CDA MEETING WITH MINISTER OF CABINET AFFAIRS DENG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002698 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO CVIS ASEC AU SU US UN SUBJECT: CDA MEETING WITH MINISTER OF CABINET AFFAIRS DENG ALOR REF: STATE 187659 Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- -------------- Deng Alor: Exploring Addis Statement of Principles -------------- -------------- ¶1. (C) On November 18, CDA Hume met with Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor at Deng's request. Deng wanted to discuss peace-keeping in Darfur and the statement of principles recently concluded in Addis Ababa. He said that the international media had presented the agreement as including all three phases, with the suggestion that on November 24 the African Union Peace and Security Council would be in a position to act. Deng was uncertain that this interpretation was true, especially regarding the composition and role of the &hybrid8 force to be deployed in the third phase. -------------- CDA: Clear GNU Signal Needed on Phase II -------------- ¶2. (C) Hume said that the United States had welcomed the agreement in Addis. It was positive to have an agreement on immediate steps and to implement them quickly, even if some issues had not been fully resolved. President Bashir and UN SYG Annan had agreement in September on the light package for phase one, but so far Sudan had refused to implement that agreement, even failing to issue visas for any of the 100 personnel the UN was expected to provide for the AU operation in Darfur. Despite this lack of action, both sides affirmed their agreement to phase one. ¶3. (C) Regarding phase two, it appeared that the Sudanese delegation had accepted phase two, even if its elements broke new ground in terms of deploying UN personnel to Darfur. In the view of the CDA, effective deployments required a full commitment of the Sudanese Armed Forces to a cease-fire, a condition that did not presently exist. Therefore, for the Sudanese agreement to phase two to be credible, an authoritative commitment had to be made by President Bashir. Such a commitment was needed urgently so that the AU Peace and Security Council meeting on November 24 could act positively on the Addis agreement. ¶4. (C) Regarding the hybrid force, two issues remained outstanding, with an assumption that consultations this week involving the UN, the AU, and Sudan could resolve them. However, the issues were difficult. The current AU force numbered about 5,000, and the force commander wanted to double its size. The UN proposed a force of 17,000. The Government of Sudan, which had so far failed to issue even one of the 100 visas needed for phase one, had yet to speak clearly on this point. At the minimum for the Addis agreement to hold, the parties would need a deployment schedule that would cover at least the next six months, permitting planning and preparation. The second issue outstanding appeared to be command and control/unity of command, on which the UN insisted. The USG position was consistent with UN SCR 1706: 17,000 troops and UN command. -------------- -- Deng Alor: VP Taha Active, but Bashir to Decide -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Deng said that Vice President Taha had become active on these issues, consulting with Deng, Presidential Adviser Mustafa Osman Ismail, NCP Vice Chairman Ibrahim Ahmad Umar, and others. The decisions, however, were made by President Bashir personally. For example, one way to deal with the command and control issue would be to give Bashir a role in selection of the commander, even if the UN retained control. -------------- CDA: Visa Restrictions Hamper Development Aid -------------- ¶6. (C) CDA Hume raised with Deng the need for the Sudanese government to reverse its visa restrictions on UN officials and citizens, as instructed reftel. He emphasized that the Government of Southern Sudan had a strong interest in fixing this problem, which would soon impact upon USG assistance programs. When Deng asked why USG officials and contractors did not simply enter at Juba without official visas, Hume explained that the answer was to fix the problem, not to violate Sudanese government laws, putting officials and contractors at personal risk. Deng said he would see Taha KHARTOUM 00002698 002 OF 002 later in the day and raise this matter with him. -------------- Deng: Restrictions to be Lifted -------------- ¶7. (U) On November 19, Deng called CDA Hume to inform him that, at the request of Foreign Minister Lam Akol, President Bashir had agreed to lift the 25-mile restriction and had signed a decree to that effect. HUME