UN, AU DESCRIBE POST-ABUJA PITFALLS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002789 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY USUN, PLEASE PASS TO AF S/E NATSIOS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU UN SUBJECT: UN, AU DESCRIBE POST-ABUJA PITFALLS Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) During a December 3 meeting of the Darfur Partners, representatives from the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) described the obstacles facing the international community as it works to end the crisis in Darfur. At the recent AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) session in Abuja, the Sudanese government agreed to a "light support" package for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) through December 31, 2006 and to a "heavy support" package from January 1 through June 30, 2007. However, numerous pitfalls remain. These include the Sudanese government's insistence: 1) that the command and control of any force be the sole responsibility of the AU, 2) that UN money be allocated to the AU to support the six-month AMIS extension, 3) that all UN military advisors be junior to AU commanders, 4) and, that the Sudanese government approve all components of the "heavy support" package on a case-by-case basis. ¶2. (C) Under these constraints, the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Taye Brook-Zerihoun, said he was more concerned about the feasibility of maintaining the AMIS force for the next six months than securing the Sudanese government's eventual approval of a hybrid force. He called the Sudanese proposal for UN financing without UN oversight "unprecedented." Taye also underscored the "serious impediments" to implementation of the heavy support package due to the Sudanese government's objections to "certain equipment." He said that the UN would be unable to deploy any uniformed personnel (including those in phase one of the "light package") until the issue of "beret color" was resolved through a joint mechanism with the Sudanese government. ¶3. (C) According to Taye, the National Congress Party (NCP) leaders were acting as if they were the only signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and had disregarded the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM/Minawi). He added that AMIS Force Commander Major General Luke Aprezi's public pledges to secure Darfur if provided with two additional battalions were "unfortunate" and lent credibility to the Sudanese government's disingenuous arguments against a UN force. ¶4. (C) The AU's deputy head of DPA implementation, Ambassador Boubou Niang, noted that Aprezi had not yet established "chambers" of the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) to accommodate DPA non-signatory groups that were abiding by the cease-fire. Taye said that the Joint Commission meeting scheduled for December 12 would be futile if the CFC remained ineffective. (Note: In a November 25 meeting with CDA Hume, Aprezi said that discussions with the Sudanese government on re-structuring the CFC had not been scheduled and that he planned to concentrate more on force protection issues during the Abuja PSC meeting. The USG does not currently have a representative on the CFC. End note.) ¶5. (C) The AU and UN have created a study team to assess the political dynamics within the non-signatory rebel groups and to develop a strategy for securing their accession to the DPA. Such a plan would include a jointly sponsored AU-UN conference of non-signatory political leaders and commanders, which would be held sometime after mid-January when AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim returns from leave. The conference will include Darfurian political actors and outside interlocutors, such as the governments of Eritrea and Chad. Niang emphasized that this conference would not inhibit "ongoing processes," such as the current movement among non-signatory commanders in Darfur to hold consultations in the field. HUME