DARFUR - VISIT OF THE USAID-OFDA DEPUTY DIRECTOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002863 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR - VISIT OF THE USAID-OFDA DEPUTY DIRECTOR KHARTOUM 00002863 001.2 OF 003 -------------- SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. From November 30 to December 2, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) Deputy Director Greg Gottlieb and a team of USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) field staff visited Nyala, South Darfur, to assess humanitarian conditions and gain a better understanding of the situation on the ground. The USAID/DCHA team included the USAID/DCHA Senior Humanitarian Advisor, the USAID Darfur Field Office (DFO) Team Leader, the DFO Field Officer for Nyala, and the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) Darfur Program Manager. In Nyala, the USAID/DCHA team met with South Darfur State Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) representatives, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS),the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),the UN Development Program (UNDP),and USAID/OFDA partners. The team also visited USAID/OFDA programs at Otash, Kalma, and Gereida internally displaced person (IDP) camps. ¶2. The situation for IDPs in Darfur is growing more precarious. USAID non-governmental organization (NGO) and UN partners face rising insecurity as the various armed groups fight across a large area, with civilians and their villages bearing the brunt of the fighting. The Government of National Unity (GNU) continues to impose unreasonable restrictions and regulations on humanitarian organizations. Considering the violence and bureaucratic harassment, it is remarkable that relief agencies continue to deliver assistance at reasonable levels to an ever-increasing number of IDPs and affected communities. End summary and comment. -------------- HAC-NEYED -------------- ¶3. Upon arrival in Nyala, the USAID/DCHA team met with Jamal Youseff, the HAC Secretary General for South Darfur. Youseff expressed appreciation for USAID's support and assistance, but noted that more assistance was necessary in the sectors of health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. Youseff stressed that donors need to provide more assistance outside of IDP camps in order to encourage IDPs to return to their areas of origin. He noted that many IDPs in camps enjoy health services that were not available in their places of origin, and that IDPs were reluctant to do without these services in the future. Youseff believes humanitarian assistance is keeping people in camps unnecessarily and that the international community should initiate a process of assisted returns, adding that security improvements would allow for such action. ¶4. Youseff told the USAID/DCHA team that the HAC would do everything possible to assist with the humanitarian efforts in South Darfur, but expressed concern that international NGOs were enriching themselves with donor funds instead of using the funds to assist those in need. ¶5. USAID in turn requested that the HAC lessen its restrictions on NGOs to facilitate assistance, instead of imposing unreasonable and constantly changing regulations. (Comment: The meeting followed the expected script with HAC personnel. The team expected little except platitudes, and received exactly that. End comment.) -------------- SPIRALING INSECURITY THREATENS AID OPERATION -------------- ¶6. While in Nyala, the USAID/DCHA team met with UNMIS, AMIS, UNDSS, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Each organization offered information on the security situation, and provided the team a better understanding of the political and military dynamics at play in Darfur. ¶7. The security situation in Darfur remains volatile. Continued splintering is occurring within opposition factions, driven by government action. As a result, humanitarian workers have relocated from different areas in North and South Darfur. Those who briefed the USAID/DCHA team anticipate that the conflict will continue to deepen over the coming three to four months, leading to more displacement and increased fighting between factions. The briefers indicated that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is insufficient to bring peace to Darfur, as the DPA does not include all those whom the factions represent. KHARTOUM 00002863 002.2 OF 003 ¶8. The month of November brought worsening security in Darfur, with significant humanitarian consequences for the wider region, including Chad and the Central African Republic. More than 80,000 people have fled their homes in the last six weeks alone: 50,000 of them in Darfur and 30,000 in Chad. Several hundred civilians, including women, children, and elderly, have been killed, and very disturbing reports have surfaced describing mass rapes and other gross violations of human rights. Escalating violence is cutting off almost one million people across Darfur from needed humanitarian aid. Recent clashes involving Arab militia, the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/Minawi),the National Redemption Front (NRF), and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have forced the relocation of UN and NGO staff. Relief workers are being attacked on a daily basis, and dozens of their vehicles have been hijacked in the last few weeks, threatening the humanitarian lifeline for a total of 4.3 million people in the region. ¶9. The USAID/DCHA team and representatives from Merlin, the American Refugee Committee (ARC),and OCHA traveled to Gereida, South Darfur, via UN helicopter. In 2006, the site became Darfur's largest IDP camp by population. Based on the current food distribution caseload, the humanitarian community estimates the number of IDPs in Gereida to be 128,000, although many believe this number is inflated. ¶10. The IDP settlement is divided into three sections named Aleef (old camp),Babanousa (new camp),and Dar es Salam. Seven international NGOs work in Gereida: Oxfam, ZOA, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),ARC, Merlin, Action Contre la Faim, and CHF International. USAID/OFDA is funding Merlin for health activities, ARC for health, water, sanitation, and hygiene activities, and CHF International for shelter activities. ¶11. Upon arrival at Gereida, the team met with the AMIS Group Site Commander, who gave a briefing about the site and shared observations about security for IDPs. The AMIS commander noted that the AMIS area of responsibility was very large and that patrols were unable to cover the same areas in the camp two days in a row. AMIS stated that it currently lacks the capacity and resources to undertake patrols to protect the population from roving Arab militia outside Gereida. The threat of Arab militia attack is especially heightened for women, who are responsible for collecting firewood outside the camp. AMIS reported incidents of skirmishes, abductions, animal looting, and thefts by armed men. The AMIS commander stated that it was difficult to distinguish between Arab militia and bandits in the camp. ¶12. The team visited an ICRC health center, which is scheduled to be transferred to USAID/OFDA partner Merlin at the end of 2006. Current humanitarian planning focuses on increasing capacity in sectors such as health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. Additionally, USAID/OFDA partner CHF International is considering expanding shelter coverage. ¶13. Currently no organization coordinates humanitarian activity for the camp. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) was tapped to take over as camp coordinator for Gereida, but the organization's withdrawal from South Darfur has left Gereida without a coordinator. Several NGOs working in Gereida told the USAID/DCHA team that a camp coordinator was unnecessary. However, they stated that a camp manager was needed to help with contingency planning as circumstances change. ¶14. Coordination between NGOs in Gereida is working well. If and when more organizations are present in Gereida, this issue may need to be revisited and a camp coordinator identified. OCHA shared plans to send an officer to work part-time with groups in Gereida and help deal with local authorities. (Comment: Camp coordination is important to identify critical gaps in humanitarian coverage and conduct effective protection activities. However, organizations are reluctant to take on the role, as the SLA or GNU can intimidate or harass an NGO serving as camp coordinator for advocacy related to sensitive issues, reducing the organization's ability to operate. End comment.) ¶15. While in Gereida, the USAID/DCHA team met with the SLA's Humanitarian Aid Commissioner (SLA/HAC). The SLA sees itself as the protective force for the population. The biggest concern for the SLA/HAC was the perceived minimal level of assistance coming into Gereida. The SLA/HAC would like to see at least 40 NGOs working in Gereida providing a range of services, particularly food, education, KHARTOUM 00002863 003.2 OF 003 and health. -------------- WE'RE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER - ALONE -------------- ¶16. In discussions with the NGO community, the USAID/DCHA team noted the lack of coordination, or the reluctance among various organizations to fully collaborate and cooperate in South Darfur. In light of the ever-growing list of demands and requirements that the GNU places on NGOs, it was interesting to see how NGOs have approached the issue of coordination in the state. ¶17. NGOs mentioned to the USAID/DCHA team that true coordination was difficult, and in some cases, not wise for an organization's survival. An "every man for himself" approach seems to work best for the NGOs in South Darfur. If the HAC is harassing one NGO, it is not in the best interest of the other NGOs to take a united approach, or stand against the HAC, lest they all be penalized. OCHA plays a vital role in taking up some of the more sensitive issues on behalf of the NGOs, but fails in the effort to unify NGOs in response to HAC demands or insecurity in areas of common operations. -------------- RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶18. USAID/OFDA should consider establishing a rapid-response fund with OCHA, as done in Liberia and Angola. The rapid-response fund would allow USAID/OFDA and the humanitarian community the flexibility to quickly address humanitarian needs during this tumultuous period in Darfur. Additionally, when and if returns begin, the fund would allow rapid start-up activities supporting the return process in anticipation of accessing other funding mechanisms. The structure of the response fund and the approval process would be based on the Liberia model, in which a USAID/OFDA representative and the grant manager from OCHA reviewed proposals and made funding decisions on the ground. ¶19. USAID/OFDA, along with other donors, should support a verification exercise in IDP camps where substantial inflation of camp population figures is suspected, such as Gereida. OCHA agreed that counting IDPs in possible, if donors are willing to support it. The USAID/DCHA team believes this would be a worthwhile exercise to give the humanitarian community a better idea of the total number of the affected population and adjust the caseload for assistance. Caution would have to be taken to prevent the HAC from hijacking the exercise to influence IDPs to "voluntarily" return home. ¶20. USAID/OFDA, along with other donors, should support more livelihoods and shelter activities in Gereida, particularly for the town population, as IDPs are living on the host community's agricultural land. HUME