SE NATSIOS' VISIT TO MALAKAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002865

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/RSA
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO SU UN
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS' VISIT TO MALAKAL

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02765


B. KHARTOUM 02772

C. KHARTOUM 02804

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Two weeks after violence erupted between the Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese Armed Forces
(SAF) in the Upper Nile capital of Malakal, SE Natsios
visited the area on December 11 to highlight the first
serious breach in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
UN officials, the National Congress Party (NCP) governor, and
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) deputy governor
underscored the UN Mission in Sudan's (UNMIS) effectiveness
in stabilizing the situation and cautioned that continued
interference from Khartoum was undermining efforts to ensure
security and to implement the CPA. Reports of the number of
victims from the recent violence still vary, ranging from 150
to 285 deaths and up to several hundred injuries.

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Wake-up Call
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2. (C) "This was a wake-up call for the fault lines of the
CPA in the South," said UN Development Program Official
Meredith Preston (please protect). Preston added that there
was a "residual level of insecurity" in the area and said
that the NCP's actions in the next month, particularly with
regard to the militias, would test their commitment to the
CPA. She noted that the rhetoric from the pro-NCP press in
Khartoum following the attack was unhelpful because the
reports of massacres of internally-displaced persons (IDPs)
had deterred many from returning to the area, which would
lessen the accuracy of the pre-election census. Preston
warned that the confluence of oil resources and large troop
concentrations in the region made it particularly volatile
and claimed that SPLA officials had told her privately that
they needed to "finish the conflict soon, violently if
necessary." She called for international pressure on the
Ministry of Energy and Mining and the Assessment and
Evaluation Commission (AEC) to facilitate agreement on wealth
sharing issues because many companies were "operating with
impunity."

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UNMIS Essential, NCP Undermining Peace
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3. (C) Governor Dak Bishob, a southerner with membership in
the NCP, called UNMIS' role in stemming the conflict
"essential" and noted that peace would not be sustainable
without it. He admitted that the problems were exacerbated
by his "partners" in Khartoum and emphasized the importance
of high-level dialogue to prevent future conflagrations. He
said that he had ordered militia leader Gabriel Tang, one of
the instigators of the recent violence, to Khartoum to lower
tensions. Bishob claimed that he had asked Minister of
Defense Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein during his recent visit
to Malakal to remove all the un-integrated militia units to
the north immediately and said the process had begun. UNMIS'
Head of Office in Malakal, Peter Maxwell, praised Bishob for
his efforts during the incident and said that though he was a
"largely maligned figure, he had risen above during the
recent crisis." Maxwell said that despite Bishob's
insistence that Tang be moved to Khartoum he had received a
"hero's welcome" upon arrival and that the SAF had sponsored
a press conference for him.


4. (C) Deputy Governor Dock Jok Dock, an SPLM member, also
lauded UNMIS for its rapid response in bringing order
following the outbreak of violence. He said that the
Sudanese government was orchestrating the breakdown of
security in Malakal in order to prevent elections from being
held in 2008 and to "pre-empt independence." Dock concurred
with the UN's assessment that the violence had discouraged
IDPs from returning and had undermined support for the CPA
among the population. He said that NCP, at the instruction
of National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Chief
Salah Ghosh, was including militia elements instead of the
SAF into the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) in a further
effort to destabilize the peace process.

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The Way Ahead
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5. (C) Outlining the way ahead, UNMIS Force Commander
Shekhawatt described the decisions taken by the Cease-fire

KHARTOUM 00002865 002 OF 002


Commission in the wake of the violence. These included the
following: 1) Appointment of a commission to investigate the
causes of the conflict, 2) Integration of the other armed
groups (OAGs) into the SAF within one month, 3) Joint
SAF-SPLM patrols during the day with SAF patrols north of the
city and SPLM patrols south of the city at night, 4)
Rotations of fresh SAF and SPLA troops into the JIUs, and 5)
Unhindered water transportation and commerce along the Nile.
Shekhawatt recommended that the issue of OAGs be addressed at
the "highest levels" by the NCP, the SPLM, and the
international community. He also pressed for the removal of
the JIUs outside the town limits and their consolidation
under one commander.
HUME