SE NATSIOS' VISIT TO ABYEI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002867

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/RSA
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UN
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS' VISIT TO ABYEI


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During SE Natsios' December 11 to visit
Abyei, UN officials and local leaders outlined the myriad
problems facing the area as a result of territorial disputes
between the Dinka and Massriya tribes, which international
observers suggest make it the next potential flashpoint to
derail the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Though
accounts of the dispute differed between the Dinka and
Massriya leaders, UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) representatives
and the force commander highlighted two key difficulties: 1)
the lack of civil authority in the area and 2) movement
restrictions placed on UNMIS to the north of Abyei town,
which limited its ability to conduct its mission. These
difficulties were exacerbated by the continuing presence of
other armed groups (OAGs) and potential oil reserves in the
area, which heightened "external interest." SE Natsios urged
the parties to continue peaceful dialogue in an effort to
forestall violence. End summary.


2. (C) According to UNMIS representatives, the absence of
civil authority and infrastructure has hindered UN project
implementation, particularly the activities of the World Food
Program (WFP),and has slowed resettlement efforts for
internally displaced persons (IDPs). This in turn has
tarnished WFP's image among the population, despite its
efforts to extend its standard three-month package for
returnees until the beginning of the harvest season.


3. (C) UNMIS also blamed the government-imposed movement
restrictions to the north of Abyei for lessening its ability
to supply basic services and for preventing UNMIS forces from
monitoring Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) deployments outside of
the town. The restrictions had been in place for 18 months
but were lifted for a one-month period beginning in
late-November. UN representatives stated that the central
government in Khartoum claimed that the restrictions were
instituted by local officials while local officials
attributed them to a directive from Khartoum. UNMIS
suggested that the restrictions were imposed in order to
protect sensitive oil drilling in the area. "People were
living peacefully and intermarrying here until oil entered
the equation," said UNMIS Head of Office in Abyei Ronald
Quejas-Risdon (please protect). (Note: A UN official in
Khartoum reported to Poloff on December 18 that the
restrictions had been re-imposed within the last week. The
UN has requested an explanation from the Sudanese government.
End note.)


4. (C) The UNMIS force commander in Abyei described the
security situation as "unpredictable." He noted that 307 of
319 Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) elements had been
folded into Joint Integrated Units (JIUs),as had 185 of 320
SAF elements. However, the force commander said that three
main OAGs remained: 1) The 1,745-man force led by Col. Hassan
Deng Malon and aligned with the SAF, 2) The 225-man force led
by Col. Mohammed Hamid Hamad and aligned with the SPLA, and
3) The force led by Brig. Hassan Hamed Saleh, which claimed
27,000 men. UNMIS had attempted on December 10 to verify
Saleh's astounding claim but was unsuccessful.


5. (C) Both the SPLA and SAF commanders of the JIUs requested
USG assistance in resolving the outstanding issues in the
area. The SPLA commander reiterated the difficulties posed
by a lack of civil administration and asked SE Natsios what
the role of the USG was in "rescuing the lives of the people
of Abyei." Though the SAF commander emphasized the increased
stability achieved since the first JIU was created in
December 2005, he criticized the U.S. for accepting the
now-contentious Abyei Border Commission (ABC) report without
sufficient consultation with the Dinka and Massriya. "What
are you expecting to do to bring together the two parties,
given that one accepted the ABC report and the other did
not?" questioned the SAF commander. SE Natsios emphasized
that he was on a fact-finding mission to the area and urged
the Sudanese to continue dialogue on the issue in order to
prevent tensions from escalating. "This is essentially a
Sudanese problem, not an American problem," explained SE
Natsios, adding that the USG could help to facilitate
negotiations between the parties.


6. (C) Massriya and Dinka leaders differed in their views of
the conflict. One Massriya chief emphasized the historic
links between the two tribes and blamed the problems on
external incitement. "There is nothing that separates us.
We are one community," he said, adding that his grandmother
had been a Dinka. He recommended that a reconciliation could
be effected if the two groups "sat together and if the
politicians left us alone." He compared the Dinka and the

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Massriya to "fingers on a single hand." By contrast, Dinka
leaders blamed the "other side" for delaying the
implementation of the CPA and the return of IDPs. They also
indicated that the Sudanese government in Khartoum was
attempting to settle the oil-rich areas with the Massriya,
who would then receive the majority of wealth generated from
the profits. They called on the international community to
increase the pressure on the Sudanese government to implement
the CPA.
HUME