MINAWI CALLED TO KHARTOUM TO BRIEF CABINET ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002743

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND
SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU US AU
SUBJECT: MINAWI CALLED TO KHARTOUM TO BRIEF CABINET ON
DARFUR

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Senior Assistant to the President and
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi has
been called to return to Khartoum from Darfur by Vice
President Taha in order to brief the Government's High
Commission on Peace and Security and the Cabinet. He intends
to emphasize that reversing the deteriorating security
environment is key to achieving the Government's stated goal
of bringing peace and security to Darfur. He will ask the
Government to facilitate an immediate cessation of
hostilities of all Parties, support for freedom of movement
to facilitate humanitarian assistance and commerce, and
request their support for his efforts to unify the moderate
non-signatory commanders. Minawi indicated he had little
time before more commanders deserted him and emphasized the
immediate requirement for non-military logistics. End
Summary.

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MINAWI FRUSTRATED WITH GOVERNMENT BACKED MILITIA
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2. (C) In a wide ranging meeting in El Fasher with Embassy
Senior Security Officer, Minawi complained that much of the
fighting in South Darfur was being orchestrated by the Wali.
He claimed the Wali had provided significant funding and
resources to Free Will militia in Geraida and Muhajeriya in
order to push his forces and people in the direction of North
Darfur. He stated that there were over 32,000 displaced
villagers in Sheiria and Muhajeriya from fighting over the
past two months. Minawi also noted that the emboldened
activities of other militia forces were caused by the Wali.
However, when asked about the reports of his threats to
mobilize forces against these militias, Minawi was evasive,
only indicating that his forces had defended the people
against militias over the past few weeks.

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CEASEFIRE CRITICAL
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3. (C) Minawi understands that without the complete cessation
of hostilities there will be little chance of unifying
non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). This
will be his primary point of discussion for the High
Commission and its chair, President Omar al-Bashir. He also
stated that this had been a good year for agriculture in
Darfur, but continued insecurity could significantly impede
the harvesting of crops. Without freedom of movement for the
people of Darfur and the international community, Minawi
predicted the humanitarian situation would continue to
deteriorate.

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PROSPECTS FOR NON-SIGNATORY CONFERENCE
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4. (C) Minawi said it would be difficult to unify the
non-signatory commanders. Furthermore, some were beyond
hope. He agreed with National Intelligence and Security
Service Chief Salah Gosh's recent comment that Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim held no
discernible vision for Darfur. He was only an instigator of
troubles and therefore would remain outside any effort to
bring non-signatories to the DPA. However, others under the
National Redemption Front (NRF) umbrella were ready to move
towards peace.


5. (C) When asked about the UN/AU proposal to hold a
non-signatory political leader conference with the Government
and himself, he claimed that Ahmed Deraige, Sharif Harir, and
other expatriate political leaders had lost the confidence of
the commanders in the field. He flatly stated there could be
no successful conclusion to a political conference unless the
political leaders had the support of the commanders, which
first required extensive unification and organizational
efforts prior to any political conference.

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MINAWI: "I CAN'T SUCCEED WITHOUT RESOURCES"
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6. (C) Minawi exhibited considerable frustration, noting that
much of his effort to unify commanders could not be initiated
due to a lack of resources. He claimed to have achieved
agreement on at least two occasions with SLM Unity and some
G-19 commanders, but could not compete with Khalil Ibrahim

KHARTOUM 00002743 002 OF 002


and others who continue to provide the means for these
commanders to fight. He said that Eritrea, Chad, the
National Congress Party, Popular Congress Party, and Umma
Party were all using Darfur to advance their own political
agendas.


7. (C) Thus, one of the primary objectives of his trip to
Darfur was to re-connect with his own commanders. He
succeeded in calling them together in Dar el Salaam and
Muhajeriya and was attempting to meet others in North Darfur
before his return to Khartoum. Minawi believes that most of
the commanders he has lost to the NRF have joined due to the
supplies the NRF can provide in the short term and the
additional military capacity to seize what they need from
Government forces in the long term. Minawi predicted he
would continue to lose commanders to SLM Unity and G-19 if he
does not receive the requisite resources to sustain his
forces in the field. Minawi concluded that his two most
urgent requirements were immediate non-military logistics and
support for political development of the SLM.
HUME