Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2747
2006-11-27 16:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
PRES. BASHIR,S JUBA VISIT: SECURITY, ABYEI, CPA,
VZCZCXRO9730 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #2747/01 3311608 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271608Z NOV 06 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5387 INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002747
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR EAID MOPS SOCI ASEC US SU
SUBJECT: PRES. BASHIR,S JUBA VISIT: SECURITY, ABYEI, CPA,
AND DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED
REF: KHARTOUM 02682
Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002747
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR EAID MOPS SOCI ASEC US SU
SUBJECT: PRES. BASHIR,S JUBA VISIT: SECURITY, ABYEI, CPA,
AND DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED
REF: KHARTOUM 02682
Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: President Bashir,s November 18 visit to
Juba has done little to assure southern Sudanese of
Khartoum,s sincerity in ending support for the Sudan Armed
Forces (SAF) and militia groups widely believed to be
responsible for recent violence in Juba and surrounding
areas. Bashir pledged to remove most SAF by early 2007. The
GNU President proposed to establish an NCP-SPLM committee to
look at Abyei issues, but again rejected the Abyei Boundaries
Commission (ABC) findings. He reiterated promises to build
roads between key cities. While the public atmospherics were
cordial and welcoming, senior SPLM/A and GoSS officials
dismiss Bashir,s visit as bringing nothing new and revealing
the North,s complicity in plans to destabilize the South.
End Summary.
-------------- --------------
Bashir's Visit to Juba only the Second since CPA Signed
-------------- --------------
2. (SBU) GNU President Omer Hassan al Bashir,s hastily
laid-on November 18 trip to Juba was only the second since
the CPA signing. The local SPLM chapter was ordered to bring
out the public to welcome Bashir, and members of the
diplomatic community were invited to receive him at the
airport, including representatives from the consulates
general of the U.S., Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea. The
Norwegians, Dutch, and Joint Donor Office representatives
were invited to Bashir,s later speech. The SPLM could,
however, only muster up groups of trucked-in school children
and a modest number of ululating women to greet Bashir, along
with the obligatory local and GoSS officials.
-------------- --------------
Bashir's Visit in Response to Violence in Juba Area
-------------- --------------
3. (C) The visit was a response to the GoSS, demands for
answers to what the GoSS believes is mounting evidence of SAF
complicity in the over 100 deaths in Juba town and the
surrounding areas since October 2006. (Note: The SPLA
continues to hold 15 captured SAF troops in Juba (reftel)
under the control of the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU),and at
least one SAF soldier subsequently accused in a separate
incident, who reportedly has described the SAF,s involvement
in the killings. End note.) Bashir was accompanied by
Director of National Intelligence and Security Service Salah
Gosh and others. They held three reportedly contentious
meetigs with the GoSS an` CPLA-icnuding i pve=bqeF ithQQGoSS Prusilet calv`K)ip int,k}y iNis|g2so0e.` q$wrn|"nQ-)hi{tEz bQeiff w)mwkes Militia, SAF, JIUs
--------------
4. (SBU) Bashir spoke extemporaneously, in a relaxed manner,
even joking occasionally, and only in Arabic with no
translation. He focused on the need to avoid a return to
war, support the CPA, build roads to link southern and
northern cities, and resettle refugees. He told the Southern
Sudan Legislative Assembly that there were about 10,000
militia left who would be absorbed into the SAF or other
security forces within a month or so. Bashir also pledged to
remove the majority of the SAF from Southern Sudan by the end
of January 2007 and the remainder by July 2007. He said only
the JIUs should remain in Blue Nile and Bentiu (Unity State)
instead of the SAF, but that the SAF should continue in
Malakal (Upper Nile State) to protect &the international
community8 and their workers.
-------------- --------------
Bashir: Abyei should be Addressed by NCP-SPLM Committee
-------------- --------------
5. (C) The GNU President again rejected the ABC conclusions
and reportedly called for a NCP-SPLM committee to address the
issue. Bashir concluded that if the South chose separation
at the end of the interim period, then the North would remain
a good neighbor.
-------------- --------------
GoSS President Kiir Raises U.S. Travel Limitation
KHARTOUM 00002747 002 OF 002
-------------- --------------
6. (C) During his private meeting with President Bashir, Goss
President Kiir reportedly pressed for a lifting of the
25-mile restriction on travel for Americans due to the
adverse impact it was having on Southern development
programs, according to Minister of Regional Cooperation
Barnaba Mariel Benjamin.
-------------- --------------
SPLA Chief of Staff: Bashir Fails to Deal with Issues
-------------- --------------
7. (C) In a conversation with CG, SPLA Chief of Staff Lt. Gen
Oyai Deng Ajak dismissed the visit as yielding little on the
security front and criticized Kiir,s conciliatory remarks
before Bashir,s address. Deng said that in the private
meetings the GoSS had accused Khartoum of: 1) keeping large
numbers of SAF forces in &the oilfields8 of Upper Nile
State and not turning Malakal over to the JIU; 2) failing to
integrate ex-militia still in Torit, Malakal, and Wau; 3)
refusing to allow the UN or SPLA to have any presence in
Abyei; 4) failing to pay JIUs for three months, and not
deploying SAF units to JIUs in Khartoum, leaving the SPLA
isolated and open to skirmishes with police; and 5)
clandestinely distributing arms to the SAF in the south.
-------------- --------------
Pagan: SPLA Deployed around Juba to Counter Violence
-------------- --------------
8. (C) Separately, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum told CG
that the SPLA was deploying over 1,000 men around Juba town
to address the recent violence, which he also attributed to
the SAF. Amun described Khartoum,s actions as an &act of
war,8 and spoke of the increasing view that the North was
attempting to destabilize the South. Senior SPLA officers
have described the situation in similarly stark terms, and
report that up to 1,500 troops have been deployed to protect
Juba and areas north, east, and south of the Southern capital.
--------------
Comment
--------------
9. (C) The visit, while historic, fell flat in delivering any
message on a strategy to address the South,s immediate
security concerns, CPA implementation, or development needs.
Bashir did, however, score some public relations points while
sporting a cowboy hat during his public address that matched
the one Kiir wore, and appearing as comfortable in the South
as he is in the North. Bashir has been criticized in
Southern-supported media for excluding Southern journalists
from participating in the visit and offering nothing of
substance. The GoSS, however, may be taking an equally hard
hit for failing to inform the public of the agenda and
substance of the discussions, and Kiir for appearing too
hospitable to Bashir. End comment.
HUME
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR EAID MOPS SOCI ASEC US SU
SUBJECT: PRES. BASHIR,S JUBA VISIT: SECURITY, ABYEI, CPA,
AND DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED
REF: KHARTOUM 02682
Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: President Bashir,s November 18 visit to
Juba has done little to assure southern Sudanese of
Khartoum,s sincerity in ending support for the Sudan Armed
Forces (SAF) and militia groups widely believed to be
responsible for recent violence in Juba and surrounding
areas. Bashir pledged to remove most SAF by early 2007. The
GNU President proposed to establish an NCP-SPLM committee to
look at Abyei issues, but again rejected the Abyei Boundaries
Commission (ABC) findings. He reiterated promises to build
roads between key cities. While the public atmospherics were
cordial and welcoming, senior SPLM/A and GoSS officials
dismiss Bashir,s visit as bringing nothing new and revealing
the North,s complicity in plans to destabilize the South.
End Summary.
-------------- --------------
Bashir's Visit to Juba only the Second since CPA Signed
-------------- --------------
2. (SBU) GNU President Omer Hassan al Bashir,s hastily
laid-on November 18 trip to Juba was only the second since
the CPA signing. The local SPLM chapter was ordered to bring
out the public to welcome Bashir, and members of the
diplomatic community were invited to receive him at the
airport, including representatives from the consulates
general of the U.S., Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea. The
Norwegians, Dutch, and Joint Donor Office representatives
were invited to Bashir,s later speech. The SPLM could,
however, only muster up groups of trucked-in school children
and a modest number of ululating women to greet Bashir, along
with the obligatory local and GoSS officials.
-------------- --------------
Bashir's Visit in Response to Violence in Juba Area
-------------- --------------
3. (C) The visit was a response to the GoSS, demands for
answers to what the GoSS believes is mounting evidence of SAF
complicity in the over 100 deaths in Juba town and the
surrounding areas since October 2006. (Note: The SPLA
continues to hold 15 captured SAF troops in Juba (reftel)
under the control of the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU),and at
least one SAF soldier subsequently accused in a separate
incident, who reportedly has described the SAF,s involvement
in the killings. End note.) Bashir was accompanied by
Director of National Intelligence and Security Service Salah
Gosh and others. They held three reportedly contentious
meetigs with the GoSS an` CPLA-icnuding i pve=bqeF ithQQGoSS Prusilet calv`K)ip int,k}y iNis|g2so0e.` q$wrn|"nQ-)hi{tEz bQeiff w)mwkes Militia, SAF, JIUs
--------------
4. (SBU) Bashir spoke extemporaneously, in a relaxed manner,
even joking occasionally, and only in Arabic with no
translation. He focused on the need to avoid a return to
war, support the CPA, build roads to link southern and
northern cities, and resettle refugees. He told the Southern
Sudan Legislative Assembly that there were about 10,000
militia left who would be absorbed into the SAF or other
security forces within a month or so. Bashir also pledged to
remove the majority of the SAF from Southern Sudan by the end
of January 2007 and the remainder by July 2007. He said only
the JIUs should remain in Blue Nile and Bentiu (Unity State)
instead of the SAF, but that the SAF should continue in
Malakal (Upper Nile State) to protect &the international
community8 and their workers.
-------------- --------------
Bashir: Abyei should be Addressed by NCP-SPLM Committee
-------------- --------------
5. (C) The GNU President again rejected the ABC conclusions
and reportedly called for a NCP-SPLM committee to address the
issue. Bashir concluded that if the South chose separation
at the end of the interim period, then the North would remain
a good neighbor.
-------------- --------------
GoSS President Kiir Raises U.S. Travel Limitation
KHARTOUM 00002747 002 OF 002
-------------- --------------
6. (C) During his private meeting with President Bashir, Goss
President Kiir reportedly pressed for a lifting of the
25-mile restriction on travel for Americans due to the
adverse impact it was having on Southern development
programs, according to Minister of Regional Cooperation
Barnaba Mariel Benjamin.
-------------- --------------
SPLA Chief of Staff: Bashir Fails to Deal with Issues
-------------- --------------
7. (C) In a conversation with CG, SPLA Chief of Staff Lt. Gen
Oyai Deng Ajak dismissed the visit as yielding little on the
security front and criticized Kiir,s conciliatory remarks
before Bashir,s address. Deng said that in the private
meetings the GoSS had accused Khartoum of: 1) keeping large
numbers of SAF forces in &the oilfields8 of Upper Nile
State and not turning Malakal over to the JIU; 2) failing to
integrate ex-militia still in Torit, Malakal, and Wau; 3)
refusing to allow the UN or SPLA to have any presence in
Abyei; 4) failing to pay JIUs for three months, and not
deploying SAF units to JIUs in Khartoum, leaving the SPLA
isolated and open to skirmishes with police; and 5)
clandestinely distributing arms to the SAF in the south.
-------------- --------------
Pagan: SPLA Deployed around Juba to Counter Violence
-------------- --------------
8. (C) Separately, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum told CG
that the SPLA was deploying over 1,000 men around Juba town
to address the recent violence, which he also attributed to
the SAF. Amun described Khartoum,s actions as an &act of
war,8 and spoke of the increasing view that the North was
attempting to destabilize the South. Senior SPLA officers
have described the situation in similarly stark terms, and
report that up to 1,500 troops have been deployed to protect
Juba and areas north, east, and south of the Southern capital.
--------------
Comment
--------------
9. (C) The visit, while historic, fell flat in delivering any
message on a strategy to address the South,s immediate
security concerns, CPA implementation, or development needs.
Bashir did, however, score some public relations points while
sporting a cowboy hat during his public address that matched
the one Kiir wore, and appearing as comfortable in the South
as he is in the North. Bashir has been criticized in
Southern-supported media for excluding Southern journalists
from participating in the visit and offering nothing of
substance. The GoSS, however, may be taking an equally hard
hit for failing to inform the public of the agenda and
substance of the discussions, and Kiir for appearing too
hospitable to Bashir. End comment.
HUME