MINAWI ON THE EVE OF HIS DARFUR TRIP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002631

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UN CD ER
SUBJECT: MINAWI ON THE EVE OF HIS DARFUR TRIP


Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: In a November 5 meeting with Sr. Security
Advisor, SLM leader Minni Minawi approached his upcoming trip
to Darfur practically, intent on taking his message directly
to the people, but understanding he had little to offer at
this stage. He expects the Government to throw some
obstacles and possibly some &surprises8 at him during the
trip, but has insisted on six NCP ministers accompanying him
to provide a little extra insurance/safety. Minawi will also
take the opportunity to talk to various commanders and
leaders repeating his three key points -- stopping the
fighting to improve humanitarian access and Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) implementation, solving Sudan-Chad
interference in each other's affairs, and establishing a
Darfur dialogue for reconciliation. He continues to reach
out to all non-signatory commanders and leaders, leaving many
key positions from the DPA open to negotiation. End Summary.


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MINAWI'S TRAVEL OBJECTIVES
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2. (S) Minawi's official trip is for just four days, two in
Nyala, and one each in El Geneina and El Fasher. He will
meet key leaders and talk to the local population in a series
of gatherings/rallies in stadiums and several IDP camps. At
the end of the official trip, he plans to visit select
locations such as Muhajeria and Sheiria in South Darfur, and
several northern Darfur districts. He briefed the National
Assembly members from the three states of Darfur on November
5 concerning his trip and his messages; as well, he held an
open forum to hear their issues. He may also attempt to meet
with several non-signatory commanders in the North.

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Lacking Empowerment
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3. (S) Minawi, however, complained that he had little to
provide in the way of incentives to rebel commanders, their
forces, or the people of Darfur. Without resources, he
cannot cement reconciliation efforts, show DPA benefits, or
provide incentives to non-signatory commanders. He indicated
he is holding three DPA commissions open as well as a
minister position, a vice governor position, and some
state/national legislation appointments for possible
non-signatory leaders. (Note: The Government agreed and
published decrees on November 5 appointing Abdelgaber Dousa
Chairman of the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund,
Adam Abdelrahman Mohamad as Chairman of the Land Commission,
and Mustafa Mohamad Ahmed (SLM-M Secretary General Terab) as
a state minister.)


4. (S) Minawi and the Government are still negotiating on the
Chairman for the Darfur Security Arrangements and Integration
Commission. He reiterated that he was still waiting to hear
if the USG would provide a security specialist to the
Security Adviser Team (SAT) before he pressed forward with
the Government on SAT arrangements. The Government has also
pressed him to begin ex-combatant integration into the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),but Minawi continues to demand
that Janjaweed disarmament must progress before integration
begins. In that regard he is disappointed that the
international community has not spoken out more forcefully on
the recent Janjaweed attacks in Jebel Moon and the lack of
international demand for the Government to implement DPA
provisions that call for the restriction, disarmament, and
demobilization of any Janjaweed/armed militia that conducted
offensive operations after the May 2006 signing. He also
indicated that President Bashir denied any SAF involvement in
the attack and claimed they were rogue militia when Minawi
pressed for action.


5. (S) Minawi indicated that Ali Traio is accompanying First
Vice President and President of the Government of Southern
Sudan (GoSS) Salva Kiir to Juba to seek SPLM funding. He
stated that Salva Kiir supports provision of funding, but
complained thatPQkQC[+od time to press the SPLM directly with Salva Kiir.

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CONTINUED NON-SIGNATORY ENGAGEMENT
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6. (S) Minawi stated that he had spent hours on the phone
with various non-signatory commanders and leaders, to include
Khalil Ibrahim. He is doubtful that Eritrea would allow
either Ahmed Abdul Shafi or Abdel Wahid to travel, but is
willing to meet with either or both of them if they departed
Eritrea, although he half-jokingly hinted that given Wahid,s
propensity to change his mind, he should probably have a
commitment from Wahid before he left Eritrea. He continues
to be supportive of a non-signatory commanders, conference,
but is leery of either Suleiman Jamoush or Dr. Mudawi,s
participation. (Note: Minawi stated that Suleiman had
requested his assistance for travel outside of Sudan,
possibly to the United States. He indicated that both
National Intelligence and Security Services Director Salah
Gosh and Presidential Advisor Magzoub al-Khalifa concur with
his travel, but President Bashir held him accountable as a
key leader involved with the National Redemption Front (NRF)
and was adamantly opposed to allowing Jamoush to depart
Sudan. End note.)


7. (S) Minawi also indicated that he had another delegation
traveling to the North to see G-19 and other non-signatory
commanders. He has directed the delegation not to press for
the commanders to rejoin him, but persuade them to stop the
fighting and facilitate humanitarian assistance. He is
willing for them to rejoin him, and will negotiate with the
Government on its behalf to meet additional demands to
supplement the DPA. Minawi is not optimistic that either
Osman Bushara or Jar al Nabi would join him. However, he
cautiously is positive that both Adam Bakheit and Siddiq
Burra could return to his forces. Both were disenchanted
with expatriate leaders, the JEM, and other personally
motivated leaders such as Suleiman Jamoush.

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Comment
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8. (C) Minawi claims and appears to be engaged fully with the
Government, Darfur leaders, and DPA non-signatories, and he
is proceeding with his Darfur trip to engage a broader
element of its population. He insists that he is pressing
back against Government efforts to make him irrelevant or to
accept funds in exchange for supporting Government actions
counter to the SLM-M positions. Minni has stepped up to ask
for specific portfolios, such as lead for non-signatory
engagement and Chadian opposition negotiations -* so far to
no avail. He claims to have gotten assurances from two of
the three (the exception being Mohamad Nouri) main Chadian
opposition leaders in Sudan to open negotiations with
President Deby. He is holding DPA positions open against the
wishes of some of his key advisors in order to entice
non-signatories to join the DPA. However, unless Minni can
be empowered in some way in the near future, he has only two
choices, join the Government or return to fighting. Neither
would benefit the people of Darfur. End comment.
POWERS