DARFUR: ARAB FACTIONALIZATION, INCREASING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002483

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/SE
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: ARAB FACTIONALIZATION, INCREASING
INSECURITY, LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF DPA


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In meetings September 21-24, UN officers, Sudanese
Liberation Movement (SLM) Minni Minawi representatives, and
Government of National Unity (GNU) officials in West Darfur
all highlighted continued insecurity, a lack of humanitarian
access and an absence of information about the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) throughout the state. National Intelligence
and Security Service,s (NISS) tight grip and the paucity of
civil society groups in West Darfur remain impediments to DPA
outreach. However, there is private interest among community
leaders in learning more about the accord. End summary.

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ARAB DISCONTENT AND FACTIONAL MILITIAS
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2. (C) Active Response Corps (ARC) Officer met with UN
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) officials in El
Geneina, capital of West Darfur state, to discuss security
developments and their impact on political and humanitarian
activities. UNDSS noted that, unlike North and South Darfur,
Government forces controls &more than ninety percent8 of
West Darfur, with the exception of small pockets of
rebel-controlled territory in Jebel Moon and west of Masteri.
The principal actors undermining stability in West Darfur
are Arab militia and Chadian opposition groups. UNDSS
related that in early 2006 conversations with Musa Hilal, the
Janjaweed leader conveyed his frustration with the Government
for having &sold out8 Arab tribes. Hilal argued that Arabs
were given no land or compensation for their losses incurred
during the fighting in Darfur. Furthermore, the Government
made no provision to officially reintegrate Arab tribes into
the security services while, at the same time, committing to
disarm the Janjaweed. According to UNDSS, Hilal was incensed
that there was no Arab representation at the Abuja
negotiations, which further exacerbated his frustration with
the government.

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INCREASING INSECURITY
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3. (C) UNDSS estimated that Hilal,s influence over Arab
tribes in the region had diminished since the signing of the
DPA. The emerging security picture is one of greater Arab
factionalization, especially among youth, who are
increasingly engaged in banditry, carjackings, and targeting
of NGOs. UNDSS described the environment as a major security
challenge, given the lack of cohesion among Arab groups and
the proliferation of self-professed militia &leaders.8
Despite Government claims of security primacy in West Darfur,
UNDSS noted that nearly all roads in the state are classified
as &no go8 for the humanitarian community because of the
likelihood of banditry or other hostile activity; many of
these roads are also off-limits for the Sudanese police and
armed forces. Additionally, UNDSS observed that many Arab
groups contend that NGOs are legitimate targets because the
delivery of humanitarian assistance has conspicuously and
deliberately neglected the Arab community.

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LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OR SUPPORT FOR DPA IN WEST DARFUR
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4. (C) UNMIS Civil Affairs and Human Rights Officers
explained that there is little public support for the DPA in
West Darfur, though there also exists a clear lack of
knowledge regarding the accord. As in other parts of Darfur,
popular discontent with the DPA stems principally from
second-hand information provided by non-signatory groups,
rather than substantive objections to the document. UNMIS
Head of Office Annamaria Laurini noted that they had already
organized workshops to explain the DPA to UN agencies and
AMIS, and were seeking to have similar events with local NGO
staff before possibly branching out to a wider audience. She
added that many community leaders, in private, conveyed a
strong interest in learning more about the DPA, but feared
public backlash. ARC Officer described efforts underway to
publicize the DPA and inform the population, in a neutral
manner, about details of the agreement. ARC Officer further
provided DPA outreach documents (produced by the UK strategic
communications team) for background, and initiated
coordination with the UK team to lay the foundation for the

KHARTOUM 00002483 002 OF 002


DPA public information campaign among select groups in West
Darfur.


5. (C) Understanding and dissemination of the DPA are
complicated by the firm grip of National Security in West
Darfur and the reluctance of many humanitarian organizations
to engage on &political8 issues. Several UN officers
remarked on the particularly forceful control exerted by
National Security in West Darfur. They highlighted the
paucity of civil society organizations that might act as
vehicles to promote or explain the DPA, and underscored the
concern of many NGOs that introducing the DPA in IDP camps or
other politically sensitive areas might further polarize the
local population. (Note: UNMIS Human Rights officers
recounted that in early September, a local Masalit imam who
spoke out in favor of UN peacekeepers was detained for
several days by Sudanese Armed Forces military intelligence,
provoking consternation among many citizens in El Geneina.
End Note.)


6. (C) Notwithstanding skeptical popular sentiment toward the
DPA, Laurini held that JEM elements in Jebel Moon are willing
to participate in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
(DDDC) and are actively pushing for peace with the
Government. She suggested that creating a buffer zone, to be
monitored by AMIS, around Jebel Moon would be a useful first
step in diffusing tensions, though she also acknowledged that
the AMIS decision to eject non-signatory representatives from
the sector sub-Ceasefire Commissions (sub-CFC) had hardened
the negotiating environment. (Note: The JEM element in
Jebel Moon has little military capacity and has been weakened
by defections. In early August, local media reported that
Deputy JEM military commander Gardi Abdallah Abuna and
thirteen other field commanders declared their support for
the DPA and sought general amnesty from the Government, which
was supposedly granted by the Wali of West Darfur Jaffar
Abdel Hakim Ishag. End Note.)

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COMMENT
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7. (C) In separate conversations with ARC Officer, UN and
local officials described the Government dismantlement of the
Arab hierarchy in West Darfur, which contributed to
deteriorating regional security. Seven Arab emirs that
controlled large swathes of West Darfur and previously
answered directly to Hilal, were replaced by &jihad emirs8
installed by the Government. With lines of authority broken,
the pre-existing Arab hierarchy began to disintegrate into a
patchwork of &warlords and armed Arab bandits.8 African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and UN security reports have
repeatedly documented the sustained presence of Arab militia
and their attacks on the local populace and NGOs in West
Darfur. For example, UNDSS reported on September 20 that
Popular Defense Forces (PDF) ) generally considered as a
Janjaweed surrogate and targeted for reform under the DPA )
organized a pro-Government rally near Zalingei University to
demonstrate their military capacity and whip up anti-UN
sentiment.


8. (C) The political and security landscape in West Darfur
differs in significant ways from the two other Darfur states,
therefore requiring tailored policy and programmatic
approaches. The international community might consider
additional means of enhancing DPA awareness in West Darfur by
pushing the UK media team to invigorate activities in the
region and through modest funding of civil society groups
(Darfur Forum has representatives in El Geneina) to promote
local reconciliation and education about the peace agreement.
Additionally, there is an SLM/Minawi office in El Geneina
(details reported septel) that could play a role in
advocating the DPA, though the office is in dire need of
logistical support (computers, supplies, etc.),which the
international community could consider supplying as a means
of demonstrating tangible and rapid support to build
SLM/Minawi capacity. End summary.
HUME