UN, AU DESCRIBE POST-ABUJA PITFALLS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002789

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
USUN, PLEASE PASS TO AF S/E NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU UN
SUBJECT: UN, AU DESCRIBE POST-ABUJA PITFALLS


Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) During a December 3 meeting of the Darfur Partners,
representatives from the United Nations (UN) and African
Union (AU) described the obstacles facing the international
community as it works to end the crisis in Darfur. At the
recent AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) session in Abuja,
the Sudanese government agreed to a "light support" package
for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) through December 31, 2006
and to a "heavy support" package from January 1 through June
30, 2007. However, numerous pitfalls remain. These include
the Sudanese government's insistence: 1) that the command and
control of any force be the sole responsibility of the AU, 2)
that UN money be allocated to the AU to support the six-month
AMIS extension, 3) that all UN military advisors be junior to
AU commanders, 4) and, that the Sudanese government approve
all components of the "heavy support" package on a
case-by-case basis.


2. (C) Under these constraints, the Deputy Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General, Taye
Brook-Zerihoun, said he was more concerned about the
feasibility of maintaining the AMIS force for the next six
months than securing the Sudanese government's eventual
approval of a hybrid force. He called the Sudanese proposal
for UN financing without UN oversight "unprecedented." Taye
also underscored the "serious impediments" to implementation
of the heavy support package due to the Sudanese government's
objections to "certain equipment." He said that the UN would
be unable to deploy any uniformed personnel (including those
in phase one of the "light package") until the issue of
"beret color" was resolved through a joint mechanism with the
Sudanese government.


3. (C) According to Taye, the National Congress Party (NCP)
leaders were acting as if they were the only signatories to
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and had disregarded the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM/Minawi). He added that AMIS Force
Commander Major General Luke Aprezi's public pledges to
secure Darfur if provided with two additional battalions were
"unfortunate" and lent credibility to the Sudanese
government's disingenuous arguments against a UN force.


4. (C) The AU's deputy head of DPA implementation, Ambassador
Boubou Niang, noted that Aprezi had not yet established
"chambers" of the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) to accommodate
DPA non-signatory groups that were abiding by the cease-fire.
Taye said that the Joint Commission meeting scheduled for
December 12 would be futile if the CFC remained ineffective.
(Note: In a November 25 meeting with CDA Hume, Aprezi said
that discussions with the Sudanese government on
re-structuring the CFC had not been scheduled and that he
planned to concentrate more on force protection issues during
the Abuja PSC meeting. The USG does not currently have a
representative on the CFC. End note.)


5. (C) The AU and UN have created a study team to assess the
political dynamics within the non-signatory rebel groups and
to develop a strategy for securing their accession to the
DPA. Such a plan would include a jointly sponsored AU-UN
conference of non-signatory political leaders and commanders,
which would be held sometime after mid-January when AU
Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim returns from leave. The
conference will include Darfurian political actors and
outside interlocutors, such as the governments of Eritrea and
Chad. Niang emphasized that this conference would not
inhibit "ongoing processes," such as the current movement
among non-signatory commanders in Darfur to hold
consultations in the field.
HUME