MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER MUSTAFA ISMAIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002664 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PHUM AU UN US SU SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER MUSTAFA ISMAIL REF: KHARTOUM 02045 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- -------------- CDA Hume, Adviser Mustafa Discuss Bilateral Relationship -------------- -------------- ¶1. (C) On November 13, CDA Hume met at his request with Presidential Adviser Mustafa Ismail, who has recently been named to take the lead on Sudan,s contacts to resolve the issue of Darfur. At the outset of the meeting, Mustafa commented that this week he had reminded government colleagues that the recent success of the Democratic Party in U.S. elections could make managing relations with the U.S., already tense, even more difficult. Presidents Bush and Bashir, despite many problems, had worked together to create a North/South peace. CDA Hume replied that despite past success, the failure to work out an agreement for UN peacekeeping in Darfur was putting the relationship under great stress. -------------- -------------- Mustafa: Gov't Wary of U.S. Intentions, Use of UN PKO -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Mustafa said that what his colleagues in government, although they spoke in public in opposition to UN peace-keeping, in fact feared was U.S. intentions and how the U.S. would try to use UN peace-keepers to weaken Khartoum. Mustafa regretted that he had not been able to meet with Special Envoy Natsios during his recent visit to Khartoum, but he knew from colleagues that the meetings had gone well. He said that, if he had been able to meet with Natsios in Qatar at the outset of the trip, he would have been able to arrange a subsequent meeting for Natsios with President Bashir. -------------- -------------- Mustafa Recalls 6-Month, 4-Point Interim Plan for Darfur -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Mustafa said that it should be possible to work out an agreement over peacekeeping in Darfur. He recalled that in August he had suggested to A/S Frazer (reftel) that the two sides consider a four-point plan as the basis for managing the situation for an interim period of six months: 1) freeze the situation in the Security Council to allow for back-room negotiation; 2) explore increasing the AMIS force with addition of troops from Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria; 3) mandate the Sudanese Armed Forces to protect humanitarian convoys; and, 4) support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with Minawi as head of the Darfur Transitional Authority. If, at the end of six months the AU force supported by the UN was still not up to the challenge, then Sudan could enter negotiations aimed at turning the whole operation over to the UN. Mustafa said President Bashir had agreed to this position. -------------- CDA Hume: UNSCR 1706 Defines USG Position -------------- ¶4. (C) CDA Hume said that the USG position was defined by UNSCR 1706. The U.S. priorities were providing protection for civilians, implementing the security provisions of the (DPA),and protecting humanitarian operations. It judged that the operation defined by 1706 was adequate to perform those tasks. Future discussions to resolve the issue should take place within the context of UNSCR 1706, even if it might not be possible in the first instance to secure full implementation of that resolution. Hume mentioned several aspects of particular importance to the USG, such as arrangements for UN financing of the force, unity of command, adequate logistic support, and a clear line of authority that ran to the Secretary General and the Security Council. -------------- -------------- Mustaf Advises of Opportunities for SE Natsios Meeting -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Mustafa said he thought all these issues could be worked out, specifically in the context of a six-month arrangement based on UN support for AMIS. Returning to the question of a possible meeting with SE Natsios, Mustafa said that he had previously committed himself to attend a meeting in London November 15-16, and then would be in Paris November 17-19, followed by Cairo November 20-22, and he would be glad to meet with Natsios during this trip. Due to his prior commitment, the Government of Sudan had decided that FM Lam KHARTOUM 00002664 002 OF 002 Akol would attend the consultation between the AU and the UN in Addis Ababa. (Note: CDA Hume provided Mustafa with contact information for A/S Frazer and SE Natsios. End note.) HUME