Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2616
2006-11-05 14:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DPA NON-SIGNATORY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE PLANNING

Tags:  PGOV PREL SU UN CD ER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9886
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2616/01 3091412
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051412Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5132
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002616 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UN CD ER
SUBJECT: DPA NON-SIGNATORY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE PLANNING

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02434

B. KHARTOUM 02479

C. KHARTOUM 02525

D. KHARTOUM 02538

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002616

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UN CD ER
SUBJECT: DPA NON-SIGNATORY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE PLANNING

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02434

B. KHARTOUM 02479

C. KHARTOUM 02525

D. KHARTOUM 02538

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: The development of an organizational
conference for Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory
commanders is moving forward slowly and fitfully.
Development of a conference is hindered by numerous field
commanders touting separate efforts with vague objectives and
disjointed coordination. Given the paucity of NGOs with the
right experience and no hidden political agendas, the African
Union (AU) must weigh in with immediate support. The AU
needs funding and personnel resources to ensure success and
may need additional prodding. The support of the
international community in conjunction with the AU must shift
out of Khartoum to Darfur, where direct communication with
the commanders will facilitate organization. End summary.

-------------- --------------
Hidden Agendas in Non-Signatory Conference Proposals
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Two separate delegations from Abdul Shafi supporters
are reported to be in negotiations with various SLA
non-signatory commanders. A delegation reportedly is in
Jebel Marra to discuss a conference proposal with Abdel Wahid
commanders and another is in the vicinity of Birmaza in North
Darfur to negotiate with G-19 and SLM Unity commanders.
Abdul Shafi is seeking travel papers to depart Asmara
November 8 to Darfur via Nairobi. Commanders Osman Bushara,
Suleiman Marjan, and Adam Bakhiet all profess to be leading
efforts for a conference in North Darfur. Minni Minawi
continues to hold discussions with all key non-signatory
leaders. The Government continues efforts to splinter
non-signatories and sign on individual groups, the most
recent attempt reportedly a JEM faction in Nyala. Meanwhile,
the Government has reportedly endorsed an effort by Asmara to
coax non-signatories back to the negotiating table.


3. (C) Momentum for a conference continues to grow as G-19

and other former SLM/A-Minawi commanders that joined the
National Redemption Front (NRF) are concerned that they are
losing leverage with further splintering of factions and
becoming increasingly more suspicious of the JEM,s strategy
and motivations. Several of these commanders have told our
international partners that they should be identified as SLM
forces, not NRF elements. But there is no agreement among
these commanders on where unity of non-signatory commanders
leads. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Sulieman Jamoush
wants to leave UN protection at Kadugli to rejoin this group
with the intent of gaining leadership and tightening their
relationship with the JEM.


4. (S) Several commanders have cautioned that Abdul Shafi
continues to organize a conference with the intention of
ousting Abdel Wahid. Minawi confirmed that Abdel Wahid has
told him that joining the NRF was a tactical move, that his
differences with JEM are too wide to bridge. Wahid
reportedly has indicated he is willing to make a deal with
Minawi if he could find a way to leave Eritrea. Khalil
Ibrahim has declined an invitation to Asmara as not timely,
but also reportedly because his travel papers are held by
France. We have also heard that Chad has declined to
participate in the Asmara conference. Both may have an
insight into Sudan,s real agenda in backing a conference
that purports to reopen discussions with the DPA Declaration
of Principles and a solidification of all non-signatory
commanders under the NRF umbrella. The international
partners group formed to support a conference (Gang of Five)
consensus is that President Bashir,s inner circle supports
the Asmara conference to add another layer of confusion to
the efforts to organize and unify the non-signatories.

--------------
African Union Missing in Action
--------------


5. (C) Meanwhile, there is some support in the AU for an
effort to counter the Government's attempt to continue
splintering the non-signatories. Sam Ibok has refused
several Government requests to add small factions to the list
of declarants. However, all three senior AU political
leaders in Khartoum were absent the week of Oct. 29 ) Nov.

5. The best the AU receptionist could do was to connect
Embassy Officer to the Political Section's secretary. AU
leadership is supposed to return to Khartoum with Ambassador

KHARTOUM 00002616 002.3 OF 002


Djinnit and Abdullah Mohamad, the chair of the Darfur-Darfur
Dialogue and Consultation Preparatory Committee Nov 4-5.


6. (SBU) The Gang of Five concurs that, given the reported
political agendas of several potential NGO coordinators, the
international community should rely on the AU to lead an
effort to unify the non-signatories and bring them to the
negotiating table. The Gang also agrees that it is within
the mandate of the AU and has the potential to add a success
to the AU Plus column in Sudan. Efforts are underway to meet
with Ambassador Ibok, AU DPA Implementation Coordinator, as
soon as possible to press the initiative forward. However,
previous reporting (REF C) indicates lukewarm support for the
effort to organize a non-signatory conference. The
international community may need to press the AU into action.


-------------- --
Shifting the Gang of Five,s Effort to the Field
-------------- ---


7. (C) There is a considerable effort to engage with the
field commanders by telephone. However, absent an official
preparatory or organizational body established by the
non-signatory commanders, there are no solid logistic
requirements, no organizing body to determine participants or
objectives, and no facilitator to mitigate disagreements
between the commanders. To achieve a successful commanders'
conference in the near-term, it is imperative to get the AU
to lead the effort. It will also greatly facilitate
coordination if this effort moves to Darfur, where
face-to-face discussions can reconcile these shortcomings.


8. (SBU) The Gang of Five has agreed to provide personnel to
the AU both in Khartoum and El Fasher if the AU takes the
lead. PQQp6NQ
for follow-on preparatory meetings and a joint political
leaders, and commanders, conference facilitated by Justice
Africa.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (SBU) Momentum provided by the commanders themselves and
coordinated international efforts provide a degree of
optimism for a successful engagement effort and movement
towards additional signatories. Navigating the road to a
commanders, conference, however, is pitted with unknowns and
potential misdirection from numerous sources. Failure to
convene a conference in the near term will lead to further
fracturing of the non-signatory forces and play into the
hands of the Government. End comment.
RPOWERS