KHARTOUM: GLOBAL PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFORMATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002785

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S/CT - F VOGEL AND CA - A FRELICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: ASEC CVIS KVPR PGOV PINR PREL PTER SU
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM: GLOBAL PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFORMATION
EXCHANGE

REF: A. STATE 190832

B. STATE 109771

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) At present, the Sudanese Government does not have an
effective computerized database to track entries and exits of
suspected terrorists/watchlisted individuals; however, the
U.S. government is working with the Sudanese Government to
deploy the PISCES system, which should hopefully be operable
in early 2007. This should enhance the ability of customs
authorities to identify those persons noted for watchlisting.
The Government does employ a name-based watchlisting system
at present, but it is not as effective as the PISCES system
will be once activated. Customs/border authorities populate
the watchlisting database with names of known/suspected
criminals, as well as names provided by some neighboring
countries, as the Government engages in information sharing
with some regional partners.


2. (C) The Sudanese Government does not employ biometric
technologies for tracking persons of interest and does not
issue either machine-readable passports or passports with
biometric information.


3. (C) While it may be possible that Government officials
might inappropriately share U.S. Government-provided
watchlisting data, we do not believe that it would be
systematic or at the direction of any senior-level
immigration or Government officials. Through its work with
refugee cases, the Consular Sectin is aware that undocumented
travelers routinely pay bribes to working-level Sudanese
Government immigration officials to enter Sudan at its land
border crossing points.
HUME