Continued negotiations to produce a political settlement at Abuja and efforts to encourage local reconciliation are essential to moving beyond the relief phase in the Darfur response. Humanitarian assistance will be needed to sustain the lives of conflict-affected populations as long as fighting and violence continues in Darfur, and return and rehabilitation of villages remains a distant goal due to the current climate of widespread insecurity. ¶2. Moreover, the reduced funding levels of major donors also threaten gains achieved by the humanitarian community. Malnutrition and mortality rates have dropped to within internationally accepted ranges yet are at risk due to lack of funding to sustain critical life-saving programs. Interventions in health, nutrition, food assistance, and water and sanitation reflect high quality services for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and residents, particularly those in or near urban centers. However, reduced NGO budgets are already resulting in the closure of vital programs, often without any possibility of handover to other entities such as government ministries. These bodies often lack the financial and technical capacity to assume operation of facilities established by the humanitarian community. ¶3. Without a change in the conditions that produced the crisis, any successes of the humanitarian community will remain fragile. In fact, available data reflects the situation some months ago, meaning that the effects of the current deterioration in both security and the response capacity of the humanitarian community are not yet evident. Agencies are im
plementing quality programs but are unable to access many of the areas most in need, particularly in West Darfur. Contingency planning and response by humanitarian agencies alone will remain largely ineffective until a political solution can be reached. In recent months, humanitarian agencies have been unable to respond to the deepening of the crisis due to the disintegrating security situation. It is important to note that under either scenario of improving or deteriorating security, basic humanitarian needs will not diminish; continued fighting will cause new displacements, while an onset of peace will allow returns to begin that will require continued support from the humanitarian community. End Summary and Comment. -------------- Background Information -------------- ¶4. From the start of the current phase of the Darfur conflict in April 2004, the number of people affected has risen from 1.1 million to more than 3.5 million in November 2005 - a number representing well over half of the area's population. While the number of IDPs has increased from 1 million to 1.76 million, the rise in the number of affected residents from 100,000 to 1.75 million accounts for the large increase in the overall number of conflict-affected individuals. ¶5. Once recognized as the largest humanitarian emergency in the world, international humanitarian intervention in Darfur has produced aggregate improvements in the lives of those affected by the conflict, particularly those people living in urban areas and IDPs living in nearby camps. Key indicators such as morbidity, mortality, and malnutrition rates have decreased to within acceptable limits. On January 19, the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) released the final report of the Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment in Darfur that found a reduction in global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates among children under the age of 5 years to 11.9 percent in September 2005 from 21.8 percent at KHARTOUM 00000288 002 OF 004 the same time in 2004. WFP concluded that the improved nutritional status is attributable to humanitarian relief including food assistance, water and sanitation, and health services. The same assessment reported a 2005 crude mortality rate of 0.46 deaths per 10,000 people per day, a figure well below the emergency threshold of 1 death per 10,000 people per day. The decreased mortality rates are corroborated by a U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) survey that indicated mortality levels had fallen below emergency threshold for the reporting period of November 2004 to May 2005. WHO reported that mortality rates had decreased by a factor of two in North Darfur and by a factor of three in West and South Darfur since the previous study conducted in July and August 2004. Mortality levels in Darfur could now be considered to be within an internationally accepted range. WHO also attributed the reduction in mortality levels to humanitarian assistance. ¶6. Nearly two years on, the Darfur response is still in the relief phase of operations due largely to the unchanged security and political context. Armed conflict is still ongoing and continues to create aditional displacements throughout Darfur. In January, violence in South Darfur displaced an estimated 55,000 people from Mershing, 15,000 to 20,000 people from Shaeria, and an unknown number in the Gereida area. USAID partner GOAL has suspended activities in the Jebel Marra region of West Darfur after losing a staff member while evacuating from the villages of Golo and Daya in response to heavy fighting between the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The U.N. Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) has moved to a "phase 4" security determination in most areas of West Darfur, dramatically curtailing the ability of humanitarian organizations to implement life-saving programs. In the current climate of widespread insecurity, a large-scale return of IDPs is unlikely. -------------- Operating Environment -------------- ¶7. The security environment in Darfur is extremely complex with the mosaic of armed factions continually in flux. In addition to the parties at the Abuja peace talks - the Sudanese government, SLA, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) - groups such as the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD),Janjaweed, non-government Arab militias, other ethnically based militias, and criminal units destabilize Darfur and prolong the humanitarian crisis. SLA clashes with SAF have increased notably in January with attacks in: the town of Golo in the Jebel Marra region of West Darfur; Kabkabiya in North Darfur; and Donkey Dereisa and Gereida in South Darfur. In addition, the rift in leadership of the SLA has reportedly solidified with the recent announcement by the Zaghawa faction of the SLA, led by Mini Minawi, of its union with JEM forces. Fur commander Abdel Wahid responded publicly that forces under his control are not involved with the announced union. Recent reports indicate that Abdel Wahid's deputy, a Massalit, broke away to join Minawi's Zaghawa faction. ¶8. The NMRD has been militarily active in the Kulbus corridor of West Darfur. The group has threatened to shoot down any helicopter in the area, resulting in the suspension of U.N. flights to Sirba, Seleah, and Kulbus. These flight cancellations have had significant curtailed humanitarian activities throughout the area given the standing road closures throughout the area. NMRD forces have also been responsible for attacks on the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) troops based in Kulbus. As a result of the compromised security environment, USAID partners Concern and Catholic Relief Services were forced to withdraw staff in December 2005, affectively ending essential programs in food, water and sanitation, shelter, and relief commodity distribution. ICRC suspended operations in October 2005 following the theft of several vehicles by NMRD. ¶9. The SAF continues to be directly involved in the fighting in Darfur with the U.N. reporting the use of helicopter gunships in at least one instance near Jebel Moon, West Darfur. SAF have also been directly involved in the fighting in Golo, West Darfur and Gereida, South Darfur. KHARTOUM 00000288 003 OF 004 In addition, U.N. and other reports point to continued government use of Janjaweed forces throughout Darfur. Field reports on January 29 indicate that large numbers of Janjaweed are amassed outside of Gereida in preparation for a counteroffensive against the SLA. While the government is utilizing Janjaweed forces to fight SLA, it is also clear that the active destruction of villages continues. AMIS forces reported that 26 villages near Gereida had been looted and burned in November. ¶10. In some cases, Arab militias do not appear to be acting on the direction of the Sudanese government. In a few notable instances, SAF have clashed with Arab militias or Arab militias have openly challenged the authority of Sudanese government officials. In addition, many local conflicts are occurring based largely on ethnic dimensions, although often with higher-level support. Bandits and cattle looters also thrive due to the large degree of impunity that currently exists in Darfur. ¶11. A relatively new trend of attacks against IDP camps has begun to emerge. The first such reported attack occurred on September 28 when armed militia launched simultaneous attacks on Aro Sharow IDP camp near Silea in the Kulbus Corridor of West Darfur, forcing an estimated 2,000 camp residents to flee for safety. On January 29, AU and U.N. sources reported that Arab militias and Sudanese government police acted jointly to attack and loot Mershing IDP camp in South Darfur, displacing the entire camp and town population estimated to be 55,000 people in the direction of Menawashi. Large numbers of residents have also fled Al Salaam IDP camp near Nyala, South Darfur over the past month due to intimidation and harassment by armed Arab men. According to U.N. sources, Arab militia also entered Fata Borno camp southeast of Kutum, North Darfur on November 16 and fired at IDPs, killing two and injuring an additional two. During the week of January 23, Kalma camp IDPs organized a peaceful protest against what they see as systematic attacks against IDPs in camps across Darfur. ¶12. Another disturbing issue that continues to affect the humanitarian response in Darfur is the harassment of individuals and organizations by the government, and to a lesser extent, the SLA. The Sudanese government's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) is pursuing a number of new initiatives including demanding not only program information, but also detailed budget information about NGO activities funded by donors and withholding travel permits if reports are not submitted. HAC identity cards are still required of all NGO staff. In addition, the issue of a Khartoum-imposed moratorium on Darfur travel permits has not changed despite significant diplomatic pressure. Travel permits expire every three months, with all travel permits of NGO staff working in Darfur having just expired on January 31. (Note: with nearly 1,000 international aid workers assigned to Darfur, this is a significant administrative burden for the Sudanese government, but also a lucrative source of revenue with each visa renewal costing USD 240. End note). In addition to government-imposed bureaucratic hurdles, armed groups impede the work of the humanitarian community by refusing to allow safe by passage by road and/or air. JEM forces have recently announced that any vehicle traveling through territory north of El Fasher must receive prior authorization from the movement, and NMRD has threatened to shoot own any helicopter in its area of operation in the Kulbus corridor of West Darfur. In the last month, unidentified armed men have stolen 15 vehicles rented by NGOs in North Darfur. ¶13. During 2005, USAID has received reports of more than 200 incidents of harassment, arrest, or attack against U.N., NGO, or AMIS personnel. A high-level Sudanese staff member of a USAID partner remains in detention after being arrested in Nyala in late October. Attacks on NGOs have experienced a disturbing increase in recent months, particularly in terms of armed men entering NGO compound in order to steal vehicles and loot money. Between late August and December, armed men attempted to enter at least seven NGO compounds in Geneina town. It is notable that West Darfur once enjoyed the greatest humanitarian access in Darfur, but is now largely inaccessible to the humanitarian community. Tensions between Chad and Sudan have increased considerably KHARTOUM 00000288 004 OF 004 in recent months, with both countries reinforcing military resources along the border. Both countries also accuse each other of supporting opposition groups in the other country. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that more than 150 NGO staff and 60 to 70 U.N. staff have relocated out of West Darfur as the result of present insecurities. The USAID Darfur Field Office (USAID/DFO) has followed this trend and removed USAID field officers from Geneina for the time being. ¶14. The cumulative effect of all of these factors is that the people of Darfur suffer. Where the safety of NGO and U.N. staff is in question, either due to targeted harassment or general conflict, the humanitarian community will be unable to access populations in need and deliver life-saving assistance in Darfur. -------------- Funding Shortfalls -------------- ¶15. Most major donors have either reduced or straight-lined budgets available for Darfur in 2006. The resulting lack of funding for humanitarian programs will impact the successes achieved to date in stabilizing the humanitarian situation. The immediate impact will be a reduction in service delivery in some key areas, possibly causing morbidity and mortality to slip back into the critical zone. NGOs are operating on smaller budgets and are therefore closing heath and nutrition centers often without any possibility of handover to others. The NGO International Rescue Committee is closing its office in Mukjar, West Darfur, where the organization has been providing essential water and sanitation interventions. The NGO International Medical Corps recently closed its Community Therapeutic Care (CTC) nutrition program in the village of Deleig in the Garsilla locality of West Darfur due to funding shortages. While the government's operating budget is slowly increasing, the financial ability - as well as technical capacity and commitment in some cases - of government ministries is generally lacking to assume the operation and maintenance of facilities established by the humanitarian community for water and sanitation, health and nutrition, and coordination of IDP camps, among others. HUME

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