AU SPECIAL ENVOY SALIM BRIEFS INT'L PARTNERS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 002786

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR EAID MOPS SOCI ASEC US SU
SUBJECT: AU SPECIAL ENVOY SALIM BRIEFS INT'L PARTNERS,
CHARGE HUME ON MISSION

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: AU Special Envoy Salim A. Salim told
international partners and CDA Hume separately on Nov. 29
that getting DPA non-signatories on board when signatories
were not abiding by it was difficult. He noted Pres.
Bashir's continued opposition to a hybrid AU/UN PKO force,
and said a joint AU/UN Special Representative on Darfur might
be named. Hume noted little DPA implementation in 6 months;
his recent Darfur trip revealed tenuous humanitarian access,
a dysfunctional society, and government attempts to buy off
rebel leaders. Salim noted that Minni Minawi was denied
influence in Khartoum, but believed power sharing with Abdel
Wahid could broaden DPA support. Salim will travel to
Washington in mid-December; he mentioned a possible meeting
with A/S Frazer. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
AU Sp Rep Salim on Darfur: We're in this Together
-------------- --------------


2. (C) During a November 29 briefing of international
partners, AU Special Envoy and Darfur Peace Talks Chief
Mediator Salim A. Salim told international partners that AU
Special Representative Konare had asked him to assist in
broadening support for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).
Salim made the following points:

-- Fragmentation of the rebel movements started a long time
ago; getting the various Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM),
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),National Redemption
Front (NRF),and Group of 19 (G-19) elements united in
support of the DPA is a major challenge.

-- The DPA is complex and hard to explain; in the days
following the DPA signing on May 5, its opponents worked
harder than its proponents to influence the attitudes of
Darfurians.

-- Incredible efforts are necessary to implement the DPA, due
to its myriad requirements. Disarming the janjaweed,
maintaining humanitarian corridors, and working with a
relatively small AMIS force.

-- A key challenge now is to involve the DPA non-signatories.
To do so, first the signatories must live up to the
agreement. To this effect, Salim said he had met so far with
President Bashir, Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Senior Assistant
to the President Minni Minawi, and Presidential Advisor and
GNU Abuja Peace Talks Chief negotiator Magzoub al-Khalifa.
He also plans to meet with Vice President Ali Osman Taha,
SPLM officials, and President Bashir again, following his
return from the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in
Abuja.

-- Demands for individual compensation are unrealistic; the
Government, however, understands that higher amounts of
funding, such as $100 million, is possible, and is showing
greater flexibility.

-- Power sharing remains problematic, with some rebel
demands, such as for a vice president and for a change of
government, unattainable. The demand for a Darfur region,
however, is largely accepted, and the Government has gone far
to accommodate movement demands.

-- There are roughly 12 initiatives in play on addressing the
Darfur conflict; these are helpful, but become confusing in
their multiplicity. The November 16 joint AU/UN Addis Ababa
meeting sought to bring these under one umbrella.

-- Regarding a meeting of rebel commanders, he noted that
they cannot talk while fighting. He was aware of requests to
transport them to a meeting site, but said this came at the
same time as threats to AU aircraft. Nonetheless, the
international community needs to hear from the rebels, as
some are having second thoughts. A rebel commanders'
conference, however, cannot simply be a recitation of past
positions; it must involve new thinking.

-- JEM leader Khalil's position is difficult; Abdel Wahid,
while important symbolically, is being undermined in the
field. His image is fading, and will continue to do so the
longer he stays out of Darfur. Abdel Wahid's remaining in
the Netherlands and Paris serves neither the Fur nor him.
Although the AU thought Abdel Wahid would sign the DPA in
Abuja, he "chickened out," and remains inconsistent. He
rejects any meeting of rebel leaders that includes the NRF.

-- The fragmentation of Abdel Wahid's field commanders helps
neither the peace process nor the Government. Some have

KHARTOUM 00002786 002 OF 004


joined with the NRF, others have not; their lack of unity
impedes DPA implementation. Salim described his role as
unblocking the process.

-- The Chad-Sudan border needs attention; the security of
each state depends on the other. The capacity of each to
make trouble for the other is high.

-- When asked who would be his UN counterpart, Salim posited
that perhaps a joint AU/UN Special Representative on Darfur
could be appointed.

-- Salim admitted that the Ceasefire Commission and Joint
Commission had been weak; nonetheless, all parties in Darfur
are supposed to adhere to the Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire
Agreement.

-- President Bashir does not accept the notion of a hybrid
AU/UN peacekeeping force in Darfur; even if all parties were
in agreement, such a transition would still take a long time.
As we do not have time, we are stuck with AMIS and have to
beef it up to achieve the necessary, required level of
security.

-- Perhaps 90 percent of Darfurian political leaders have not
left the region, yet Darfurian diaspora negotiated on their
behalf, without being grounded in reality. It is important
for the field commanders to participate in establishing peace
in Darfur; Abdel Wahid, however, does not listen to them.


-- Asked about the involvement of Arab tribes, Salim stated
that the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process was
designed to incorporate their views, as well as those of
others who did not participate in the Abuja peace talks.
IDPs should also participate; they will return home when
security conditions permit and when resources are provided in
their villages.

-- The AU is operating under the assumption that the UN will
take over peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur eventually;
even some in the government appear to realize this. In the
meanwhile, the AU must build on what is possible, and start
with Phase 1 and 2, as agreed in Addis Ababa.

-- Part of the problem with implementing the DPA is that the
signatories themselves are not living up to it. The
Government is not abiding by it, and is marginalizing Sr.
Assistant to the President Minni Minawi.

-------------- --------------
CDA Hume: Not Much to Show for 6 Months Post-Abuja
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Following the briefing, Salim met with CDA Hume, who
noted that little had been accomplished over the past six
months regarding peace in Darfur. SLM leader Abdel Wahid
al-Nur had acted irresponsibly during the Abuja peace talks,
the Sudanese government had demonstrated that it did not want
foreigners in Darfur, and the military was pursuing the
Government's plan to stabilize Darfur through conquest.
Realizing the DPA was a chair with only two legs, the U.S.
continued to support the African Union and to foster a
non-signatory rebel commanders' conference. The dozen or so
initiatives to resolve the Darfur conflict require on the
ground buy-in, rather than that of expatriate Darfurians to
offer hope for success. CDA Hume also spoke of his November
25-27 visit to El Fasher and El Geneina, underscoring the
fragility of conditions, which testified to tenuous
humanitarian access, a dispirited and dysfunctional social
structure, and an apparent Government effort to buy off rebel
leaders one by one, rendering a consensus for peace
impossible.

-------------- --------------
Salim: Gov't Buys Rebels; Unclear re Post-Addis Status
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Salim referred to what he viewed as the Government's
"salami" technique, wherein GNU chief negotiator for the
Abuja peace talks and Presidential Advisor Magzoub al-Khalifa
regarded everyone in Darfur as for sale. Although Salim
referred to the joint AU/UN meeting in Addis Ababa on
November 16 as good, he questioned the extent to which there
was a common understanding thereafter. He claimed all
parties were on board regarding the peace process, however,
including Abdel Wahid. He asked if S/E Natsios had met with
Abdel Wahid; CDA Hume said he had for a brief meeting in
Paris, although the discussion did not include mention of a
possible trip to Washington or to the White House.


KHARTOUM 00002786 003 OF 004



--------------
Salim: Minni no longer in Picture
--------------


5. (C) Salim stated he had met with President Bashir, and
hoped to do so again before departing Khartoum, and after
having met with Vice President Taha. CDA Hume noted,
however, that Taha has not been a member of Bashir's inner
circle recently. Salim said that his conversation with Minni
Minawi convinced him that he was no longer in the picture.
CDA Hume concurred that Minni had no connection to power, but
he is performing better than expected, and has differentiated
himself from Abdel Wahid. Minni has restrained his forces,
but is weaker due to a few defections.

-------------- --------------
Salim: No Objection to Rebel Commanders' Conference
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Salim said that he did not object to efforts to
facilitate a rebel commanders' conference, although he
indicated that he would not become involved, either. Khalil
is not interested in a commander's conference. CDA Hume said
that there were two additional impediments to DPA
implementation: a reluctance to address the issue of
compensation for Darfurians, and the plan of al-Khalifa,
which involves buying off rebel leaders individually, does
not allow for necessary political closure.

-------------- --------------
Salim: Rebel Flexibility Needed in DPA Power Sharing
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Salim noted that implementing power sharing under the
DPA was complex, as rebel leaders sought to transform the
central government and have a Darfurian vice president. On
the other hand, Darfur showed promise of becoming a region,
and its citizens will have a clear choice on the matter;
also, the Government can move on compensation. Many,
however, have the impression that pressure was only made on
the rebels during the Abuja peace talks, not on the
Government.


8. (C) Salim pondered why Minni Minawi served as both Senior
Assistant to the President and Chair of the Transitional
Darfur Reconstruction Administration (TDRA),and whether he
would be willing to share power with Abdel Wahid. CDA Hume
responded that one should be leery of taking power away from
Minni. Salim suggested that perhaps Abdel Wahid could be
named a governor, in particular as he did not want a Zaghawa
to serve in that capacity. CDA Hume noted that positions in
Darfur could be more important to rebels that those in
Khartoum, but Abdel Wahid wanted the status of a top job in
Khartoum.

-------------- --------------
Salim: UN PKO Survey Team to Chad, Nothing New in Libya
-------------- --------------


9. (C) On Chad, Salim observed that the UN had sent a survey
team to review the potential for peacekeeping operations
along the boarder with Sudan. Salim asked how powerful the
NRF would be without G-19 support, or assistance provided
through Chad. CDA Hume said that the NRF had demonstrated
its abilities through its recent raid on the town of Abu
Jabra, in the southeast of Darfur, near Kordofan, despite
President Bahir's earlier pledge to prevent NRF attacks in
South Darfur State. As well, it had recently killed a couple
of SAF generals and captured a number of SAF vehicles.



10. (C) Regarding the November 20-21 Six-Party Tripoli
Summit, Salim said he had no impression anything definitive
had occurred. Qadhafi is trying to keep the UN out of
Darfur, and continues to stir the pot.

-------------- --------------
Hume: CFC Should be Comprehensive, Not Create Outlaws
-------------- --------------


11. (C) CDA Hume noted that shutting out the DPA
non-signatories from the Ceasefire Commission had been a
mistake. All movements with forces committee to the
ceasefire should participate, if only to provide an
opportunity to engage them. If all such groups were
involved, then the international community could complain
about those who remained the enemies of peace. Most fighting
is directed at military targets, although civilians also feel
the consequences. Even though both the rebels and the
Government were indifferent to civilian suffering, the

KHARTOUM 00002786 004 OF 004


present level of violence was less than two years ago. The
question remaining is would the Government force the IDPs out
of their camps. Salim said that IDPs did not want to go
back, and that sheikhs were asking for assistance with
vocational training.

--------------
Travel Note
--------------


12. (C) In departing, Salim noted that he would depart
Khartoum for Addis Ababa early on December 3, and that he
planned to travel to Washington on December 17 for a two-week
leave. He raised the possibility of seeking a meeting with
A/S Frazer during his vacation. End note.
HUME