MINAWI ON THE EVE OF HIS DARFUR TRIP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002631 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UN CD ER SUBJECT: MINAWI ON THE EVE OF HIS DARFUR TRIP Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In a November 5 meeting with Sr. Security Advisor, SLM leader Minni Minawi approached his upcoming trip to Darfur practically, intent on taking his message directly to the people, but understanding he had little to offer at this stage. He expects the Government to throw some obstacles and possibly some &surprises8 at him during the trip, but has insisted on six NCP ministers accompanying him to provide a little extra insurance/safety. Minawi will also take the opportunity to talk to various commanders and leaders repeating his three key points -- stopping the fighting to improve humanitarian access and Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation, solving Sudan-Chad interference in each other's affairs, and establishing a Darfur dialogue for reconciliation. He continues to reach out to all non-signatory commanders and leaders, leaving many key positions from the DPA open to negotiation. End Summary. -------------- MINAWI'S TRAVEL OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. (S) Minawi's official trip is for just four days, two in Nyala, and one each in El Geneina and El Fasher. He will meet key leaders and talk to the local population in a series of gatherings/rallies in stadiums and several IDP camps. At the end of the official trip, he plans to visit select locations such as Muhajeria and Sheiria in South Darfur, and several northern Darfur districts. He briefed the National Assembly members from the three states of Darfur on November 5 concerning his trip and his messages; as well, he held an open forum to hear their issues. He may also attempt to meet with several non-signatory commanders in the North. -------------- Lacking Empowerment -------------- ¶3. (S) Minawi, however, complained that he had little to provide in the way of incentives to rebel commanders, their forces, or the people of Darfur. Without resources, he cannot cement reconciliation efforts, show DPA benefits, or provide incentives to non-signatory commanders. He indicated he is holding three DPA commissions open as well as a minister position, a vice governor position, and some state/national legislation appointments for possible non-signatory leaders. (Note: The Government agreed and published decrees on November 5 appointing Abdelgaber Dousa Chairman of the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, Adam Abdelrahman Mohamad as Chairman of the Land Commission, and Mustafa Mohamad Ahmed (SLM-M Secretary General Terab) as a state minister.) ¶4. (S) Minawi and the Government are still negotiating on the Chairman for the Darfur Security Arrangements and Integration Commission. He reiterated that he was still waiting to hear if the USG would provide a security specialist to the Security Adviser Team (SAT) before he pressed forward with the Government on SAT arrangements. The Government has also pressed him to begin ex-combatant integration into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),but Minawi continues to demand that Janjaweed disarmament must progress before integration begins. In that regard he is disappointed that the international community has not spoken out more forcefully on the recent Janjaweed attacks in Jebel Moon and the lack of international demand for the Government to implement DPA provisions that call for the restriction, disarmament, and demobilization of any Janjaweed/armed militia that conducted offensive operations after the May 2006 signing. He also indicated that President Bashir denied any SAF involvement in the attack and claimed they were rogue militia when Minawi pressed for action. ¶5. (S) Minawi indicated that Ali Traio is accompanying First Vice President and President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Salva Kiir to Juba to seek SPLM funding. He stated that Salva Kiir supports provision of funding, but complained thatPQkQC[+od time to press the SPLM directly with Salva Kiir. -------------- CONTINUED NON-SIGNATORY ENGAGEMENT -------------- KHARTOUM 00002631 002 OF 002 ¶6. (S) Minawi stated that he had spent hours on the phone with various non-signatory commanders and leaders, to include Khalil Ibrahim. He is doubtful that Eritrea would allow either Ahmed Abdul Shafi or Abdel Wahid to travel, but is willing to meet with either or both of them if they departed Eritrea, although he half-jokingly hinted that given Wahid,s propensity to change his mind, he should probably have a commitment from Wahid before he left Eritrea. He continues to be supportive of a non-signatory commanders, conference, but is leery of either Suleiman Jamoush or Dr. Mudawi,s participation. (Note: Minawi stated that Suleiman had requested his assistance for travel outside of Sudan, possibly to the United States. He indicated that both National Intelligence and Security Services Director Salah Gosh and Presidential Advisor Magzoub al-Khalifa concur with his travel, but President Bashir held him accountable as a key leader involved with the National Redemption Front (NRF) and was adamantly opposed to allowing Jamoush to depart Sudan. End note.) ¶7. (S) Minawi also indicated that he had another delegation traveling to the North to see G-19 and other non-signatory commanders. He has directed the delegation not to press for the commanders to rejoin him, but persuade them to stop the fighting and facilitate humanitarian assistance. He is willing for them to rejoin him, and will negotiate with the Government on its behalf to meet additional demands to supplement the DPA. Minawi is not optimistic that either Osman Bushara or Jar al Nabi would join him. However, he cautiously is positive that both Adam Bakheit and Siddiq Burra could return to his forces. Both were disenchanted with expatriate leaders, the JEM, and other personally motivated leaders such as Suleiman Jamoush. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Minawi claims and appears to be engaged fully with the Government, Darfur leaders, and DPA non-signatories, and he is proceeding with his Darfur trip to engage a broader element of its population. He insists that he is pressing back against Government efforts to make him irrelevant or to accept funds in exchange for supporting Government actions counter to the SLM-M positions. Minni has stepped up to ask for specific portfolios, such as lead for non-signatory engagement and Chadian opposition negotiations -* so far to no avail. He claims to have gotten assurances from two of the three (the exception being Mohamad Nouri) main Chadian opposition leaders in Sudan to open negotiations with President Deby. He is holding DPA positions open against the wishes of some of his key advisors in order to entice non-signatories to join the DPA. However, unless Minni can be empowered in some way in the near future, he has only two choices, join the Government or return to fighting. Neither would benefit the people of Darfur. End comment. POWERS