SO. SUDAN: SOUTH BLAMES NORTH FOR UPSURGE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002609 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 TAGS: MOPS PGOV ASEC SOCI UG UN SU SUBJECT: SO. SUDAN: SOUTH BLAMES NORTH FOR UPSURGE IN VIOLENCE AROUND JUBA REF: A. KHARTOUM 02572 ¶B. KHARTOUM 02599 Classified By: CDA E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has yet to produce concrete evidence that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are behind the current upsurge in violence in areas east and south of Juba. The deployment of a brigade of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) troops to the affected areas is underway, but taking longer than expected. GoSS political and military officials nevertheless continue to assert that Khartoum is responsible for the attacks, together with the Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and remnants of the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF). An UNMIS convoy exchanged fire with an armed group near Torit on October 27 (Ref A), and the UN has suspended all travel in a large area east of Juba. Though details are sketchy, 8-16 people appear to have been killed in separate incidents between October 27 and 31. SPLA deployment is expected to proceed despite the renewal of a Cessation of Hostilities agreement with the LRA (Ref B). End Summary. -------------- SAF Detainees in Custody -------------- ¶2. (C) Although 15 members of the SAF remain in GOSS custody for alleged complicity in attacks October 18 and 19 on a village just east of Juba, the government has so far failed to conclude its "preliminary" investigation, present the detainees to the media, or make public the evidence against them. GoSS President Salva Kiir publicly accused the SAF of complicity in the attacks during remarks to his church congregation October 22, but has been more circumspect in subsequent statements. Two senior SPLA officials have told us the detainees have so far provided little useful information. UNMIS personnel who saw the detainees October 24 collected names, ranks, and identification numbers (to be reported in IIR septel). They report that the detainees are attached to six different battalions in the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs),formed under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) from elements of SAF and SPLA. Within the JIUs, however, SAF and SPLA components remain distinct. Eleven of the 15 detainees were based in SAF JIU units in Juba. Ten were from ethnic groups common in the general area of the recent attacks. ¶3. (C) The detainees are associated with only two of the approximately 12 incidents that have killed several dozen people in areas near Juba over the last two weeks. Privately, both civilian and military leadership in the south continues to blame SAF -- particularly its military intelligence wing -- for the upsurge in violence. Maj. Gen. Bior Ajang told us October 31, "SAF is doing this, whether through the LRA or the EDF." Bior admitted there had been delays in the promised deployment of three SPLA battalions east of Juba to respond to the attacks. He had met earlier in the day with the first battalion, Bior said, and efforts were underway to bring in two more. He said the new forces would concentrate on finding the attackers and providing security on the Juba-Torit road (linking Southern Sudan and Kenya),the Juba-Nimule Road (linking Southern Sudan and Uganda) and the Juba-Mongalla road (linking Juba and points north). -------------- Further Incidents -------------- ¶4. (C) Though details vary, UN security sources and SPLA personnel confirm the following incidents: -- On October 27 a six-vehicle UNMIS convoy happened upon an ambush of a civilian vehicle by an unidentified armed group on the Juba-Torit road, which had resulted in four fatalities (Ref A). The convoy, headed by the UNMIS Sector One commander, was shot at and returned fire. There were no injuries reported in this incident; -- On October 29 a civilian vehicle was ambushed on the Juba-Torit road near Nisitu. Four people were killed, including an SPLA commander. Another SPLA officer was injured; -- Also on October 29, there was a second incident on the Juba-Torit road. Reports of the number of deaths in this incident vary significantly. According to first reports three persons were killed. A later report from a knowledgeable UN security officer indicates eleven killed, including several SPLA soldiers; and KHARTOUM 00002609 002 OF 002 -- On October 31 an SPLA colonel was assassinated in downtown Juba. He was reportedly killed by a relative, also an SPLA officer. Both the killer and his victim were reportedly former members of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF),a militia now incorporated into the SPLA. The killer and an accomplice escaped. -------------- UN Response -------------- ¶5. (C) After the latest incidents, UN security personnel imposed "Level 4" restrictions on a large area east and south of Juba. Level 4 is the UN's highest threat level, an essentially bans all travel by UN personnel. The threat level in Juba town was raised from Level 1 to Level 2, similar to most of the remainder of southern Sudan. Most movement is permitted under threat Level 2, but travelers are advised to take extra precautions. "Juba is basically safe," the head of UN security told ConGen. "It is the roads outside Juba I worry about." -------------- LRA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement -------------- ¶6. (C) Despite suspicions of LRA complicity in at least some of the recent attacks, the GOSS persevered in its efforts to mediate peace talks between the LRA and the Government of Uganda (GoU). On November 1 (Ref B),all parties signed a renewed and modified Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The agreement requires the LRA to reassemble at two locations, including a site at Owiny-Kibul, east of the Nile and close to the Sudan-Uganda border. SPLA sources said their planned increased deployment east of Juba would continue, and that they would take action against anyone thought to be responsible for the attacks, despite the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The GoSS may be stalling in producing evidence against detained SAF personnel because the evidence is not persuasive, or because the GoSS "preliminary" investigation is truly still underway, or because the GoSS is not prepared to deal with the consequences of publicly accusing its CPA partner of complicity in the recent violence. Military intelligence operatives in the SAF, however, have a long and unsavory history of supporting anti-SPLA militia, including the LRA and the EDF. A full accounting of who is responsible for the violence around Juba may never be possible. Southern suspicions, however, are focused squarely on Khartoum. End Comment. EWHITAKER