SOUTHERN SUDAN: MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000275 SIPDIS SIPDIS, SENSITIVE DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND INL/CIV E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KCRM ASEC EAID CG UG SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN: MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF POLICE AND SECURITY ¶1. (U) CG Juba met with GoSS Minister of Police and Security Daniel Awet on February 3 to review progress in establishing a functional police force in Southern Sudan, and re- establishing security. Awet began by discussing the structure of the police force in South Sudan. There will be a total of 2,000 unified police, 200 for each state, that will remain under the direct control of the Ministry and take care of state to state transactions: transfer of prisoners, internal investigations, etc. -------------- Recruitment and Training -------------- ¶2. (U) Awet said that the GoSS has started training the first contingent of 300 on its own, a three-month process, and has requested UNMIS assistance with the remainder. Within a year, he hopes to have the unified force trained and deployed in place. In addition, the Ministry is recruiting 1,800 police for each state (Note: the actual populations and areas of each state vary greatly. End note.),for a grand total of almost 20,000 police throughout the South. Awet said that in addition to the police already under GoSS training, UNMIS has committed to train 500 and the UK has sent 200 more to Uganda for training. ¶3. (U) Awet said that northern police officers formerly stationed in the South have already left for the North, and southern police in the North are returning, providing a core of trained officers. He said that the southward transfer is not complete, but that the GNU had stopped paying southern police salaries in December. The bulk of the southern force would be recruited within the ten states. Awet said that he planned to recruit new people and not just demobilized SPLA soldiers, to help bolster the concept of rule of law among the police. He listed capacity building as his ministry's top priority. -------------- Equipment and Resources -------------- ¶4. (U) Awet listed infrastructure and equipment as next on the priority list. Awet complained that the northerners did not leave anything behind, not even a single functioning vehicle. UNDP has provided ten police sedans, one for each state, but the ministry alone had ten directors who need vehicles. The police are still largely disarmed, a legacy of the past, since Khartoum had refused to arm southerners in the police force stationed in the South, for fear they would defect to the SPLA. Awet said that the disarmament of civilians already underway in some areas would provide arms for the police. ¶5. (U) Uniforms are also in short supply, although the British have promised to provide 10,000, half the total required. And finally, communications are non-existent. Awet said the Ministry wants to procure Motorola-style radios for local communications and side-band UHF for state- to-state outreach. He noted that these needs covered only the police. The prisons and the fire brigade are also unequipped and under-trained. -------------- Security and the LRA -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Awet said that he remains very concerned about security conditions, including in Juba. He said that rumors of a periodic LRA presence in town are true. These individuals, however, are Sudanese nationals rather than Ugandans. He accused hardliner elements in the North of continuing to recruit and pay southerners to create disturbances in the South. The GoSS knows from papers found on dead LRA fighters, and from interrogations of captives, that many of these are Sudanese. Most are Acholi, Awet continued, but there is a disturbing trend of Madi and Bari tribesman involved as well. He said that these elements are not taking orders from Kony or Otti, who were on the run from UN justice, but rather from northern security officials. Awet added that he intends to travel to Khartoum soon to confront El Zubier Beshir Taha, who he referred to as his GNU counterpart, over continued northern meddling in the South, and demand that Taha use his influence to stop this. Awet said that due to economics and infrastructure he favors continued unity with the North, but only if the North complies with its CPA obligations and ceases to meddle. ¶7. (SBU) Awet said that he had reports that some LRA KHARTOUM 00000275 002 OF 002 fighters had moved north out of DRC following the confrontation between the LRA and Guatemalan UN peacekeepers. He said that the northward movement would increase when the rainy season arrives and fighters could move under the cover of high grasses, a tactic the SPLA had used in the past. Awet said that since the LRA operated in groups of three to five - and never more than ten - stopping this infiltration would be very difficult. Awet stated that he believed there are as many as 12,000 LRA in southern Sudan (Note: Other sources put this number much lower. End note.) He concluded by saying he is aware that USAID could not engage in training and equipping police, but wondered if other branches of the USG might be able to assist. Awet did not mention last year's INL assessment visit. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The complicity of NIF elements from Khartoum in using rogue forces to sow disorder in the South is an article of faith among most senior GoSS officials, Awet not excluded. The view that the LRA is morphing from a Ugandan into Sudanese force is also widely held. To date, however, no one has offered conclusive evidence of Northern involvement, other than generalized accusations. -------------- Bio Data -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Awet is known as a straightforward and honest soldier who frankly expresses his views. A strong supporter of John Garang, he was nonetheless one of the first SPLA insiders to challenge Garang on the decision to site the southern capital in Rumbek. He was reportedly sent by Garang to Wau to detain Salva Kiir in November 2004, but ended up helping to broker the meeting in Rumbek in which top SPLM/A officials, including Kiir, aired their grievances with Garang. Awet is said to have established cordial relations with Kiir. Awet was a combatant in both Anyanya One and the most recent conflict, during which he was the senior commander in Bahr el Ghazal. He moved his forces from there to support the successful SPLA attack on Torit. He may have attended the Sudanese Military College, but otherwise is not thought to have undertaken formal tertiary- level studies. HUME