SE NATSIOS DISCUSSES DARFUR WITH SUDANESE OFFICIALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002837

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, IO A/S SILVERBERG, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU UN
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS DISCUSSES DARFUR WITH SUDANESE OFFICIALS


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In meetings with Special Envoy Andrew
Natsios from December 10-12, Sudanese officials expressed
their ongoing support for the November 30 Abuja agreement.
They indicated a willingness to expedite the implementation
of UN Secretary General (UNSYG) Kofi Annan's proposal for
"phase one" of United Nations (UN) assistance for the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and to work towards an
agreement to accelerate "phase two." They expressed
continued resistance to an international force wearing the
UN's "blue berets" and offered little clarification on the
structure of a joint UN/AU mission, which UN officials in
Khartoum described as problematic. Sudanese officials noted,
however, that the government wanted SE Natsios' trip to be
fruitful.


2. (C) Summary continued: Throughout his meetings, SE Natsios
told his Sudanese interlocutors that the USG was more
interested in seeing demonstrable progress "on the ground"
than on agreements that go unimplemented. He said that the
USG had demonstrated its interest in progress through the
November 16 Addis Ababa agreement, which could not be
re-negotiated. SE Natsios said that there had been no
movement on "phase one" of the UNSYG's proposal and that
"phase two" was "paralyzed." He also explained that the room
for negotiation with the Sudanese government would narrow
when the Democratic Party takes control of the U.S. Congress
in January. SE Natsios repeatedly told Sudanese officials
that he would need to point to concrete progress toward peace
in Darfur when he testifies before the House Committee on
International Relations (HIRC) in January. He proposed that
the Sudanese government implement "phase one" by December 15
and conclude an agreement with the AU and the UN on
implementation of "phase two" by December 31. Though
Sudanese officials agreed to move forward on "phase one"
(without, however, indicating that they would agree to the
blue beret),they indicated that President Bashir would need
to make a decision on "phase two." A meeting between SE
Natsios and President Bashir is scheduled for December 13.
End summary.

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Meeting with Foreign Minister Lam Akol
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3. (C) In a December 10 meeting with SE Natsios, Foreign
Minister Lam Akol called the November 16 Addis Ababa
agreement on Darfur a "big step for us." He noted that the
remaining issues to be resolved were the appointment of the
UN Secretary General's special representative, the size of a
peace-keeping force in Darfur, and the appointment of a force
commander to lead an AU-UN operation. Akol said that a
recent press statement released by the Sudanese Embassy in
Washington re-stating Bashir's rejection of a UN role was
"outdated", and emphasized that the Council of Ministers had
endorsed the November 30 Abuja agreement. "We understand
that the UN should have a role in decision making and in
running things," said Akol. "We are still committed to the
fact that once the AU and the UN agree on size, we will use
that. Sudan is not even a party to that discussion." Akol
said that implementation of "phase one" of UNSYG Annan's plan
for UN assistance to the AU was proceeding. When questioned
why over 30 UN police advisors had been turned back to
Khartoum at the airport in El Fasher, North Darfur two weeks
before, Akol characterized the incident as a
"misunderstanding."


4. (C) SE Natsios emphasized that "phase one" should be
implemented as soon as possible, and said that the USG needed
to see evidence of the implementation of the Addis Ababa
agreement "on the ground." "We are not interested in what
anyone agrees to," he said. "We're interested in what people
do." Akol said that the Sudanese government and the USG were
on the "same wavelength" in their interpretation of the Abuja
agreement, and that there would be no backtracking.

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Meeting with Intelligence Chief Salah Ghosh
--------------


5. (C) In a meeting with SE Natsios on December 10, National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) chief Salah Ghosh
described the Sudanese government's strategy to negotiate
individually with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
non-signatories. He said that he had met with rebel leaders
Sharif Hareer, Khamis Abdullah, and Ahmed Diraige ten days
before in an attempt to "make a deal" with the National
Redemption Front (NRF). Ghosh called Diraige "reasonable,"

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and noted that Diraige was "a political leader only and did
not control any troops." He said that he was negotiating
with Ahmed Abdul Shafi and planned to meet him in Cairo on
December 12. Ghosh also indicated that he could reach an
agreement with Abdel Wahid al-Nur, and acknowledged the
importance of Abdel Wahid's symbolic status within the Fur
population, though this exceeded his actual military
strength. Ghosh said that he was working with the "Libyans"
to bring Abdel Wahid to Tripoli in the near future, where he
hoped to conclude an agreement with him. "We believe that if
we put our hands together with the international community,
we can be successful in reaching an agreement with the
rebels," said Ghosh.


6. (C) Ghosh concurred with Akol's earlier assessment that
"phase one" could proceed quickly and explained that the UN
police advisors who had been turned away in El Fasher had
entered Sudan before the conclusion of the Addis Ababa
agreement. When SE Natsios proposed that "phase one" be
implemented by December 15, Ghosh replied, "Why not?" SE
Natsios then proposed that the AU, UN, and Sudanese
government conclude an agreement on implementing "phase two"
by December 31 and begin implementation by early January. SE
Natsios said that in order to avoid a severe deterioration in
the bilateral relationship, he needed to point to
demonstrable progress toward peace in Darfur when he
testified in front of the (HIRC) on January 24. He reminded
him that Ghosh had said during SE Natsios' October visit that
the government would agree to any number of troops but was
now trying to lower the established Addis Ababa agreement of
17,000 troops and 3,000 police. Ghosh said he would raise SE
Natsios' proposals with his government. (Note: In a call
later that evening with CDA Hume, Ghosh said that he had
raised the issue of "phase one" implementation with President
Bashir, who agreed that it could move forward. CDA Hume
asked if the UN advisors would enter under UN blue berets or
AU green berets. Ghosh said only that Minister of Defense
Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein insisted on green berets, so it
would require a decision by Bashir. End note.)

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Meeting with UNSYG'S Deputy Representative
--------------


7. (C) Meeting with SE Natsios on December 10, the UNSYG's
Principal Deputy Special Representative Taye-Brook Zerihoun
underscored the importance of the creation of the tripartite
commission between the UN, AU, and Sudanese governments to
advance implementation of "phase one" and "phase two." He
said that both the UN and AU had appointed their
representatives to the commission, but were awaiting the
Sudanese government's nominees. Taye-Brook said that he was
skeptical that the Sudanese government would proceed with
either phase, noting President Bashir's frequent mention of
AMIS Force Commander Luke Aprezi's comments that two
additional AMIS battalions could achieve stability in Darfur.
He said that the UN and AU still agreed with the June joint
assessment that 17,000 troops and police were needed to
ensure security in the region, one-third of which would
consist of support and logistics staff. Taye-Brook said that
at least 5,000 of these would need to come from outside of
Africa.


8. (C) Taye-Brook stated that the UN Department of
Peace-keeping Operations (UNDPKO) was finalizing a specific
proposal for "phase two," which would be transmitted to the
Sudanese government in the near future. He said that this
would need to be agreed to as "an annex" to the Addis Ababa
agreement. However, Taye-Brook expressed his concerns about
the structure of a UN-AU mission. The administrative
constraints on the UNSYG's special representative would be
problematic, given the Sudanese government's view that he
would be overseeing both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) and a Darfur intervention--the latter of which would be
subordinate to an AU command. "Would that mean procurement
from two separate budgets?" questioned Taye-Brook. He said
it would also be difficult to select a force commander to
head both missions, given the Sudanese government's demand
that the force commander be African and the necessity that a
force commander for Southern Sudan be Indian, Bangladeshi, or
Pakistani based on their significant troop contributions.


9. (C) (Note: During a December 10 phone call with UNDPKO
Undersecretary Jean-Marie Guehenno, SE Natsios requested a
copy of the UN's proposal for "phase two." Guehenno said
that the principle impediment to progress was the beret
color. UNDPKO sent the proposal to SE Natsios on December

10. It will be briefed to the UN Security Council on
December 15 and, pending approval, will be sent to the

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Sudanese government during the week of December 18.
Separately, CDA Hume received confirmation on December 12
that the Sudanese government had nominated two members to the
tripartite commission. End note.)

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Meeting with Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahuddin
-------------- --------------


10. (C) In a December 12 meeting with SE Natsios,
Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahuddin said he sought
constructive solutions to areas of disagreement on UN
intervention in Darfur so SE Natsios' visit could be
"successful." He acknowledged that President Bashir's August
5 plan to stabilize Darfur by force "had been overtaken by
events." He concurred with Akol and Ghosh's assessment that
the Sudanese government supported the recent Abuja agreement,
and said that it had no objection to implementation of "phase
one." He said the principal areas of disagreement between
the Sudanese government and the USG on UN intervention
remained beret color and the size of the force. SE Natsios
said it was unlikely that the UN would yield on "hatting" but
that the Sudanese government should engage directly with the
UN on the issue.


11. (C) According to Salahuddin, hard-liners within the
Sudanese government believe that the 17,000-troop
recommendation was inflated in order to force acceptance of
non-African soldiers. He recommended that an agreement
should be reached on "5,000 to 10,000" troops as a base, and
that more might not be needed if a peace settlement could be
reached on the ground. "Let's leave it (the size of the
force) as open-ended," he said, adding that setting a
"movable date" for troop withdrawal might help to re-assure
hard-line elements of his government of the temporary nature
of the UN's role in Sudan. Responding to Salahuddin's
assertion that there were only 10,000 troops in Southern
Sudan to support implementation of the CPA, CDA Hume said
that a larger force would be needed in Darfur due to the
acute security situation and to the lack of a political
settlement like the CPA. SE Natsios noted that the National
Congress Party (NCP) had had a single interlocutor--the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)--in the South when
negotiating a peace settlement, as opposed to the splintered
rebel groups in Darfur.


12. (C) SE Natsios reiterated the necessity for immediate,
concrete steps to be taken to resolve the crisis in Darfur
and again proposed that the Sudanese government conclude an
agreement on implementation of "phase two" by December 31.
He also asked if the Sudanese government would facilitate the
"two-chamber" structure of the "dysfunctional" Cease-fire
Commission (CFC) to include the DPA non-signatories. SE
Natsios called for a CFC meeting to be held before the Joint
Commission meeting scheduled for December 15 in Addis Ababa
to provide an update on violations. He said it was in the
interest of the Sudanese government to improve the
functioning of the CFC and that the USG was willing to make
more public condemnations of rebel violations of the
cease-fire. "The CFC will not end the crisis in Darfur,"
said Natsios, "but it is a constructive process." Salahuddin
cautioned that the rebels used the last cease-fire to "expand
and re-arm" but said he would discuss SE Natsios' request
with Bashir and Hussein in preparation for SE Natsios'
meeting with Bashir on December 13.


13. (SBU) This message was cleared by SE Natsios.
HUME