Darfur: Text of Wali Kibir Interview

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002626 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KPKO PHUM PREF SU SUBJECT: Darfur: Text of Wali Kibir Interview ¶1. (SBU) On November 5, the Sudan Vision daily published an interview of North Darfur State Wali (governor) Sayed Osman Yousif Kibir. In the interview, Wali Kibir reiterated the importance of the Darfur Peace Agreement, which he states does not need to be re-opened but rather supplemented to bring on board additional rebel groups. He also discusses the expansion of the North Darfur State cabinet and legislative assembly to incorporate additional members in keeping with the DPA. Kibir, regrettably, downplays the significance of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process and the extent of violence that continues in North Darfur. He regards the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their home villages as being delayed for political reasons, and accuses the UN and its member agencies of being used as a tool by others. Finally, he finds favor with continued African Union efforts to address the security situation in Darfur, rather than a more international effort. ¶2. (U) The text of the interview is as follows: (Begin text) Interviewed by: Nasr Addeen Al Tahir and Mona Al Bashir of Sudan Vision Daily Situations in Darfur are being focused on presently by, all local, regional and international circles. Much talk is consequently circulated about this issue in the form of rumours by circles who have their own agenda and interests. To get information about the Darfur situation from Darfur itself, Sudan Vision had to interview some personalities who are directly in contact with the real situations in Darfur. One of these was North Darfur State Governor, Sayed Osman Yousif Kibir. We related hereunder our interview with him. Q: Mr. Osman Yousif Kibir, Governor of North Darfur State let us begin by discussing progress on implementation of the DPA and the steps taken so far. A: First let me state that the Abuja agreement was the best available option at the time as failure of the Abuja 7 talks would have undoubtedly meant a return to war. The Abuja agreement is solid which is not to say perfect as it needs complementation in our view. Opinion regarding the DPA can be divided into three main categories: full support, reservation, and objection. This tended to create an atmosphere of disruption and rumors with each of the three groups propagating those rumors and allegations which best served their interests. This has been addressed through an extensive informative campaign to clarify the terms of the agreement. A number of relevant decisions have been made and a higher implementation committee and several technical subcommittees have been formed including a committee for summarizing the contents of the 115-page long agreement of which about a thousand copies have been distributed. A state-wide tour was conducted with the aim of enlightening and winning support for the agreement which created a degree of stability and security in all regions with very few exceptions namely in regions which are exposed to attack by the Redemption Front. We can safely assert that significant progress has been made security-wise and that overall the agreement is steadily moving ahead. Q: You stated that the agreement needs complementing, which aspects do you recognize as deficient and what are your proposals? A: For the sake of accuracy and in order to avoid misunderstanding, let me clearly state that we do not believe that the agreement needs reconsideration. Some appendices have to be made to accommodate non-signing factions. Q: Has contact been made with these non-signatories? A: The truth of the matter is that we presently have a delegation engaged in discussions with these factions and I personally make contact with their representatives several times a day. Several civil administration delegations have conferred with these factions on more than one occasion and we can confidently state that there are common grounds and understanding which may well lead to positive outcomes. Q: In relation to Al Fashir state constitution, has it been passed and have amendments been made to accommodate the SLM share in power? A: This has been accomplished very early on and required amendments were forwarded to and approved by the National Constitutional Committee. We are now ready to fully implement the agreement which has been incorporated into the National Constitution. The number of state ministries has been amended to (10) ministries and Legislative Assembly membership was expanded from 71 to 73 members. Q: We would like a practical rebuttal of the talk circulating with KHARTOUM 00002626 002 OF 003 regard to the sluggish implementation of the agreement and claims of deteriorating security within the state. A: Technically speaking and in relation to timetables specified by the agreement, there is a delay in implementation. This delay was intended to provide an opportunity to those who have not signed to reconsider their position and to allow for needed readjustments and accommodations. We are proceeding slowly but surely. Q: What are the steps following the formation of the transitional authority? A: As state authorities, we have no role in this aspect. Some posts have to be filled by both sides and this will be supervised by the implementing committee. Q: Will some ministers be required to leave office? A: No. According to the state constitution, there are eight ministries which are currently fully staffed. The agreement provided for the creation of two additional ministries to be administered by the signing armed movements raising the total to 10 ministries. Q: How will positions within these two ministries be distributed especially with regard to non-SLM Abuja supporters? A: I am not part of the distribution committee but these positions have been set aside for all movements. Distribution and labeling of these posts and positions will be left up to the signing movements. Q: How do you perceive the relationship between the transitional and state governments? A: According to the agreement, the nature of this relationship is one of coordination. The agreement provides for full administrative, financial and executive autonomy to the states which implies transcendence of the state government. Q: How are preparations proceeding for the Darfur-Darfur dialogue? A: So far we have participation on the state federal level but we have not yet been assigned a definite role on the state level. Q: Some observers cite that Darfur-Darfur dialogue needs a lot of work to achieve the desired results, what are your comments on that? A: My personal opinion is that Darfur-Darfur dialogue as addressed by the agreement is of no particularly great significance. Its primary function seems to be limited to making suggestions relating to the membership within the state council. With regard to the issue of peaceful coexistence and patching up of the social fabric, several reconciliatory conferences have been held with excellent results. In my view the entire Darfur-Darfur dialogue issue needs re-evaluation and preparation to define specific goals and mandates and the extent to which outcomes and recommendations are binding to all parties. Q: Returning to the humanitarian and security issues how would you evaluate the current situation in North Darfur state? A: This is an extremely important question because resolution 1706 and the accompanying uproar are predicated upon the assumption that the security situation is in fact highly deteriorated. I can assert unequivocally that the situation is far from that which has been depicted and I challenge anyone who would claim otherwise. It is true that some problematic issues remain but in comparison to 2003-2006 the situation has improved remarkably. We have detailed statistics of crimes including armed robbery, murder, rape and automobile theft which indicate a vast difference between 2004 and 2006. If the international community is bent on intervening it should have done so in 2004 when total criminal incidents reached 3,500 as opposed to only 350 from January 1st - September 30th of this year. There was a time when you could hear artillery on the top of every ten minutes in Al Fashir. I defy anyone who would claim deterioration with respect to the humanitarian situation. There have been reports issued by seven UN organizations which placed the figure of deaths due to malnutrition at one for every ten thousand per day. The UNICEF has officially stated that 88% of refugees in the camps of North Darfur receive full daily nutrition while 79% have access to clean drinking water and 80% receiving comprehensive medical care. No incident of epidemic outbreak has occurred within the heavily populated camps since 2004. All camps offer free school instructions and the state bears the cost of education, nutrition and health care. KHARTOUM 00002626 003 OF 003 Q: In spite of this resettlement is proceeding rather slowly, how do you justify that? A: Politically motivated migration is the reason behind this and the camps are sure to be full as long as this is in practice. A considerable number of rebel elements have infiltrated the camps in order to sabotage any effort to develop positive dialogue. Some villages are not adequately secured or ready to accommodate return. Some are awaiting restitution in the manner of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour while others are pinning hopes on resolution 1706 to topple the regime. Q: What becomes of the positive reports presented by UN organizations seeing that the UN officially claims that circumstances are deteriorating? A: I can state briefly that the UN and its organizations had become a tool used by some to achieve certain objectives. There are what may be described as pre-packaged conceptions and decisions imposed upon and endorsed by the UN. As Governor of North Darfur State, I have received approximately 440 delegations since 2004. This included visits by five heads of State, over 20 foreign ministers, 2 visits by the UN Secretary General and previous and current U.S. Secretaries of State. Each has come for their separate agendas, SIPDIS initially proclaiming inculpability only to assume a position of condemnation upon leaving Khartoum airport. The whole issue amounts to escalation in order to achieve a certain agenda. Q: Let us talk about the African Union and the role it is expected to play following extension of its mandate. A: I am of the belief that at one point the AU has exacerbated the situation through its unclear position. Nevertheless our insistence is that its participation does not compromise national sovereignty or autonomy. The AU mission can yield positive results with proper logistic and financial support. Secondly we as Africans are more comfortable with the AU assuming this mission. I am not particularly pleased with the foreign experts who will be coming from abroad as it seems only to be a prelude for further intervention. (End text) POWERS