KHARTOUM: GLOBAL PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFORMATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002785 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR S/CT - F VOGEL AND CA - A FRELICK E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 TAGS: ASEC CVIS KVPR PGOV PINR PREL PTER SU SUBJECT: KHARTOUM: GLOBAL PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFORMATION EXCHANGE REF: A. STATE 190832 ¶B. STATE 109771 Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) At present, the Sudanese Government does not have an effective computerized database to track entries and exits of suspected terrorists/watchlisted individuals; however, the U.S. government is working with the Sudanese Government to deploy the PISCES system, which should hopefully be operable in early 2007. This should enhance the ability of customs authorities to identify those persons noted for watchlisting. The Government does employ a name-based watchlisting system at present, but it is not as effective as the PISCES system will be once activated. Customs/border authorities populate the watchlisting database with names of known/suspected criminals, as well as names provided by some neighboring countries, as the Government engages in information sharing with some regional partners. ¶2. (C) The Sudanese Government does not employ biometric technologies for tracking persons of interest and does not issue either machine-readable passports or passports with biometric information. ¶3. (C) While it may be possible that Government officials might inappropriately share U.S. Government-provided watchlisting data, we do not believe that it would be systematic or at the direction of any senior-level immigration or Government officials. Through its work with refugee cases, the Consular Sectin is aware that undocumented travelers routinely pay bribes to working-level Sudanese Government immigration officials to enter Sudan at its land border crossing points. HUME