PERHAPS A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002669

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR THE SECRETARY, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AND
IO A/S SILVERBERG
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSA HADLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: PERHAPS A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY ON DARFUR

REF: KHARTOUM 02664

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Six months after the conclusion of the
Darfur Peace Agreement, perhaps there is a moment of
opportunity to re-launch implementation of its important
security provisions. The new AMIS force commander has
provided needed leadership and challenged the international
community to support immediate deployment of two additional
battalions. Commanders loyal to groups that did not sign the
Darfur Peace Agreement are finally signaling a willingness to
meet to discuss how to move forward on questions of
leadership and policy. Minni Minawi, the one insurgent who
signed the agreement and now badly needs non-military
supplies for his troops, still maintains the support of his
senior commanders. And, President Bashir's new envoy for
Darfur peace implementation has stated a desire to resolve
differences over peace-keeping in Darfur. See para 9 for
recommendations. End Summary.

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Reasons for Derailment
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2. (C) The Darfur peace process went off track for three
reasons. First, the African Union peace-keeping force
(AMIS),inadequate for the tasks of maintaining the
cease-fire and protecting civilians, failed to implement the
security provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).
Second, only one of the three insurgent groups engaged in the
negotiations signed the DPA, and the other two have since
stoked political and armed opposition to the DPA. Third,
Sudan's President Bashir turned away from international
cooperation as a way to address the problems of Darfur and
endorsed a unilateral plan of action based on a military
offensive to confront the two non-signatory insurgent groups.
He subsequently rejected UN Security Council Resolution 1706
as a way to secure implementation of the DPA.

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Moment of Opportunity
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3. (C) Current circumstances present a moment of opportunity
in which to reverse these negative trends. The new AMIS
commander, Nigerian Major General Aprezi, is providing much
needed leadership. At this week's meeting of the Joint
Commission in Addis Ababa, he secured agreement to fix the
cease-fire mechanism, which had been ineffective for the last
six months. Aprezi also appealed for support to strengthen
AMIS, including an immediate deployment of two additional
battalions to the most dangerous hot spots in Darfur, one to
Geraida in South Darfur and the second to Tawila in North
Darfur. In Geraida, there is intense inter-ethnic rivalry
pitting the forces of SLA/Minawi against Massalit tribesmen;
in Tawila the clashes are between Janjaweed and Fur
inhabitants. Additional forces in these two areas are indeed
required urgently.

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Support for AMIS
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4. (C) Resolution 1706 calls for a strengthening of AMIS
forces in an interim period before actual transition to a UN
force. The addition of these two battalions would be
consistent -- indeed required -- as a prelude to a UN
mission. A public pledge by the United States to provide
immediately the logistic support needed for these two
battalions would have several positive effects: backing up
the new Force Commander's determination to protect civilians;
moving assets into place for eventual transition to a UN
peace-keeping force; providing important political support
for implementation of the security provisions of the DPA;
and, strengthening the overall U.S. diplomatic effort to
address the Darfur crisis in all its aspects.
Recommendation: Authorize an immediate pledge by the USG to
provide the support needed to deploy these two battalions.

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Support for Conference of Non-Signatories
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5. (C) Since May 5, when the SLM,s Abdel Wahid and JEM,s
Khalil Ibrahim refused to sign the DPA, the challenge
presented by non-signatories has grown worse. The newly

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formed National Redemption Front (led by JEM and armed by
Chad) has stepped up military attacks in North Darfur. Abdel
Wahid is isolated politically and, until recently, lived in
exile for months in Asmara. Efforts to convene the
non-signatories in a conference have proliferated (Asmara?
Cairo? Tripoli? Southern Sudan? Darfur?),without any
single idea gaining majority support. Now many of the
non-signatory commanders in Darfur, principally those who had
broken away from either Abdel Wahid or Minni Minawi, have
signaled a desire to meet in Darfur to discuss issues of
leadership and policy (septel). Although such a meeting
should not be expected to resolve all problems presented by
the non-signatories, it could reverse the current slide
toward anarchy in the Fur and other local ethnic groups and
should be an important first step toward generating support
for the DPA. A majority of non-signatory commanders have
expressed a willingness to meet as early as November 20, if
arrangements can be made. Recommendation: Immediately
guarantee the modest sum of money needed from the USG to
enable the commanders to hold their conference ($50,000).

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Support for Minni Minawi
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6. (C) The position of Minni Minawi, the one insurgent leader
who did sign the DPA, is at risk. So far his senior
commanders have remained loyal, but the number of his
supporters is shrinking. A collapse of Minawi,s position
would make it impossible to revive the Darfur peace process
and would lead inevitably to further violence. Overall, the
most important support for Minawi would be the implementation
of the DPA, including its security, power-sharing, and
wealth-sharing provisions. Immediately, however, he needs
supplies to compensate for the supplies he previously secured
through fighting. Recommendation: Immediately make
available funds to provide alternative non-military supplies
for SLM/Minawi.

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Phased Approach to UN Force
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7. (C) Finally, we have an opportunity to push forward toward
implementation of Resolution 1706. Mustafa Ismail, President
Bashir,s new envoy for Darfur, and former Minister for
Foreign Affairs, has told CDA Hume (reftel) that he would
welcome early bilateral talks to resolve differences over
peace-keeping in Darfur and promised flexibility in the
Sudanese position. Secretary General Annan and President
Bashir have already agreed to (but not yet implemented) a
light package of measures to strengthen AMIS. Annan is now
going to AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to present an interim
proposal for a &phased approach8 that would involve a
further package of UN measures to strengthen AMIS. While
Annan,s proposal falls far short of full implementation of
1706, it would begin the process of implementing that
resolution. Most important, it would provide early support
to increase the ability of AMIS to protect civilians and to
implement the security provisions of the DPA.
Recommendation: Give overall support to the &phased
approach,8 while insisting strongly on necessary
modifications (e.g., guaranteeing unity of command).


8. (C) The crisis in Darfur is profound and complex. These
four steps will not solve it. However, taken together, they
can launch a reversal of the negative trends that have
plagued the Darfur peace process since May 5: lack of
capacity of the AU peace-keeping force, lack of support in
Darfur for the DPA, and Sudan,s insistence on national
solutions for problems that can only be solved with the help
of the international community. Current trends, if left
unchecked, will produce increased risk of anarchy, threats to
the civilian population, and collapse of the DPA. These
steps, if taken quickly and resolutely, can open a new
dynamic for U.S. diplomatic efforts, fully consistent with
eventual full implementation of 1706.

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Recommendations
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9. (C) The following measures are recommended: a) Authorize
a pledge by the USG to provide immediate support for AMIS to
deploy two additional battalions; b) Guarantee up to $50,000
as USG support for a commanders, conference in Darfur; c)
provide funds to make available non-military supplies to

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SLM/Minawi; and, d) Give overall support to a &phased
approach8 toward transition to UN peace-keeping in Darfur,
while insisting strongly on necessary modifications.
HUME