ACTION NEEDED TO STEM WORSENING SECURITY IN DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000282

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, AF - A/S FRAZER, AND IO - A/S SILVERBERG, FROM
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUME

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO MOPS EAID US UN AU SU
SUBJECT: ACTION NEEDED TO STEM WORSENING SECURITY IN DARFUR

KHARTOUM 00000282 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) A February 4-5 visit to Darfur confirmed that the
security situation in Darfur is getting worse. A companion
message will report on separate meetings with the local
governor, the new AMIS commander, UN staff, U.S. military
observers, and international NGOs. All are worried what will
happen next. The deteriorating situation is characterized
by:

-- More frequent violence throughout the area: along the
border with Ch`d, io the"
ebed Mea,{oUt( nf(OYclq.`a`Kp gQN!lc6`~jboBpWg3LOnufNeSbf^9%Q9H{s rD#~3~*2*Qv4YQQDo[6humanitarian vehicles;

-- Disappearing command and control: The political
leadership of the SLA and JEM have faltering control of their
units and no control over splinter groups active in banditry
and hostage-taking. The government has enlisted
undisciplined Arab militiamen into popular defense forces and
allowed renegade operations by some commanders. Worse, some
reports indicate the government may be actively instigating
Reizegat tribesmen to take up arms against neighboring Fur;
and

-- Overall, lawlessness is spreading.


2. (C) The current peace process is based on a cease-fire
agreement between the parties, supported by AMIS. The
parties ignore their commitments to the cease-fire; and, the
cease-fire commission lacks any vigor in investigating
incidents. While AMIS has registered success in decreasing
the scale of violence in Darfur, over a third of the entire
population has abandoned their homes in the countryside for
the relative security of the IDP camps. AMIS cannot deliver
improved security by simply working with the parties to
maintain the often violated cease-fire. AMIS should redirect
its efforts away from &observing8 a cease-fire to which
neither party demonstrates much commitment toward a phased
strategy to provide security and to re-establish order.


3. (C) The Darfur crisis, once essentially an internal
conflict of a failing state, is now also an international
conflict between Chad and Sudan. In violation of the bedrock
obligation not to use force or the threat of force against
other states, both governments arm and harbor insurgent
groups that attack across the international border. The AU
talks in Abuja ignore these threats to international peace
and security, despite the presence of an official Chadian
&mediator.8 On the ground NGOs and military observers
report rising tensions in the border area, increased levels
of armament, and greater restrictions on travel. The UN
security threat level is now just one step short of mandatory
evacuation of all humanitarian personnel; at current levels
of staffing operations will be curtailed within three weeks.
The risks are serious and require immediate attention.


4. (C) On February 4, AU mediator Salim Salim painted a
troubled picture of the negotiations. Around the table in
Abuja the parties were making progress in discussing wealth-
and power-sharing, but on the ground in Darfur they were
responsible for a deplorable escalation of violence. Each
month since October the fighting has worsened and forced
severe restrictions on humanitarian operations. Salim stated
that the international community was drawing the conclusion
that Darfur was lawless and that the parties were not serious
about making peace. The facts on the ground confirm Salim,s
conclusion.


5. (C) The new AMIS commander, General Ihekare, told CDA Hume
that he was determined to &dominate the area8 to improve
security, rather than simply to rely on the good will of the
parties or the faulty cease-fire mechanism. He said he
needed to reshape the operation in the border area, where the
risks were higher, and he saw a need to redeploy CIVPOL in
order to make most efficient use of his troops. He wanted to
begin live-fire training for his troops, to step up training
in use of the Canadian APCs, and to deploy an increased
number of U.S. military observers. Ihekare is planning to
improve AMIS operations. He is not waiting for possible
decisions about UN-rehatting.


KHARTOUM 00000282 002.2 OF 002



6. (C) Recommendations: Despite positive inputs, the current
framework for solving the Darfur crisis is not working. We
need to redirect efforts in three areas:

-- First, security plans ought no longer to be based solely
on the parties, insincere commitment to their agreed
cease-fire. AMIS or a follow-on UN force must plan to extend
security and to protect civilians; perhaps the success of the
UN operation in Sierra Leone could provide a model. The USG
should respond positively and immediately to the AMIS
commander,s request for additional U.S. military observers
and open a dialogue with him regarding other support he could
use now. On the diplomatic front we should still support the
Abuja process, but no longer be held hostage to it. The
facts on the ground confirm the need for more independent
action;

-- Second, the U.S. should lead the call for action to stem
the risks of conflict along the Chad-Sudan border, a concern
not adequately covered by current AMIS operations. Regional
peace efforts, such as the consultations now convened in
Libya, may be helpful, but will not be sufficient. An early
response could include a UN mandate, perhaps initially for
AMIS operating under Chapter VIII with outside support, to
monitor the border and to report to the UN Security Council
as well as to the AU; and

-- Third, the USG cannot afford a hands-off posture with
regard to the planning for the eventual UN mandate or the
AMIS transition to that mandate. We should not allow the
wishes of the parties negotiating in Abuja to dictate the
terms of a mandate, nor should we simply await the proposals
and plans of UNDPKO. Initially we need to work with the new
AMIS commander on the ground to improve performance, creating
a more satisfactory base-line. Simultaneously, to produce
the right &range of options8 called for in the UNSC
presidential statement, we should engage AMIS and the UN in
the field to offer solid military advice and planning
assistance. The dangers in Darfur are rising and call for
prompt and effective measures.


7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
HUME