SE NATSIOS MEETING WITH SALAH GHOSH: WILLINGNESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002531 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S AF FRAZER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER SU UN SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS MEETING WITH SALAH GHOSH: WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE BUT NO TO UN FORCE Classified By: A/Pol Chief M. Honigstein, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, Sudanese intelligence chief Salah Ghosh said that the Sudanese government would never accept a UN force but was willing to work with the USG to find a solution to the Darfur crisis. He indicated that such discussions could include enhancing the size of an African Union (AU) force, altering the force's composition, and accepting advisors and logistical support from the UN and Western countries. Ghosh also suggested a coordinated approach to engage the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, stabilize security in the internally displaced persons camps through community policing, and resolve inter-tribal conflicts in South Darfur as a basis for peace in other parts of the region. In an effort to underline his willingness to negotiate with the USG, Ghosh granted SE Natsios permission to travel to Southern Sudan and to Darfur, which had been revoked on the previous day. END SUMMARY -------------- SUDAN FRUSTRATED BUT CAN COOPERATE -------------- ¶2. (C) During an October 16 meeting with SE Natsios, Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh restated the Sudanese government's opposition to UN intervention in Darfur. Ghosh expressed his government's frustration at the slow progress made to normalize bilateral relations despite Sudanese cooperation on counter-terrorism and its signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the DPA and said that some now called it a "funny joke." However, Ghosh emphasized that the American and Sudanese governments have been able to resolve issues when they have worked together. "We need to focus on solving this issue rather than fighting over UN forces," he said. -------------- NO UN, BUT STRONGER AU -------------- ¶3. (C) Though he said the Sudanese government would never accept UN force intervention, he noted his government's willingness to discuss options for strengthening the AU force in Darfur. Denying that troops from South Asia would be more capable than those from Africa, he said the Sudanese government would be willing to accept forces from Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and other African countries. He also stated that the force's size could be doubled and that there would be no restrictions on outside advisors or the source of equipment, "even from NATO." ¶4. (C) SE Natsios said the UN's experience in peacekeeping and disarmament, particularly among troops from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, surpassed that of African countries such as Algeria and Egypt, which have rarely if ever participated in such operations. He also emphasized that the use of Western troops had not been proposed and that the West was focused on the humanitarian situation in Sudan, not on obtaining oil or military bases. "A peaceful, stable, and just Sudan is in the interests of the US," he said. After SE Natsios explained the utility of the UN's automatic financing mechanism for an international force, Ghosh re-iterated that direct UN intervention was impossible and said that financing was the USG's "problem." -------------- DIALOGUE WITH NON-SIGNATORIES -------------- ¶5. (C) Ghosh highlighted Sudanese efforts to garner support for the DPA from the non-signatories, saying that he had personally traveled to Tripoli and Eritrea on several occasions for talks. "We are not convinced that the problems of Darfur will be solved militarily, but we need to keep a military balance to get people to come to a political discussion...We are running after them (the non-signatories)." Ghosh said that there was room for dialogue with the non-signatories, that a coordinated approach with the USG would be helpful, and that his government was meeting with them in Jebel Marra to develop an annex to the DPA. Ghosh criticized Chadian support for rebel groups and indicated that it was exploiting tribal divisions along the border. He also noted that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was focused on overthrowing the Sudanese government and that it was "a waste of time" to negotiate with them. "The JEM needs to be restrained around KHARTOUM 00002531 002 OF 002 the world," he said, suggesting that the JEM could be isolated through dialogue with other rebel groups. -------------- BASIS FOR PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN -------------- ¶6. (C) Ghosh explained that South Darfur, home to 60 percent of the region's population, could serve as the basis for peace in other parts of Darfur. He said that inter-tribal conflicts in the area could be addressed and that there has already been some reconciliation between tribes. He also showed a willingness to strengthen the cease-fire mechanism in cooperation with the USG and suggested that a community police force could be established from the local population to increase security. He said that the American and Sudanese governments could establish a joint technical team to discuss this issue. -------------- WARNING ON VIOLENCE -------------- ¶7. (C) As a gesture of his willingness to negotiate with the USG, Ghosh announced that SE Natsios could travel to Juba and to Darfur as previously planned, despite the Sudanese government's October 15 decision to deny him permission to travel. SE Natsios said that Ghosh's pragmatism was constructive but emphasized that the Sudanese government must prevent any action that would exacerbate the tense security situation in Darfur. He warned Ghosh that a massacre of civilians in the region, either by the Sudanese military or by rebel groups, would elicit a "severe" response in the U.S. ¶8. (C) NOTE: In a subsequent conversation with Embassy staff, Ghosh said that he felt the meeting was extremely positive and represented the first step to finding a way forward on the Darfur crisis. He planned to brief President Omer Bashir, First Vice President Salva Kiir, and Foreign Minister Lam Akol on the discussion within days. END NOTE ¶9. (U) Special Envoy Natsios cleared this cable. POWERS