DPA: WAITING FOR CHANGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002764 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/SE NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SU UN SUBJECT: DPA: WAITING FOR CHANGE Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Over six months after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),frustration and anger about the agreement were common themes across discussions with groups in El Fasher. In a series of meetings in November, Poloff spoke with members of the Fur and Tunjur communities, the Head of Native Administration in El Fasher, SLA/Minawi representatives, the Darfur Forum, and Al Salam IDP camp leaders. Interlocutors cited a total absence of visible improvement in the daily life of Darfurians since the signing of the DPA and noted the marked rise in insecurity. All groups expressed frustration with the inaction of the African Union (AU) and Government of Sudan (GOS),the moribund Cease-fire Commission (CFC),the continuing lack of protection for civilians, and the glacial progress of DPA implementation. Many flagged land and compensation issues and criticized the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). The majority called for continuing negotiation with non-signatory parties and expansion of the DPA. End summary. -------------- AU CFC not functioning -------------- ¶2. (C) Almost every group said the first priority for Darfur must be security, including the protection of civilians, safe corridors for travel, and the disarmament of the Janjaweed. Fur leader Rabie Baharaddin Ali Ninar argued that the AU has neither the mandate nor the capability to protect Darfurians. "Civilians must be protected. The AU can't do it. We need the UN," he continued. "The AU are not the right people to protect Darfur, and the pretense that they are effective has become a barrier to peace." He further stated that the Sudanese government is using the presence of the AU to delay acceptance of UN forces. He noted that the AU was failing as observers, as they did not collect accurate information about the situation in each sector. ¶3. (SBU) SLA/Minawi representative Adam Ali War stated that "the CFC is not functioning." He noted that there is a lengthy delay in incident reports sent to AMIS headquarters, few investigations are completed, cease-fire violations go unpublicized, and there is no punishment for perpetrators. 
In a CFC meeting last week, only five minutes of the 90-minute session were spent discussing investigations. When the SLA representative asked about the recent killings in Birmaza, he was told that "they weren't there to talk about people getting killed." ¶4. (C) According to Mohamed El Sadiq Adam, Advisor for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Affairs at the Darfur Forum, AU investigations are dropping in number. When troops witness atrocities, they are not submitting reports to headquarters. IDP camp omda (village leader) Abdullah Musa stated that "if the AU is not capable of addressing even simple problems inside the IDP camps, it cannot possibly be part of the solution to Darfur,s problems." -------------- DPA: Implementation Not Visible -------------- ¶5. (C) Head of native administration and king of El Fasher Rahmhalla Mahmoud questioned what the population of Darfur has gained since the DPA was signed. "We need a real peace agreement," he said. "The GoS has no credibility. People don't believe it will live up to its word when it never has before." Rahmhalla said that the greatest damage to the DPA has been caused by a lack of improvement in security and infrastructure on the ground. ¶6. (C) The lack of progress in implementation of the DPA shows that the Sudanese government has no intention of fulfilling its commitments, argued Khalil Adam Abdulkareem, Fur leader and deputy chairman of the Darfur Forum's El Fasher office. Abdullah Musa concurred. "We know the government does not want to implement the provisions in the Abuja agreement, and we appeal to the international community to deploy troops capable of protecting the people of Darfur, otherwise all camp populations will have to leave Sudan." ¶7. (C) Ahmed Mahmoud al Gadi and Iddris Abdalla, representatives of the Tunjur tribe, said that due to their location between Zaghawa and Arab groups, attempts to remain KHARTOUM 00002764 002 OF 003 neutral in the fighting have failed. Tunjur territory has been used as a base by Zaghawa for attacks, and they are forced to pay protection money to Zaghawa rebel factions. In retribution, the Tunjur are targeted by the Janjaweed, who use the Zaghawa attacks to justify raids and occupation of Tunjur land. "We must have protection, the umbrella of the international community," al Gadi said. ¶8. (C) Fur leaders flagged the importance of resolving land ownership issues, emphasizing that Arab settlers who have moved onto Fur land must be removed. They noted that traditional records track legal ownership of the land. They opposed the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), stating that it "legitimizes the government's claim that the violence is an inter-tribal conflict." They also argued that starting the DDDC implies that all parties involved support the DPA. "We must sign it before we participate in the DDDC," Abdulkareem said. Tunjur leaders requested the DDDC be held in a neutral location, under the supervision of the international community. -------------- Need for Development -------------- ¶9. (C) Iddris Abdalla noted that the conflict stems from political marginalization and an absence of development. He conceded this was recognized in the DPA but argued that there has been no change since the signing. "Minni Minawi brought a check to El Fasher two weeks ago, but where has the money gone?" Abdalla asked. He argued that Minawi had funneled development projects to Zaghawa territory and not supported other groups. -------------- Role of DPA Non-Signatories -------------- ¶10. (C) Abdullah Musa castigated the international community for accepting an agreement signed with only one movement, and called for greater efforts to include the concerns of non-signatory groups. Darfur Forum Legal Affairs Advisor Babiker Mahmoud Abdullah said that the Sudanese government's biggest mistake was to work with only SLA/Minawi and to sideline the non-signatories and groups like the Darfur Forum that were working for peace. Abdullah argued that the Sudanese government must stop offensives against non-signatories, disarm the Janjaweed, and bring the non-signatories on board. He felt neither the Sudanese government nor Arab senior leadership could control the Janjaweed and that the Janjaweed would follow their own agenda and target Fur tribes and other groups for their own ends. ¶12. (C) "Minni doesn't represent us, and we must reach out to non-signatories," argued Mohamed El Sadig Adam. "The UN resolutions, if enforced, will contribute to peace, especially a cease-fire agreement and a ban of military flights over Darfur." Darfur forum leaders are planning to visit European capitals to meet with the leadership of various armed movements and push negotiation with the government. -------------- Compensation -------------- ¶13. (C) Adam Suleiman Rasheed of the Tunjur community asked why there has been no progress in compensaQDafurians. "People expect their villages to be rehabilitated and provided with seeds, tools, and livestock to replace what they lost," he said, adding that compensation for IDPs must be both individual and community-based. ¶14. (C) Mohamed El Sadig Adam said "the IDPs need compensation, and the DPA doesn't address that sufficiently." He argued that the Sudanese government was not willing to support a real solution and has not yet transferred the initial funds it had agreed to in Abuja. "Darfurians don't believe the GOS will restore their lives to them," he said. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (SBU) In the months directly following the signing of the DPA, it was argued that detractors simply were not familiar with the contents of the agreement, but were following the guidance of their ethnically-based political leaders. To a KHARTOUM 00002764 003 OF 003 certain extent, this remains an accurate assessment. However, frustration is rising at the lack of any progress in alleviating individual suffering in Darfur. The AU is mistrusted and seen as a de facto ally of the Sudanese government. IDPs are no closer to returning to their homes, and although some political positions have been filled in Khartoum by signatories, there is no visible improvement in the share of national wealth and power. For the DPA to gain traction, it needs three things: Signatories to fulfill commitments made in Abuja, a viable cessation of hostilities, and an expanded declaration of commitment by the non-signatories to return to the negotiating table. End comment. HUME