MINAWI THREATENS TO MOBILIZE AGAINST JANJAWEED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002727

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV MOPS SU
SUBJECT: MINAWI THREATENS TO MOBILIZE AGAINST JANJAWEED


Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: SLM leader and Senior Assistant to the
President Minni Minawi has reached an apex of frustration
with the Sudanese government's inaction on implementation of
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and obvious attempts to foil
his efforts to engage non-signatories. Of immediate concern
is his reported threat to take action if Janjaweed attacks
against villages and other militia attacks against his forces
are not stopped. Mid-level Minawi officials have claimed
that he has given the government an ultimatum to stop the use
of Janjaweed or face Minawi's authorization for his
commanders to mobilize their forces against the militia. End
Summary.

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Minawi's Return Met with Increased Military Operations
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2. (C) Minawi's attempt to take his message to the people of
Darfur between November 6-10 was overshadowed by increased
government military operations and the mobilization of
Janjaweed militia, which he reportedly believes was
orchestrated to counter his efforts to gain momentum for DPA
implementation. At the conclusion of his tour, Minawi warned
the government that if it did not move to implement portions
of the DPA within 60 days, he would quit the government and
return to Darfur.


3. (C) Minawi has continued to engage DPA non-signatories,
and on November 13, his military delegation returned from
successful negotiations with commanders of the G-19 and
SLM-Unity. The agreement created a unified SLA command of
SLM-M, G-19, and SLM-Unity. They pledged to 1) a cessation
of hostilities and maintenance of their present positions; 2)
allow humanitarian assistance, international NGOs, and
commercial convoys safe passage through their areas of
control; 3) allow freedom of expression for all parties; 4)
work together to achieve unity of effort; 5) refrain from
using the agreement for political or media gain; and 6)
appoint a chairman to head a committee for implementation of
the agreement.


4. (C) Minawi informed the government, African Union (AU),
and UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) of the agreement and
requested the government postpone offensive operations in the
area of Birmaza. Government forces attacked Birmaza and
participants of the agreement within 24 hours. (Note: There
has been no substantive response from AU or UNMIS field
headquarters regarding the agreement, and AU representatives
in Khartoum are unaware of its existence as of November 22.
End note.)

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Minawi Threatens to Mobilize against the Janjaweed
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5. (C) With the government's extensive use of Janjaweed
elements and other aligned militia against the population
over the past week, Minawi has since warned the government
that he will authorize his commanders to mobilize against
Janjaweed forces and other militias if the government does
not restrain them and stop the attacks on the population. He
has moved with his senior advisors to Dar el Salaam to
convene commanders and discuss their options.


6. (C) He has reportedly threatened to move his heavy
artillery out of Abu Gamra to Birmaza to reinforce G-19 and
SLM-Unity forces against the Janjaweed. (Note: Minawi's
possession of heavy artillery was confirmed by an UNMIS
representative in El Fasher, who said that Minawi claims to
have taken the equipment from the Sudanese Armed Forces prior
to the DPA. End note.) Last week, elements of his forces
moved south to reinforce units in Muhajeriya against
potential renewed SLM/Free Will attacks. On November 20,
local commanders were authorized to counterattack Arab
militia that attacked farmers in Haskanita, who had taken up
arms against nomads grazing herds in their fields.

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Comment
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7. (C) Though information is sketchy and has not come
directly from Minawi or his senior advisors, the recent lull
in fighting in Birmaza and Jebel Marra over the last two days
may indicate the government takes his warning seriously.
Embassy officers are attempting to reach more senior advisors
or Minawi himself to clarify his intent and expected timing

KHARTOUM 00002727 002 OF 002


of decisions. While we do not believe Minawi will move
rapidly to fulfill this warning, he will not stand idly for
long in the face of continuing Janjaweed attacks against the
population of Darfur. Even if he would delay considerably,
his commanders may not. End comment.
HUME