SO. SUDAN: SOUTH BLAMES NORTH FOR UPSURGE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002609

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: MOPS PGOV ASEC SOCI UG UN SU
SUBJECT: SO. SUDAN: SOUTH BLAMES NORTH FOR UPSURGE IN
VIOLENCE AROUND JUBA

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02572


B. KHARTOUM 02599

Classified By: CDA E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has
yet to produce concrete evidence that the Sudan Armed Forces
(SAF) are behind the current upsurge in violence in areas
east and south of Juba. The deployment of a brigade of Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) troops to the affected areas
is underway, but taking longer than expected. GoSS political
and military officials nevertheless continue to assert that
Khartoum is responsible for the attacks, together with the
Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and remnants of
the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF). An UNMIS convoy exchanged
fire with an armed group near Torit on October 27 (Ref A),
and the UN has suspended all travel in a large area east of
Juba. Though details are sketchy, 8-16 people appear to have
been killed in separate incidents between October 27 and 31.
SPLA deployment is expected to proceed despite the renewal of
a Cessation of Hostilities agreement with the LRA (Ref B).
End Summary.

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SAF Detainees in Custody
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2. (C) Although 15 members of the SAF remain in GOSS custody
for alleged complicity in attacks October 18 and 19 on a
village just east of Juba, the government has so far failed
to conclude its "preliminary" investigation, present the
detainees to the media, or make public the evidence against
them. GoSS President Salva Kiir publicly accused the SAF of
complicity in the attacks during remarks to his church
congregation October 22, but has been more circumspect in
subsequent statements. Two senior SPLA officials have told
us the detainees have so far provided little useful
information. UNMIS personnel who saw the detainees October
24 collected names, ranks, and identification numbers (to be
reported in IIR septel). They report that the detainees are
attached to six different battalions in the Joint Integrated
Units (JIUs),formed under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) from elements of SAF and SPLA. Within the JIUs,
however, SAF and SPLA components remain distinct. Eleven of
the 15 detainees were based in SAF JIU units in Juba. Ten
were from ethnic groups common in the general area of the
recent attacks.


3. (C) The detainees are associated with only two of the
approximately 12 incidents that have killed several dozen
people in areas near Juba over the last two weeks.
Privately, both civilian and military leadership in the south
continues to blame SAF -- particularly its military
intelligence wing -- for the upsurge in violence. Maj. Gen.
Bior Ajang told us October 31, "SAF is doing this, whether
through the LRA or the EDF." Bior admitted there had been
delays in the promised deployment of three SPLA battalions
east of Juba to respond to the attacks. He had met earlier
in the day with the first battalion, Bior said, and efforts
were underway to bring in two more. He said the new forces
would concentrate on finding the attackers and providing
security on the Juba-Torit road (linking Southern Sudan and
Kenya),the Juba-Nimule Road (linking Southern Sudan and
Uganda) and the Juba-Mongalla road (linking Juba and points
north).

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Further Incidents
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4. (C) Though details vary, UN security sources and SPLA
personnel confirm the following incidents:

-- On October 27 a six-vehicle UNMIS convoy happened upon an
ambush of a civilian vehicle by an unidentified armed group
on the Juba-Torit road, which had resulted in four fatalities
(Ref A). The convoy, headed by the UNMIS Sector One
commander, was shot at and returned fire. There were no
injuries reported in this incident;

-- On October 29 a civilian vehicle was ambushed on the
Juba-Torit road near Nisitu. Four people were killed,
including an SPLA commander. Another SPLA officer was
injured;

-- Also on October 29, there was a second incident on the
Juba-Torit road. Reports of the number of deaths in this
incident vary significantly. According to first reports
three persons were killed. A later report from a
knowledgeable UN security officer indicates eleven killed,
including several SPLA soldiers; and

KHARTOUM 00002609 002 OF 002



-- On October 31 an SPLA colonel was assassinated in downtown
Juba. He was reportedly killed by a relative, also an SPLA
officer. Both the killer and his victim were reportedly
former members of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF),a
militia now incorporated into the SPLA. The killer and an
accomplice escaped.

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UN Response
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5. (C) After the latest incidents, UN security personnel
imposed "Level 4" restrictions on a large area east and south
of Juba. Level 4 is the UN's highest threat level, an
essentially bans all travel by UN personnel. The threat
level in Juba town was raised from Level 1 to Level 2,
similar to most of the remainder of southern Sudan. Most
movement is permitted under threat Level 2, but travelers are
advised to take extra precautions. "Juba is basically safe,"
the head of UN security told ConGen. "It is the roads
outside Juba I worry about."

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LRA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
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6. (C) Despite suspicions of LRA complicity in at least some
of the recent attacks, the GOSS persevered in its efforts to
mediate peace talks between the LRA and the Government of
Uganda (GoU). On November 1 (Ref B),all parties signed a
renewed and modified Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The
agreement requires the LRA to reassemble at two locations,
including a site at Owiny-Kibul, east of the Nile and close
to the Sudan-Uganda border. SPLA sources said their planned
increased deployment east of Juba would continue, and that
they would take action against anyone thought to be
responsible for the attacks, despite the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement.

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Comment
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7. (C) The GoSS may be stalling in producing evidence against
detained SAF personnel because the evidence is not
persuasive, or because the GoSS "preliminary" investigation
is truly still underway, or because the GoSS is not prepared
to deal with the consequences of publicly accusing its CPA
partner of complicity in the recent violence. Military
intelligence operatives in the SAF, however, have a long and
unsavory history of supporting anti-SPLA militia, including
the LRA and the EDF. A full accounting of who is responsible
for the violence around Juba may never be possible. Southern
suspicions, however, are focused squarely on Khartoum. End
Comment.
EWHITAKER