PERHAPS A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002669 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR THE SECRETARY, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AND IO A/S SILVERBERG WHITE HOUSE FOR NSA HADLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV AU UN US SU SUBJECT: PERHAPS A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY ON DARFUR REF: KHARTOUM 02664 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Six months after the conclusion of the Darfur Peace Agreement, perhaps there is a moment of opportunity to re-launch implementation of its important security provisions. The new AMIS force commander has provided needed leadership and challenged the international community to support immediate deployment of two additional battalions. Commanders loyal to groups that did not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement are finally signaling a willingness to meet to discuss how to move forward on questions of leadership and policy. Minni Minawi, the one insurgent who signed the agreement and now badly needs non-military supplies for his troops, still maintains the support of his senior commanders. And, President Bashir's new envoy for Darfur peace implementation has stated a desire to resolve differences over peace-keeping in Darfur. See para 9 for recommendations. End Summary. -------------- Reasons for Derailment -------------- ¶2. (C) The Darfur peace process went off track for three reasons. First, the African Union peace-keeping force (AMIS),inadequate for the tasks of maintaining the cease-fire and protecting civilians, failed to implement the security provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Second, only one of the three insurgent groups engaged in the negotiations signed the DPA, and the other two have since stoked political and armed opposition to the DPA. Third, Sudan's President Bashir turned away from international cooperation as a way to address the problems of Darfur and endorsed a unilateral plan of action based on a military offensive to confront the two non-signatory insurgent groups. He subsequently rejected UN Security Council Resolution 1706 as a way to secure implementation of the DPA. -------------- Moment of Opportunity -------------- ¶3. (C) Current circumstances present a moment of opportunity in which to reverse these negative trends. The new AMIS commander, Nigerian Major General Aprezi, is providing much needed leadership. At this week's meeting of the Joint Commission in Addis Ababa, he secured agreement to fix the �00A;cease-fire mechanism, which had been ineffective for the last six months. Aprezi also appealed for support to strengthen AMIS, including an immediate deployment of two additional battalions to the most dangerous hot spots in Darfur, one to Geraida in South Darfur and the second to Tawila in North Darfur. In Geraida, there is intense inter-ethnic rivalry pitting the forces of SLA/Minawi against Massalit tribesmen; in Tawila the clashes are between Janjaweed and Fur inhabitants. Additional forces in these two areas are indeed required urgently. -------------- Support for AMIS -------------- ¶4. (C) Resolution 1706 calls for a strengthening of AMIS forces in an interim period before actual transition to a UN force. The addition of these two battalions would be consistent -- indeed required -- as a prelude to a UN mission. A public pledge by the United States to provide immediately the logistic support needed for these two battalions would have several positive effects: backing up the new Force Commander's determination to protect civilians; moving assets into place for eventual transition to a UN peace-keeping force; providing important political support for implementation of the security provisions of the DPA; and, strengthening the overall U.S. diplomatic effort to address the Darfur crisis in all its aspects. Recommendation: Authorize an immediate pledge by the USG to provide the support needed to deploy these two battalions. -------------- Support for Conference of Non-Signatories -------------- ¶5. (C) Since May 5, when the SLM,s Abdel Wahid and JEM,s Khalil Ibrahim refused to sign the DPA, the challenge presented by non-signatories has grown worse. The newly KHARTOUM 00002669 002 OF 003 formed National Redemption Front (led by JEM and armed by Chad) has stepped up military attacks in North Darfur. Abdel Wahid is isolated politically and, until recently, lived in exile for months in Asmara. Efforts to convene the non-signatories in a conference have proliferated (Asmara? Cairo? Tripoli? Southern Sudan? Darfur?),without any single idea gaining majority support. Now many of the non-signatory commanders in Darfur, principally those who had broken away from either Abdel Wahid or Minni Minawi, have signaled a desire to meet in Darfur to discuss issues of leadership and policy (septel). Although such a meeting should not be expected to resolve all problems presented by the non-signatories, it could reverse the current slide toward anarchy in the Fur and other local ethnic groups and should be an important first step toward generating support for the DPA. A majority of non-signatory commanders have expressed a willingness to meet as early as November 20, if arrangements can be made. Recommendation: Immediately guarantee the modest sum of money needed from the USG to enable the commanders to hold their conference ($50,000). -------------- Support for Minni Minawi -------------- ¶6. (C) The position of Minni Minawi, the one insurgent leader who did sign the DPA, is at risk. So far his senior commanders have remained loyal, but the number of his supporters is shrinking. A collapse of Minawi,s position would make it impossible to revive the Darfur peace process and would lead inevitably to further violence. Overall, the most important support for Minawi would be the implementation of the DPA, including its security, power-sharing, and wealth-sharing provisions. Immediately, however, he needs supplies to compensate for the supplies he previously secured through fighting. Recommendation: Immediately make available funds to provide alternative non-military supplies for SLM/Minawi. -------------- Phased Approach to UN Force -------------- ¶7. (C) Finally, we have an opportunity to push forward toward implementation of Resolution 1706. Mustafa Ismail, President Bashir,s new envoy for Darfur, and former Minister for Foreign Affairs, has told CDA Hume (reftel) that he would welcome early bilateral talks to resolve differences over peace-keeping in Darfur and promised flexibility in the Sudanese position. Secretary General Annan and President Bashir have already agreed to (but not yet implemented) a light package of measures to strengthen AMIS. Annan is now going to AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to present an interim proposal for a &phased approach8 that would involve a further package of UN measures to strengthen AMIS. While Annan,s proposal falls far short of full implementation of 1706, it would begin the process of implementing that resolution. Most important, it would provide early support to increase the ability of AMIS to protect civilians and to implement the security provisions of the DPA. Recommendation: Give overall support to the &phased approach,8 while insisting strongly on necessary modifications (e.g., guaranteeing unity of command). ¶8. (C) The crisis in Darfur is profound and complex. These four steps will not solve it. However, taken together, they can launch a reversal of the negative trends that have plagued the Darfur peace process since May 5: lack of capacity of the AU peace-keeping force, lack of support in Darfur for the DPA, and Sudan,s insistence on national solutions for problems that can only be solved with the help of the international community. Current trends, if left unchecked, will produce increased risk of anarchy, threats to the civilian population, and collapse of the DPA. These steps, if taken quickly and resolutely, can open a new dynamic for U.S. diplomatic efforts, fully consistent with eventual full implementation of 1706. -------------- Recommendations -------------- ¶9. (C) The following measures are recommended: a) Authorize a pledge by the USG to provide immediate support for AMIS to deploy two additional battalions; b) Guarantee up to $50,000 as USG support for a commanders, conference in Darfur; c) provide funds to make available non-military supplies to KHARTOUM 00002669 003 OF 003 SLM/Minawi; and, d) Give overall support to a &phased approach8 toward transition to UN peace-keeping in Darfur, while insisting strongly on necessary modifications. HUME