AU SPECIAL ENVOY SALIM BRIEFS INT'L PARTNERS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 002786 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR EAID MOPS SOCI ASEC US SU SUBJECT: AU SPECIAL ENVOY SALIM BRIEFS INT'L PARTNERS, CHARGE HUME ON MISSION Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: AU Special Envoy Salim A. Salim told international partners and CDA Hume separately on Nov. 29 that getting DPA non-signatories on board when signatories were not abiding by it was difficult. He noted Pres. Bashir's continued opposition to a hybrid AU/UN PKO force, and said a joint AU/UN Special Representative on Darfur might be named. Hume noted little DPA implementation in 6 months; his recent Darfur trip revealed tenuous humanitarian access, a dysfunctional society, and government attempts to buy off rebel leaders. Salim noted that Minni Minawi was denied influence in Khartoum, but believed power sharing with Abdel Wahid could broaden DPA support. Salim will travel to Washington in mid-December; he mentioned a possible meeting with A/S Frazer. End Summary. -------------- -------------- AU Sp Rep Salim on Darfur: We're in this Together -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) During a November 29 briefing of international partners, AU Special Envoy and Darfur Peace Talks Chief Mediator Salim A. Salim told international partners that AU Special Representative Konare had asked him to assist in broadening support for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Salim made the following points: -- Fragmentation of the rebel movements started a long time ago; getting the various Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),National Redemption Front (NRF),and Group of 19 (G-19) elements united in support of the DPA is a major challenge. -- The DPA is complex and hard to explain; in the days following the DPA signing on May 5, its opponents worked harder than its proponents to influence the attitudes of Darfurians. -- Incredible efforts are necessary to implement the DPA, due to its myriad requirements. Disarming the janjaweed, maintaining humanitarian corridors, and working with a relatively small AMIS force. -- A key challenge now is to involve the DPA non-signatories. To do so, first the signatories must live up to the agreement. To this effect, Salim said he had met so far with President Bashir, Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi, and Presidential Advisor and GNU Abuja Peace Talks Chief negotiator Magzoub al-Khalifa. He also plans to meet with Vice President Ali Osman Taha, SPLM officials, and President Bashir again, following his return from the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Abuja. -- Demands for individual compensation are unrealistic; the Government, however, understands that higher amounts of funding, such as $100 million, is possible, and is showing greater flexibility. -- Power sharing remains problematic, with some rebel demands, such as for a vice president and for a change of government, unattainable. The demand for a Darfur region, however, is largely accepted, and the Government has gone far to accommodate movement demands. -- There are roughly 12 initiatives in play on addressing the Darfur conflict; these are helpful, but become confusing in their multiplicity. The November 16 joint AU/UN Addis Ababa meeting sought to bring these under one umbrella. -- Regarding a meeting of rebel commanders, he noted that they cannot talk while fighting. He was aware of requests to transport them to a meeting site, but said this came at the same time as threats to AU aircraft. Nonetheless, the international community needs to hear from the rebels, as some are having second thoughts. A rebel commanders' conference, however, cannot simply be a recitation of past positions; it must involve new thinking. -- JEM leader Khalil's position is difficult; Abdel Wahid, while important symbolically, is being undermined in the field. His image is fading, and will continue to do so the longer he stays out of Darfur. Abdel Wahid's remaining in the Netherlands and Paris serves neither the Fur nor him. Although the AU thought Abdel Wahid would sign the DPA in Abuja, he "chickened out," and remains inconsistent. He rejects any meeting of rebel leaders that includes the NRF. -- The fragmentation of Abdel Wahid's field commanders helps neither the peace process nor the Government. Some have KHARTOUM 00002786 002 OF 004 joined with the NRF, others have not; their lack of unity impedes DPA implementation. Salim described his role as unblocking the process. -- The Chad-Sudan border needs attention; the security of each state depends on the other. The capacity of each to make trouble for the other is high. -- When asked who would be his UN counterpart, Salim posited that perhaps a joint AU/UN Special Representative on Darfur could be appointed. -- Salim admitted that the Ceasefire Commission and Joint Commission had been weak; nonetheless, all parties in Darfur are supposed to adhere to the Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. -- President Bashir does not accept the notion of a hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping force in Darfur; even if all parties were in agreement, such a transition would still take a long time. As we do not have time, we are stuck with AMIS and have to beef it up to achieve the necessary, required level of security. -- Perhaps 90 percent of Darfurian political leaders have not left the region, yet Darfurian diaspora negotiated on their behalf, without being grounded in reality. It is important for the field commanders to participate in establishing peace in Darfur; Abdel Wahid, however, does not listen to them. -- Asked about the involvement of Arab tribes, Salim stated that the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process was designed to incorporate their views, as well as those of others who did not participate in the Abuja peace talks. IDPs should also participate; they will return home when security conditions permit and when resources are provided in their villages. -- The AU is operating under the assumption that the UN will take over peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur eventually; even some in the government appear to realize this. In the meanwhile, the AU must build on what is possible, and start with Phase 1 and 2, as agreed in Addis Ababa. -- Part of the problem with implementing the DPA is that the signatories themselves are not living up to it. The Government is not abiding by it, and is marginalizing Sr. Assistant to the President Minni Minawi. -------------- -------------- CDA Hume: Not Much to Show for 6 Months Post-Abuja -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Following the briefing, Salim met with CDA Hume, who noted that little had been accomplished over the past six months regarding peace in Darfur. SLM leader Abdel Wahid al-Nur had acted irresponsibly during the Abuja peace talks, the Sudanese government had demonstrated that it did not want foreigners in Darfur, and the military was pursuing the Government's plan to stabilize Darfur through conquest. Realizing the DPA was a chair with only two legs, the U.S. continued to support the African Union and to foster a non-signatory rebel commanders' conference. The dozen or so initiatives to resolve the Darfur conflict require on the ground buy-in, rather than that of expatriate Darfurians to offer hope for success. CDA Hume also spoke of his November 25-27 visit to El Fasher and El Geneina, underscoring the fragility of conditions, which testified to tenuous humanitarian access, a dispirited and dysfunctional social structure, and an apparent Government effort to buy off rebel leaders one by one, rendering a consensus for peace impossible. -------------- -------------- Salim: Gov't Buys Rebels; Unclear re Post-Addis Status -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Salim referred to what he viewed as the Government's "salami" technique, wherein GNU chief negotiator for the Abuja peace talks and Presidential Advisor Magzoub al-Khalifa regarded everyone in Darfur as for sale. Although Salim referred to the joint AU/UN meeting in Addis Ababa on November 16 as good, he questioned the extent to which there was a common understanding thereafter. He claimed all parties were on board regarding the peace process, however, including Abdel Wahid. He asked if S/E Natsios had met with Abdel Wahid; CDA Hume said he had for a brief meeting in Paris, although the discussion did not include mention of a possible trip to Washington or to the White House. KHARTOUM 00002786 003 OF 004 -------------- Salim: Minni no longer in Picture -------------- ¶5. (C) Salim stated he had met with President Bashir, and hoped to do so again before departing Khartoum, and after having met with Vice President Taha. CDA Hume noted, however, that Taha has not been a member of Bashir's inner circle recently. Salim said that his conversation with Minni Minawi convinced him that he was no longer in the picture. CDA Hume concurred that Minni had no connection to power, but he is performing better than expected, and has differentiated himself from Abdel Wahid. Minni has restrained his forces, but is weaker due to a few defections. -------------- -------------- Salim: No Objection to Rebel Commanders' Conference -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Salim said that he did not object to efforts to facilitate a rebel commanders' conference, although he indicated that he would not become involved, either. Khalil is not interested in a commander's conference. CDA Hume said that there were two additional impediments to DPA implementation: a reluctance to address the issue of compensation for Darfurians, and the plan of al-Khalifa, which involves buying off rebel leaders individually, does not allow for necessary political closure. -------------- -------------- Salim: Rebel Flexibility Needed in DPA Power Sharing -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Salim noted that implementing power sharing under the DPA was complex, as rebel leaders sought to transform the central government and have a Darfurian vice president. On the other hand, Darfur showed promise of becoming a region, and its citizens will have a clear choice on the matter; also, the Government can move on compensation. Many, however, have the impression that pressure was only made on the rebels during the Abuja peace talks, not on the Government. ¶8. (C) Salim pondered why Minni Minawi served as both Senior Assistant to the President and Chair of the Transitional Darfur Reconstruction Administration (TDRA),and whether he would be willing to share power with Abdel Wahid. CDA Hume responded that one should be leery of taking power away from Minni. Salim suggested that perhaps Abdel Wahid could be named a governor, in particular as he did not want a Zaghawa to serve in that capacity. CDA Hume noted that positions in Darfur could be more important to rebels that those in Khartoum, but Abdel Wahid wanted the status of a top job in Khartoum. -------------- -------------- Salim: UN PKO Survey Team to Chad, Nothing New in Libya -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) On Chad, Salim observed that the UN had sent a survey team to review the potential for peacekeeping operations along the boarder with Sudan. Salim asked how powerful the NRF would be without G-19 support, or assistance provided through Chad. CDA Hume said that the NRF had demonstrated its abilities through its recent raid on the town of Abu Jabra, in the southeast of Darfur, near Kordofan, despite President Bahir's earlier pledge to prevent NRF attacks in South Darfur State. As well, it had recently killed a couple of SAF generals and captured a number of SAF vehicles. ¶10. (C) Regarding the November 20-21 Six-Party Tripoli Summit, Salim said he had no impression anything definitive had occurred. Qadhafi is trying to keep the UN out of Darfur, and continues to stir the pot. -------------- -------------- Hume: CFC Should be Comprehensive, Not Create Outlaws -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) CDA Hume noted that shutting out the DPA non-signatories from the Ceasefire Commission had been a mistake. All movements with forces committee to the ceasefire should participate, if only to provide an opportunity to engage them. If all such groups were involved, then the international community could complain about those who remained the enemies of peace. Most fighting is directed at military targets, although civilians also feel the consequences. Even though both the rebels and the Government were indifferent to civilian suffering, the KHARTOUM 00002786 004 OF 004 present level of violence was less than two years ago. The question remaining is would the Government force the IDPs out of their camps. Salim said that IDPs did not want to go back, and that sheikhs were asking for assistance with vocational training. -------------- Travel Note -------------- ¶12. (C) In departing, Salim noted that he would depart Khartoum for Addis Ababa early on December 3, and that he planned to travel to Washington on December 17 for a two-week leave. He raised the possibility of seeking a meeting with A/S Frazer during his vacation. End note. HUME