MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER MUSTAFA ISMAIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002664

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PHUM AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER MUSTAFA ISMAIL

REF: KHARTOUM 02045

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

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CDA Hume, Adviser Mustafa Discuss Bilateral Relationship
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1. (C) On November 13, CDA Hume met at his request with
Presidential Adviser Mustafa Ismail, who has recently been
named to take the lead on Sudan,s contacts to resolve the
issue of Darfur. At the outset of the meeting, Mustafa
commented that this week he had reminded government
colleagues that the recent success of the Democratic Party in
U.S. elections could make managing relations with the U.S.,
already tense, even more difficult. Presidents Bush and
Bashir, despite many problems, had worked together to create
a North/South peace. CDA Hume replied that despite past
success, the failure to work out an agreement for UN
peacekeeping in Darfur was putting the relationship under
great stress.

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Mustafa: Gov't Wary of U.S. Intentions, Use of UN PKO
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2. (C) Mustafa said that what his colleagues in government,
although they spoke in public in opposition to UN
peace-keeping, in fact feared was U.S. intentions and how the
U.S. would try to use UN peace-keepers to weaken Khartoum.
Mustafa regretted that he had not been able to meet with
Special Envoy Natsios during his recent visit to Khartoum,
but he knew from colleagues that the meetings had gone well.
He said that, if he had been able to meet with Natsios in
Qatar at the outset of the trip, he would have been able to
arrange a subsequent meeting for Natsios with President
Bashir.

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Mustafa Recalls 6-Month, 4-Point Interim Plan for Darfur
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3. (C) Mustafa said that it should be possible to work out an
agreement over peacekeeping in Darfur. He recalled that in
August he had suggested to A/S Frazer (reftel) that the two
sides consider a four-point plan as the basis for managing
the situation for an interim period of six months: 1) freeze
the situation in the Security Council to allow for back-room
negotiation; 2) explore increasing the AMIS force with
addition of troops from Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, and
Algeria; 3) mandate the Sudanese Armed Forces to protect
humanitarian convoys; and, 4) support implementation of the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with Minawi as head of the
Darfur Transitional Authority. If, at the end of six months
the AU force supported by the UN was still not up to the
challenge, then Sudan could enter negotiations aimed at
turning the whole operation over to the UN. Mustafa said
President Bashir had agreed to this position.

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CDA Hume: UNSCR 1706 Defines USG Position
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4. (C) CDA Hume said that the USG position was defined by
UNSCR 1706. The U.S. priorities were providing protection
for civilians, implementing the security provisions of the
(DPA),and protecting humanitarian operations. It judged
that the operation defined by 1706 was adequate to perform
those tasks. Future discussions to resolve the issue should
take place within the context of UNSCR 1706, even if it might
not be possible in the first instance to secure full
implementation of that resolution. Hume mentioned several
aspects of particular importance to the USG, such as
arrangements for UN financing of the force, unity of command,
adequate logistic support, and a clear line of authority that
ran to the Secretary General and the Security Council.

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Mustaf Advises of Opportunities for SE Natsios Meeting
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5. (C) Mustafa said he thought all these issues could be
worked out, specifically in the context of a six-month
arrangement based on UN support for AMIS. Returning to the
question of a possible meeting with SE Natsios, Mustafa said
that he had previously committed himself to attend a meeting
in London November 15-16, and then would be in Paris November
17-19, followed by Cairo November 20-22, and he would be glad
to meet with Natsios during this trip. Due to his prior
commitment, the Government of Sudan had decided that FM Lam

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Akol would attend the consultation between the AU and the UN
in Addis Ababa. (Note: CDA Hume provided Mustafa with
contact information for A/S Frazer and SE Natsios. End note.)
HUME